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In my PhD thesis I analyze corporate governance issues of initial public oﬀerings
and their subsequent performance. The thesis consists of three chapters: Chapter 1
“Managerial Incentive Explanation of Equity Carve-outs Initial Returns”, Chapter 2
“Are Incentive Stock Options Signaling Better Corporate Governance? - An Evidence
from Equity Carve-outs” and Chapter 3 “Short Selling and the Subsequent Performance
of Initial Public Oﬀerings”.
In the first two chapters of the thesis I focus on one type of initial public oﬀerings
called equity carve-outs and earnings management behavior of the managers as a com-
mon principal-agent problem at the IPOs. An equity carve-out is a type of corporate
reorganization in which a conglomerate is selling one of its divisions to the public. As a
part of the reorganization the division (middle-level) managers become CEOs of a pub-
licly listed company. Compensation contracts of the subsidiary managers are revised in
order to incorporate subsidiary share prices and profits as measure of performance. New
contracts are becoming more eﬃcient. Often incentive stock options granted on the IPO
date are part of the revised contracts. Those options usually have an exercise (strike)
price equal to the IPO oﬀer price (IPO options in the rest of the text) with payoﬀ equal
to max (0, St - Oﬀer Price). I hypothesize that subsidiary managers who received such
incentive stock options don’t have an incentive to push up the oﬀering price of the IPO
because it will decrease their future payoﬀ. At the other side, subsidiary managers who
don’t have IPO options (have only shares) in their new contracts have an incentive to
window dress the company before going public by using more aggressive accounting
techniques in order to pump-up the performance around the IPO.
The core of my data set in both chapters is a hand-collected information about
incentive stock option grants to division managers on the IPO date (IPO options) from
the prospectuses of the initial public oﬀerings (filing type S-1 in EDGAR database) .
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When this information was not available in the prospectuses then I hand-collected it
from the proxy statements (filing type DEF 14A in EDGAR database) in the year of
the IPO.
Chapter 1 “Managerial Incentive Explanation of Equity Carve-outs Initial
Returns” examines the hypothesis that managers select accruals at the time around
the IPO opportunistically depending on their compensation packages. In this chapter
the focus is on the first-day return of the carve-outs and I show that it is explained by
the reporting distortions in the pre-IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives
and directors of the subsidiary received IPO options (with exercise price is equal to the
IPO oﬀer price).
In absence of IPO options, accruals in the year before the issue are negative predic-
tors in the cross-sectional variation of the first-day returns. In presence of IPO options
this relationship is reversed and becomes positive: this is especially pronounced in cases
where non-employee directors received such compensation packages.
I find that managers incentivized by IPO options are using less aggressive accounting
techniques in the years around the IPO. Their reported earnings are more realistic
compared to the other subsample of managers that did not receive such option grants.
I conclude that incentive stock options are good governance mechanism to decrease
opportunistic reporting by the managers in the years around the IPO.
The predictive power of the accruals on future returns and its direction diﬀer depend-
ing on the executive compensation packages, suggesting that management intentionally
manipulate earnings.
This finding contribute to the vast literature of earnings management. I show that
predictive power of accruals diﬀers depending on the executives compensation packages.
This is an indirect proof that earnings are managed intentionally by the management.
Accruals as a measure of earnings management and as predictor of future returns should
be seen trough lens of the executives and how they are incentivized. My findings are
potentially useful for investors and regulators. Investors are concerned about whether
they are trading at the fair initial price and at which direction earnings management
aﬀects the short-term return. Accounting and financial regulators must be concerned
about the informativeness of the accounting numbers and how accurately accounting
information communicates firm performance to capital markets.
Chapter 2 “Are Incentive Stock Options Signaling Better Corporate Gov-
ernance? - An Evidence from Equity Carve-outs” focuses on the long-run per-
formance of equity carve-outs conditioned on whether the executives received incentive
iv
stock options on the IPO date. Carve-outs that did not grant incentive stock options
subsequently underperform both relative to the overall market and relative to a sample
of carve-outs that granted stock options. The stock returns are robust to alternative
specifications of abnormal returns.
In particular, I consider the returns to a zero-investment strategy which takes a long
position in the stock of equity carve-outs that granted IPO options and short position
in carve-outs that did not grant IPO options. I show that the alpha of following this
strategy for three years (using value-weighted or equal-wighted returns) is positive in a
four factor time-series return regression.
Further, I show that accruals in years around the IPO explain the cross-sectional
variation of the long-run stock market and accounting underperformance. Contrarily,
carve-outs that grant incentive stock options to their executives at the IPO date do not
underperform appropriate benchmarks over three-year period following the IPO and
use less aggressive accounting around the IPO.
The result in this chapter points out that incentive stock options are signaling better
corporate governance to the market that result in better long-run stock market and
accounting performance. There is distortion in behavior induced by the compensation
packages of the executives and it does aﬀect ultimate firm performance. Incentive stock
options are good governance mechanism to decrease opportunistic reporting by the
managers in the years around the IPO resulting in better long-run stock market and
accounting performance.
This findings are potentially useful for investors and regulators. Investors may want
to use the information on IPO options that is public before the IPO to discriminate
among issuers. Particularly, this information is very useful because for most of the
investors it is diﬃcult to detect earnings management i.e. which part of the accruals
are “normal” or unusually high for a given company given the business conditions.
IPO options by it self should signal them less managed earnings i.e. better corporate
governance. Finally, regulators must be concerned about the informativeness of the
accounting numbers and how accurately accounting information communicates firm
performance to the markets.
Chapter 3 “Short Selling and the Subsequent Performance of Initial Pub-
lic Oﬀerings” examines short sale volume on the oﬀer day of initial public oﬀerings
and their subsequent performance. IPOs are major corporate events surrounded by
much noise and pricing ineﬃciencies. I find it interesting to know whether short sellers
posses superior information about the fundamentals of IPOs relative to other investors.
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Up to my knowledge my paper is a first attempt to measure long-run performance of
IPOs conditioned on short selling activity on the first trading day. The tests provide
evidence of informed trading immediately at the IPO.
The main finding is that short sellers are well informed about the fundamental
value of IPOs. Heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day underperform both relative to
the lightly-shorted IPOs and relative to the overall market in one-year window. On
risk-adjusted basis when using calendar time-series portfolio approach, heavily-shorted
IPOs on the oﬀer day underperform lightly-shorted IPOs by an average of 9 basis
points daily (22.68% annualized return) and 1.72% monthly average (20.64% annualized
return). The stock returns are also robust to alternative specifications of abnormal
returns (CARs and BHARs).
When using accounting measures such as net income, earnings per share and ROA
I find that accounting performance declines significantly in the quarter after the IPO
for companies that were shorted the most on the first trading day.
To support the main finding of this chapter I show that short sellers are sophisticate
investors that possess information of the fundamentals of IPOs at least as informative
as the analysts. Heavily-shorted IPOs get the least favorable initiation of analysts’
recommendations that occur on average 28 trading days after the oﬀer day in my sample.
Further, I show that heavily-shorted IPOs have the highest predicted probability for
downgrade by the analysts within the first year after the IPO.
I explore which types of IPOs are subject to more short selling on the oﬀer day. I
provide evidence that short sellers are picking hot issues with high demand and high
first-day return. Heavily-shorted IPOs are overpriced on the end of the first-trading
day on average by 35% relative to their industry peers. Short sellers go against the
sentiment of the individual investors for hot issues. This result indicates that short
sellers are more sophisticated than the other investors and go against the behavioral
biases such as overoptimism that surrounds hot issues in order to make profit on longer
run.
Overall the results indicate that, on average, short sellers are sophisticated investors
that are well informed regarding the fundamental value of IPOs and important contrib-
utors to eﬃcient stock prices. The finding should encourage regulators to provide more
timely disclosure of short selling to all investors.
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Managerial Incentives Explanation of Equity
Carve-outs Initial Returns
Abstract
This paper studies the first-day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that
the first-day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting dis-
tortions in the pre-IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of
the subsidiary received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price.
In absence of IPO options, accruals in the year before the issue are negative predictors
in the cross-sectional variation of the first-day returns. In presence of IPO options this
relationship is reversed and becomes positive: this is especially pronounced in cases
where non-employee directors received such compensation packages. The predictive
power of the accruals on future returns and its direction diﬀer depending on the ex-
ecutive compensation packages, suggesting that management intentionally manipulate
earnings.
JEL classifications: M41; G24; G32; G34; J33
Keywords: Earnings management; Initial public oﬀerings; IPO underpricing; Equity carve-outs;
Executive compensation; Stock options
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1.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the first-day return of a sample of 227 equity carve-outs dur-
ing 1996-2013 with an aggregate proceeds of $69 billion that represents 11.7% of the
total IPO market (Ritter (2013) reported $591.8 billion of aggregate proceeds for the
same period). It shows that when a conglomerate sells one of its devision to the pub-
lic (carve-out), division managers of the newly issued subsidiary are choosing diﬀer-
ent income-increasing accounting policies depending on their compensation packages.
These policies influence the initial performance of the new company. In a very specific
environment when executives and directors of the subsidiary receive stock options with
an exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price (IPO options in the rest of the paper)
I show that predictive power of accruals (measure of earnings management) on the
initial return is decreasing and for higher compensation packages it reverses i.e. the
relationship becomes positive. The oﬀer price of these companies is set close to their
industry peers, as well as their initial secondary market stock price. The paper shows
that in this setting incentive stock options are good governance mechanism to decrease
opportunistic reporting by the managers in the years around the IPO. Furthermore,
this paper rise a red flag that accruals as predictors of magnitude and direction of the
future returns should be seen conditioned on the executives’ incentives suggesting that
earnings are managed intentionally by the management.
Equity carve-outs are special class of IPOs where a company decides to sell a portion
of one of its wholly owned subsidiary to the public. It is expected that those kind of
IPOs have same stylized fact (anomalies) as all other IPOs: initial underpricing con-
firmed by several studies (McDonald and Fisher (1972); Logue (1973); Ibbotson (1975);
Ritter (1984); Rock (1986); Ibbotson and Ritter (1988); Loughran and Ritter (2002);
Ritter and Welch (2002); among others) and long-run underperformance confirmed by:
Stern and Bornstein (1985); Ritter (1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995). However, Vijh
(1999) shows that newly issued subsidiary stocks beat appropriate benchmarks over a
three-year period following the carveout. This result is in striking contrast with the doc-
umented poor long-run performance of initial public oﬀerings. Positive market reaction
to an announcement of equity carve-outs is noted by Schipper and Smith (1986), while
market reaction for SEOs announcement is negative. They oﬀer a set of reasons based
on divestiture gains, and one of them is designing more eﬃcient compensation contracts
for the subsidiary’s managers. Vijh (2002) continues their work confirming that market
reacts positively to an equity carve-outs and furthermore his results support the di-
2
vestiture gains hypothesis of carve-outs discriminating asymmetric information model
proposed by Nanda (1991).
These findings lead to a conclusion that equity carve-outs have special features
among IPOs that distinguishes them from standard IPOs. To the best of my knowl-
edge, initial underpricing of equity carve-outs is rarely present in the literature. Only
Benveniste (2008) finds that the subsidiary’s first-day return is significantly related to
its parent’s return over the book-building period, but not related to its contemporane-
ous return. I find that the average first-day return in my sample of carve-outs is 17.99%
that is significantly lower than the 21.6% average first-day return of 5402 IPOs during
1990-20131 (information available on Jay Ritter’s web site).2 Aggregate money left on
the table in my sample of equity carve-outs is $9.3 billion. Ritter (1991) concludes that
investors are periodically overoptimistic about the earnings potential of new issues.
My paper explores a possible sources for less optimism noted around equity carve-
outs issues. According to the earnings management explanation of IPO anomalies
issuing firms report high earnings around the IPO by reporting abnormal accruals
aggressively, inflating the earnings. The stock market temporarily overvalues those
firms. Teoh and Wong (1998) provide evidence that in standard IPOs issuers with
unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in
the three years thereafter.
Earnings reported in the financial statements (income statement) of each public
company consist of cash flows from operations and accounting adjustments called ac-
cruals. The simplest way to think about the accruals is that they are diﬀerence between
earnings and cash flows. When this amount is positive for example, it can be a sign (not
necessarily) of artificially inflated earnings by use of “creative” legal accounting tech-
niques. Managers have certain legal discretion over the accruals. On shorter run they
can increase the accruals (leading to increased earnings), for example, by recognition
of revenues earned on credit (before cash is received), delaying recognition of expenses
(cash paid in advance), realizing unusual gains, decelerating depreciation. On longer
run all of these accounting adjustments will be reversed resulting in lower earnings.
Earnings management is certainly a sign of bad corporate governance. The bottom line
is that accounting accruals are negative predictors of the future performance: so-called
1The first-day return is even higher if I exclude the period from 1990 until 1995 in order to corre-
spond to my sample period of equity carve-outs.
2I thank Professor Ritter for making these data publicly available. See
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
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investor fixation on earnings theory documented by Sloan (1996).
In order to be able to do the manipulation companies may create earnings reserves in
pre-IPO period by using more conservative accounting techniques and report negative
accruals (by postponing the sales or accelerating the depreciation for example). They
report lower earnings than cash flows. This allow them to boost the earnings in the year
of the IPO. The bottom line is that accounting accruals in pre-IPO year can predict the
cross-sectional variation of the first-day return and due to the reversal of the accruals
that inflate the earnings in the IPO year this relationship is negative. Up to this point
the evidence doesn’t prove that managers intentionally are adjusting accruals to exploit
market credulity.
In order to disentangle and find evidence that earnings are managed intentionally
by the management I use the unique environment surrounding the equity carve-outs.
Schipper and Smith (1986) argue that carve-outs are associated with a restructuring
of managers’ responsibilities and incentives. Furthermore the incentive contracts of
subsidiary managers are revised to incorporate subsidiary share prices and profits as
measure of performance. Afterwords Aron (1991) points out that after the carveout the
stock value of the subsidiary firm is a cleaner measure of managerial productivity. She
shows that a stock-based compensation plan motivates the managers of the carved out
subsidiary to work harder and better exploit investment opportunities. My research
question is whether incentive stock options are a good governance mechanism to de-
crease opportunistic reporting by the managers. It turns out that they are, particularly
in years around the IPO.
Following Lowry and Murphy (2007) I split the sample in two groups, companies that
grant stock options to the top executives (ex-division managers) with an exercise price
set equal to the oﬀer price (I will use the name “IPO options” in future) and companies
that do not incentivize their top management in such way. Forty-five percent of the
sample (i.e. 102 companies out of 227) granted IPO options to the top management.
Lowry and Murphy (2007) look at all IPOs and their hypothesis is that if executives can
influence the IPO oﬀer price there should be a positive relationship between IPO option
grants and underpricing. They do not find evidence of a such relationship. In standard
IPOs there are two sides of the incentives story of the executives that are in striking
contrast: executives who receive IPO options will benefit from higher underpricing
(lower oﬀer price relative to the aftermarket price), but at the same time they will
lose from underpricing if they hold shares or options granted before the IPO due to
the dilution when shares are sold below the market price. In case of equity carve-outs
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IPO options give unique one-side incentive to executives to push down the oﬀer price
because their pre-IPO holdings remain in the conglomerate (not in the newly carved
out subsidiary) and they will lose less from the dilution of their previous holdings.
I predict that companies that grant options will have lower first-day return (un-
derpricing). Executives cannot exercise their options immediately on the day of the
issue, so they cannot profit from short-term performance of the company. More than
92% of the executives in the sample can exercise partially their options one year after
the issue and then gradually with diﬀerent annual percentages (with range from 10%
to 50%) in the years that follows. The findings of the paper are in the line with the
finding of Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) who show that during years of high ac-
cruals, CEOs exercise unusually large amounts of options. Executives of the carved
out companies are not allowed to exercise their IPO options around the IPO, so I pre-
dict lower accruals around the IPO. Furthermore top management of newly carved out
subsidiary typically comes from former division management of the parent company.
As mid-level executives in the parent companies (having in mind underwriters, insti-
tutional investors and parent top executives), it is unlikely that they can influence the
oﬀer price. However, they could search for a possibility to decrease the investors’ op-
timism trough less aggressive accounting (lower accruals leading to lower earnings) in
the years around the IPO compared to the managers that did not receive IPO options.
I do not find reversal of accruals in the IPO year for companies that grant IPO options
to their executives, while for companies that did not grant IPO options I find reversal
of the negative accruals in the pre-IPO period to the IPO year as a sign for earnings
management (consistent with Sloan (1996)’s pattern). In absence of IPO options I find
that accruals in the year before the issue negatively predict the first-day return. While
in presence of IPO options this relationship is reversed and becomes positive.
The first-day return is a function of both: i) the first-day market price (driven by
an individual investor) and ii) the oﬀer price (driven by underwriters, parent company
and institutional investors that are more informed compared to an individual investor).
I find that carved out companies that grant IPO options on average experience less
underpricing (16.27%) than companies that did not grant such options (19.39%). I
interpret the smaller underpricing as a function of less managed earnings in the years
around the IPO by incentivized managers. Further I find that for these companies
the initial oﬀer price is set more closely to the price of their industry peers while for
companies that did not grant options to their executives the oﬀer price overvalues the
company on average by 12% compared to their industry peers. This finding is in the line
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with the finding of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) that the median IPO was
significantly overvalued relative to industry peers. Contemporaneously, due to more
realistic reported earnings, the market optimism decreases towards the companies that
grant IPO options resulting in lower initial market price and lower first-day return.
In this unique setting of one-side incentive, I conclude that options, as part of
compensation packages, play their main role i.e. aligning the interest of agents and
investors. In this special case of IPOs interests are aligned with the parent as well.
Parent usually retains the control in the carved out subsidiary. Average shares retained
by the parent in the sample is 70%. Zingales (1995) shows that first selling a portion
of the firm’s shares to the individual investors and then selling a controlling block
to bigger more sophisticated investors maximizes the seller’s revenue. According to
this finding parent company is less interested in the short-term performance of the
subsidiary. Incentivized managers do not manage earnings around the IPO in order
to show high short-term performance, instead they have an incentive to manage the
company in such a way that the stock prices increases on longer run.
The last finding of the paper is that for companies that grant IPO options to the
outside directors statistical results are strongest. I find a direct, unconditional on
accruals, positive relationship between option grants to directors and the first-day return
suggesting that directors might have direct influence over the oﬀer price unlike the
subsidiary managers.
The main conclusion of the paper is that incentive stock options grants are good
governance mechanism to align the interests of the principals and agents in the years
around the IPO. Managers of IPO options granting carve-outs are managing less the
earnings in the years around the issue compared to managers of carve-outs that did not
grant IPO options. The finding of this paper contributes to the literature on earnings
management, initial public oﬀerings underpricing and executives compensation adding
insight on managerial incentives to manage earnings. The findings are potentially useful
for investors and regulators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and motivates
development of the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and
data. Section 4 shows the empirical relationship between the accruals and the first-day
return (and its two drivers) conditioned on IPO options grants. Section 5 provides
robustness tests to support the main findings and Section 6 concludes.
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1.2 Carve-outs underpricing and earnings management
conditioned on managerial incentives
A company may decide to partially sell a portion of one of its subsidiaries to the public
(so called equity carve-out strategy) for several reasons: raise capital, highlight a true
value of the division etc. This strategy also allows to create more eﬃcient compensa-
tion contracts for division’s managers based directly on divisional performance. Often
management’s stock option plan in a carved out subsidiary is based on the oﬀer price.
Managers who receive such options benefit from a lower oﬀer price meaning a lower
exercise price of their options. An elaborate negotiation about the oﬀer price takes
place in the period before the IPO. The underwriters and the owners of the company
engage in a discussion about the price at which the division’s stock should be sold to
the public. Demand for the new issue formed by the institutional investors also play
a role in forming the final oﬀer price. Middle level division managers cannot directly
influence the oﬀer price. They might avoid to window dress the division by using less
aggressive accounting techniques (more realistic ones) in both the pre-IPO year and at
the IPO year trying to push down the oﬀer price down as much as possible and decrease
the market optimism toward the new issue. Supporting fact is that these IPO options
cannot be exercised immediately at the day of issue (usually after one year these op-
tions became partially exercisable). Managers who receive such options would not care
much about the short-run performance of the subsidiary. This eventually decreases
the usual investor’s overoptimism towards the new issues that will negatively aﬀect the
second driver of the first-day return i.e. first-day market closing price resulting in lower
first-day return.
Greenblatt (2010)3 points out in his book “ You can be a stock market genius”:
“...don’t expect bullish pronouncements or presentations about a new carve-outs until
a price has been established for management’s incentive stock options... Sometimes a
management silence about the merits of a new carve-out may not be bad news; in some
case, it can be actually golden.” I expect that these carve-outs are less “hot” issues and
they will have negative mid-price revision as a result of decreased demand. I predict that
these companies report more realistic earnings around the IPO. No reversal of accruals
3Joel Greenblatt is an American academic, hedge fund manager, investor, and writer. He is a value
investor, and adjunct professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business. Through his
firm Gotham Capital, Greenblatt presided over an impressive annualized return of 40% from 1985 to
2006.
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from pre-IPO period is observed in the IPO year; this leads to smaller first-day return.
In contrast, carve-outs that did not incentivize their managers with IPO options
care more about the short-term performance tying to increase oﬀering proceeds and
value of their holdings in the company. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) point out that
managers have extraordinary incentives to make their firms “shine” before floating. To
use their example, consider a manager who owns 10 per cent of a firm that normally
earns $1 million and that will sell at eight times earnings when it goes public. Every
$1.000 increase in earnings before going public means another $800 for the manager.
Then it is not surprising that managers want to present the best possible figures in their
prospectuses. My predictions are that these managers who don’t own IPO options (they
usually own shares) create a reserve of earnings in the pre-IPO period by using more
conservative accounting techniques (income decreasing) that allow them to inflate the
earnings in the IPO year by reporting positive accruals aggressively. This leads to
higher first-day return i.e. negative relationship between accruals form pre-IPO period
and the first-day return.
To answer my research question whether incentive stock options are good gover-
nance mechanism to align the interests of shareholders and management and avoid one
of the principal-agent problem i.e. earnings management I use the special environment
of equity carve-outs where insiders may benefit when the company trades at more re-
alistic initial price. My main hypothesis (H1) is as follows: “Carve-outs that grant
incentive stock options (with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price) to their executives
do not manage earnings in the IPO period and they experience less initial underpricing
compared to carve-outs that did not grant such options.” Initial underpricing (first-day
return) is a function of two variables: first-day market price and oﬀer price. Both of
them influence the first-day return in diﬀerent direction. To support the main hypoth-
esis I additionally test two hypothesis regarding how earnings management influences
the two drivers of the initial return. The second hypothesis (H2) is that “Carve-outs
that grant incentive stock options (with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price) to their
executives do not manage earnings in the IPO period and they have more realistic oﬀer
price compared to the carve-outs that did not grant such options. The second group
will be overvalued (higher oﬀer price than their industry peers) due to earnings man-
agement. The third hypothesis (H3) is as follows:“Carve-outs that grant incentive stock
options (with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price) to their executives do not manage
earnings in the IPO period and they experience less market overoptimism resulting in
lower first-day closing price compared to the carve-outs that did not grant such options.
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Predicted relationships are as follows:
• For carve-outs that did not grant IPO options to their executives reversal of
accruals should be observed in the IPO year (t) as a sign for earnings management.
This has two opposite eﬀects on the first-day return. Inflated earnings in the
IPO year trigger the market overoptimism and lead to a higher first-day closing
price i.e. higher first-day return. On the other hand inflated earnings might
bias the oﬀer price up and have a negative impact on the first-day return. Since
individual investors are less informed and more anchored to earnings compared
to institutional investors and underwriters I predict that the eﬀect on the first-
day market price will be stronger than the eﬀect on the oﬀer price resulting in
higher first-day return. The bottom line of my predictions is that the relationship
between accruals in the pre-IPO year (t-1 ) and the first-day return is negative.
(H3) # accrualst 1 =) " accrualst =)" f ir st day closing price =)" f ir st day return
(H2) # accrualst 1 =) " accrualst =)" o f f er price =)# f ir st day return
(H1) # accrualst 1 =) stronger e f f ect on the market =)" f ir st day return
• For carve-outs that grant IPO options to their executives no reversal of accruals
should be observed in the IPO year (t). Realistic earnings in the IPO period
decrease the market overoptimism and lead to a lower first-day price compared
to the other IPOs. On the other hand realistic earnings lead to more realistic
oﬀer price. Since individual investors are less informed and more anchored to
earnings compared to institutional investors and underwriters I predict that the
eﬀect on the first-day market price is stronger than the eﬀect on the oﬀer price
resulting in lower first-day return. The bottom line of my predictions is that the
relationship between accruals in the pre-IPO year (t-1 ) and the first-day return
will be positive for this subsample of carve-outs.
(H3) # accrualst 1 ⇡ accrualst =)# f ir st day closing price =)# f ir st day return
(H2) # accrualst 1 ⇡ accrualst =)# o f f er price =)" f ir st day return
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(H1) # accrualst 1 =) stronger e f f ect on the market =)# f ir st day return
Consistent with the prediction, I find the following development of accruals (see
Figure 1.1): for companies that did not grant IPO options there is an increase of positive
accruals in the year of the IPO suggesting that these companies are inflating the earnings
around the IPO, while for companies that grant IPO options I do not observe such pick
suggesting that they report more realistic earnings. In the first graph I compute the
total accruals scaled by assets from companies’s balance sheet statements (named BS
Accruals), while in the second graph total accruals scaled by assets are collected directly
form the operating part of the cash flow statements (named CF Accruals). The third
graph represents development of the discretionary (abnormal) part of total accruals
computed using performance-adjusted modified Jones model (DAC in the rest of the
paper).
One possible way to test the hypothesis is to see whether the cross-sectional diﬀer-
ences of the first-day return are explained by the changes in the accruals between the
pre-IPO year (t-1 ) and IPO year (t) conditioned on whether the carved out company
grant IPO options or not. Since accruals at the IPO year are observed only ex-post,
more interesting test from individual investor’s point of view would be whether ac-
cruals in the pre-IPO year conditioned on IPO options grants predict cross-sectional
diﬀerences of the first-day returns. For carve-outs that did not grant IPO options this
relationship should be negative as a sign for earnings management. In contrast this
negative relationship should be oﬀset in the other subsample of carve-outs that grant
IPO options. In this setting all information is publicly available before or soon after
the IPO. Cash flow and earnings for the pre-IPO year is public information and it can
be found in the section financial statements of prospectus for the issue. If the investor
is attracted to some carve-out, he can check the SEC filings for information about
the compensation packages of the executives, more precisely for stock options grants
connected to the IPO oﬀer price.
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Figure 1.1: Mean of accruals conditioned on IPO options grants
11
1.3 Sample selection, data description, variables def-
inition and empirical methodology
1.3.1 Sample selection and data description
I restrict my sample from May 1996 to December 2013 because IPO prospectuses are
available on SEC’s (Securities and Exchange Commission) EDGAR system (Electronic
Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system) starting from May 1996. First I collect
data from the Thomson One SDC (Securities Data Company) database for US’s issues.4
The initial sample has 661 carve-outs for the period of almost 18 years. I require that
the newly carved out subsidiary has available CRSP’s (Center for Research in Security
Prices) tapes and has available financial statements in Compustat database. After
merging all three database the sample decreases to 381 carve-outs. Further I exclude 81
finance firms (SIC Codes 6000-6999) and 20 units oﬀers yielding a sample of 280 carve-
outs. I hand collect data from financial statements of the subsidiary in the prospectuses
(filing type S-1 in EDGAR database) for two years preceding the IPO in order to be able
to compute the accruals in the pre-IPO year. Additionally, I hand collect data for the
option grants to executives and outside directors that have exercise price equal to the
oﬀer price (IPO options) from the prospectuses of the issue. If this information is not
available in the prospectus then I collect it from the proxy statements (filing type DEF
14A in EDGAR database) of the IPO year. I lost additional firms that did not have
available prospectus or proxy statement. My final sample has 227 equity carve-outs out
of which 102 firms grant IPO options to their executives.
Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics of the whole sample (column 1) and the two
subsamples (columns 2 and 3) conditioned on whether the company grants stock op-
tions to the executives and outside directors with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price.
Companies that grant IPO options have lower accruals in the pre-IPO period and lower
first-day return relative to companies that did not grant IPO options. Furthermore,
they do not have huge reversal of the accruals in the IPO year (accruals remain neg-
ative) suggesting that they use less aggressive accounting techniques compared to the
huge reversal of accruals in the IPO year for companies that did not grant IPO op-
tions. These diﬀerences in mean are statistically significant. IPO options granters on
average are slightly smaller companies in terms of assets but they have higher sales and
they are trading at statistically significant lower multiples (price-to-sales ratio). They
4In the Screening&Analysis common stock part, subsidiary IPO’s (spinoﬀs) restriction is set “Yes”.
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also have lower debt ratio compared to the non-granting companies. As for the issue
characteristics, carve-outs with IPO options are bigger issues that leave less money on
the table (due to the lower underpricing). It turns out that they are less “hot” issues
revising initial mid point of the price range downwards suggesting lower demand in the
book-building process. On average in both groups the parent company kept the control
over the subsidiary after the initial public oﬀering.
In order to disentangle the eﬀect of earnings management on the two drivers of the
first-day return (oﬀer price and market first-day price) I need a benchmark price that
should be considered a fair price (I call it intrinsic price in the rest of the paper) of the
subsidiary. For each carveout in the sample I find a non-IPO industry peers. To select
appropriate matching firms, I consider all firms in Compustat in the fiscal year prior to
the IPO year with available information about their sales. I eliminate those that went
public in the respective year. For remaining firms I obtain SIC codes and share prices
from CRSP. Those firms were matched with each carveout in the sample based on IPO
date and 3-digit SIC code (Alford (1992) and Weiner (2005) argue that matching based
on 3-digit SIC on average provides the best multiple valuation accuracy).
From the set of matching firms for each carveout I keep five comparable firms that
are closest in sales scaled by total assets in the year prior to the IPO. Finally, out of the
five selected peers I keep three comparable firms with closest operating income scaled
by total assets to the respective carveout. Each carveout in the sample is matched with
industry peers with comparable sales and profitability. I matched on industry because
this is where I, most likely, can find matching firms with similar risk, profitability and
growth. I matched on sales scaled by total assets to control for diﬀerences in size. I
matched on operating income scaled by total assets to control for diﬀerences in prof-
itability and to ensure that matching firms are as close as possible to the fundamentals
of appropriate carveout. Bhojraj and Lee (2002) argue that adjustment to industry
multiples based on firm operating performance (profitability) improve valuation accu-
racy. I decided to keep three (instead of only one) best matched companies and compute
the average of their multiple (P/S ratio) in order to decrease the eﬀect of a possible
idiosyncratic shock on one single company on the IPO day. Table 1.2 compares the
fundamentals of the carve-outs and matching firms.
Matching firms share similar sales and operating income distribution characteristics
as the carve-outs for the both subsamples, IPO option granters and non granters. How-
ever, they trade at diﬀerent price to sales ratios. The diﬀerence is especially pronounced
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Table 1.1: Summary sample characteristics
Whole Sample No IPO Options IPO Options
(1) (2) (3)
Observations 227 125 102
Main variables statistics:
first-day Return (%) 17.99% 19.39% 16.27%
BS Accruals (t 1) -0.0708 -0.0665 -0.0761
BS Accruals (t ) 0.0493 +0.0435 -0.0423*
CF Accruals (t 1) -0.0854 -0.0826 -0.0889
CF Accruals (t ) -0.0239 -0.0046 -0.0475*
DAC (t 1) 0.0177 0.0015 0.0377
DAC (t ) 0.0482 0.0694 0.0229*
Grants to Executives (mil.) 0.2510 0 0.5585
Grants to CEO (mil.) 0.1162 0 0.2587
Grants to Directors (mil.) 0.0177 0 0.0395
Company characteristics:
Total Assets (t 1) (mil.) 1,330.57 1,430.04 1,208.67
Sales (t 1) (mil.) 1,147.66 1,056.86 1,258.94
Liabilities/Assets(t 1) 0.85 0.89 0.79
P/Sales 13.63 20.09 5.71*
IPO characteristics:
No of Shares Oﬀered (mil.) 17.18 14.47 20.51
Oﬀer Price 15.41 15.42 15.39
Average Proceeds (mil.) 303.99 288.82 322.59
Money Left on the Table (mil.) 41.11 41.55 40.58
Oﬀer Price Revision (%) 0.11% +1.83% -1.99%
Shares Retained by the Parent (%) 69.79% 72.61% 66.33%
Asterisks denote significant diﬀerences between two subsamples based on t-statistics.
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of the carve-outs and matching firms
The sample of carve-outs runs from May 1996 to December 2013. For each carve-out there are three
matching firms that are industry peers with most similar sales and profitability. Price-to-Sales ratio
of the carve-outs is the product of the oﬀer price and shares outstanding (all share classes) over the
reported sales one year prior to the IPO. Price-to-Sales ratio of the matching firms is the average of
the three most similar industry peers. For each of the three matching firms Price-to-Sales is computed
as a product of the trading price of the respective firm at IPO date times shares outstanding over the
sales reported one year prior the cohort IPO year.
Carve-outs Matching Firms
Characteristics mean 25% 50% 75% mean 25% 50% 75%
Whole Sample (227obs.)
Sales(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 1.28 0.55 0.98 1.73 1.22 0.62 1.11 1.73
Operat ing Income(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.16
Price(t )
Sales(t 1) 13.63 1.11 2.24 6.24 4.49 0.60 1.20 2.65
IPO Options=0 (125 obs.)
Sales(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 1.11 0.53 0.89 1.55 1.12 0.58 0.96 1.54
Operat ing Income(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.15
Price(t )
Sales(t 1) 20.09 1.39 2.83 8.10 5.78 0.72 1.34 2.59
IPO Options=1 (102 obs.)
Sales(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 1.49 0.63 1.27 1.97 1.35 0.67 1.27 1.84
Operat ing Income(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.17
Price(t )
Sales(t 1) 5.71 0.84 1.76 3.75 2.91 0.55 0.97 2.83
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in the subsample of carve-outs that did not grant IPO options. It seems that they are
overvalued compared to their industry peers. This is in the line with my hypothesis
that those companies manage earnings in the IPO period and that inflated earnings
mislead the market participants resulting in overvaluation compared to the industry
peers.
1.3.2 Variables definition
1.3.2.1 Stock option grants
I define an incentive option as IPO option only if the exercise price is equal to the oﬀer
price of the IPO. Grant to executives is the number of IPO options (in millions) granted
to the top executives of the company including the CEO. Grants to CEO is the number
of IPO options (in millions) granted to the CEO. Grants to directors is the number of
IPO options granted to the outside directors. I also hand collect the data about the
terms under which the agents can exercise the options. In more than 92% of the sample
they can start partially exercising these options one year after the oﬀering. Data on
IPO options are hand collected from the prospectuses of the initial public oﬀerings. If
this information is not available in the prospectuses then I hand collected it from the
proxy statements in the year of the IPO.
1.3.2.2 Measures of initial pricing
Following the literature, I define the first-day return as percentage diﬀerence of the
first-day secondary market closing price and the oﬀer price.
First Day Return = f ir st day closing price o f f er priceo f f er price ⇤ 100
Positive first-day return is a result of the following possibilities: either the oﬀer price
is set too low or the first-day closing market price is too high or both. In order to be
able to decompose the first-day return I need a measure of a “fair” price of the oﬀering.
I compute the intrinsic (fair) price of each carveout with method of compatibles using
price multiples. I am restricted to use only price-to-sales ratio (P/S) because sales
figures are available for all companies. I am not able to use other multiples because a
lot of carve-outs in my sample have losses in the year prior to the IPO and a lot of them
are underfunded with negative value of their equity. Using other multiples like P/E,
P/B, P/EBITDA is practically impossible without losing a lot of observation from the
sample (around 20% of the sample). After matching based on sales and operating profit
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I have three best matching industry peers for each carveout. For each matching firm
(three for each carveout) I compute P/S ratio as follows:
( PS )single match =
Market Price⇤Shares Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year Sales ; where market price is CRSP stock price
for the matching firm at the close of the respective IPO oﬀer date of the carveout.
Than I compute the average of three P/S ratios to get one P/S ratio for each carveout:
( PS )Match =
( PS )single match 1+(
P
S )single match 2+(
P
S )single match 3
3
The intrinsic (fair) value of each carveout is computed by multiplying the average P/S
ratio of the three industry peers with prior year fiscal sales of the appropriate carveout:
Intrinsic Value = ( PS )Match ⇤ Sales(t 1) ; while intrinsic price of the carveout is:
Intrinsic Price = Intrinsic ValueShares Outstanding
I use the intrinsic (fair) price as a benchmark to compare the oﬀer price and the first-day
market price. I decompose the first-day return in its two drivers: oﬀer price undervalu-
ation (coming from low oﬀer price) and market overpricing (coming from overoptimistic
first-day closing market price):
O f f er PriceUndervaluation = Intrinsic Price O f f er PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100
Market Overpricing = First DayClosing Price Intrinsic PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100
For clarity about the decomposition I use one recent example taken from my sample
of equity carve-outs. Zoetis, Inc. is the world’s largest producer of medicine and
vaccinations for pets and livestock. The company was a subsidiary of Pfizer, the world’s
largest drug maker. Pfizer oﬃcially filed for registration of a Class A stock of Zoetis
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on 10 August 2012. Zoetis’ IPO on
1 February 2013 sold 86.1 million shares for US$ 2.2 billion. Pfizer retained 414 million
Class B shares giving it an 83% controlling stake in Zoetis. At the time, Zoetis’ debut
was the largest IPO from a U.S. company since Facebook’s $16 billion IPO on 18 May
2012. The oﬀer price of Zoetis’ shares was set at $26 per share (leading underwriters
were JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley). Shares
sharply rose by the end of the first trading day to $35.01 per share. The first-day return
of Zoetis’ IPO was 19.27% (35.01 2626 ⇤100). Zoetis was trading at 3.05 times its reported
sales of $4259 million in 2012 (one fiscal year prior to the IPO). Price-to-Sales ratio
of Zoetis is computed as follows: PS Zoetis =
$26⇤(86.1+414)
4259 (oﬀer price is multiplied by
number of all share classes). The first-day return could be result of either too low oﬀer
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price ($26) or too high first-day closing price ($35.01) or even both. I selected Zoetis’
three industry peers based on sales and operating income: Neogen Corp., Biodilivery
Sciences Inc. and Integra Life Science Inc. On first of February 2013 (the day of Zoetis’
IPO) they had an average price-to-sales ratio of 3.35. That is slightly higher than
Zoetis’ price-to-sales ratio indicating that Zoetis was initially undervalued compared
to its industry peers. According to my methodology the fair (intrinsic) price of Zoetis
would have been $28.53 per share:
Intrinsic Value = ( PS )Match ⇤ Sales(t 1) = 3.35 ⇤ 4,259 = $14,267.65million
Intrinsic Price = Intrinsic ValueShares Outstanding =
14267
(86.1+414) = $28.53 per share
Using the calculated intrinsic price I decompose the first-day return of Zoetis into the
part that comes from oﬀer price undervaluation and market overpricing:
O f f er PriceUndervaluation = Intrinsic Price O f f er PriceO f f er Price ⇤100 = 28.53 2626 ⇤100 = 9.73%
Market Overpricing = Fir st Day Market Pr ice I ntr insic Pr iceOf f er Pr ice ⇤100 = 35.01 28.5326 ⇤100 = 9.54%
The initial return of Zoetis is decomposed into two parts: 9.73 percentage points due
to initial undervaluation caused by low oﬀer price and 9.53 percentage points due to
market overpricing on the first trading day. The sum of the two components gives
exactly 19.27% that is the first-day return of Zoetis. Having in mind the big picture
of the paper I will add an info on executives pay of Zoetis and its reporting “habits”.
Zoetis granted 550,640 stock options to its executives with an exercise price equal to
$26 (the IPO oﬀer price) on first of February 2013 (the IPO date). More than a
half of the options (285,306) were granted to the CEO Juan Ramon Alaix. Mr.Alaix
joined Pfizer in 2003 and he was appointed as CEO of the division (Zoetis) in July
2012. The IPO options granted to him are subject to cliﬀ vesting in three years.
This means that he cannot exercise any of these options until first of February 2016.
However he had an incentive to push down the oﬀer price as much as possible resulting
in 9.73% undervaluation compared to Zoetis’ industry peers. The total accruals of
Zoetis remained almost unchanged between year prior to the IPO and the IPO year.
In both years and based on diﬀerent specifications the accruals are negative (around
-0.01) suggesting that Zoetis did not use “creative” accounting techniques to inflate the
earnings and window dress the company before going public (documented procedure
for an average IPO). Anecdotally, nowadays (two months before the end of the vesting
period) Zoetis is trading around $45 per share. Potential profit of Mr.Alaix is around
$5.5 million just from the grant of IPO options . This amount is more than twice his
18
cash compensation (salary and bonus) achieved in 2014.
1.3.2.3 Measures of earnings management (accruals)
Standard measure for earnings management in the literature are accruals. The simplest
way to think about the accruals is that they are diﬀerence between earnings and cash
flows. When this amount is positive for example, it can be a sign (not necessarily) of
artificially inflated earnings by use of “creative” legal accounting techniques. One of
the most popular way in which managers can engage in “window-dressing” before going
public is that they can “borrow” earnings from other periods (future of past periods).
If a manager knows that the company will go public next year, he could slow down
earnings growth in the year before the IPO by postponing some sales deals for the
next year for which cash was received in advance in the pre-IPO year or expensing
some future expenses in the year prior to the IPO. This will create an earnings buﬀer
that the managers could use to boost the performance in the IPO year by reporting
higher sales or lower expenses that were suppose to be reported in the pre-IPO year.
The time-shifting of earnings will be reflected in the financial statements trough the
accruals. For example, postponed sales will increase the cash position and the current
liabilities in the pre-IPO year and this will lead to lower accruals (see formulas below)
and lower earnings in the pre-IPO year. Contrarily, in the IPO year when the sales will
be actually reported, current liabilities will decrease and this will increase the accruals
i.e. earnings.
There are many methodologies how one can compute the accruals. I use three
measures of accruals. The first two measures are total accruals at each firm level that
I compute from diﬀerent statements (balance sheet or cash flow statement).
Balance sheet total accruals are computed with information found in the comparable
balance sheets of each carve-out. I hand collect data from balance sheets for two years
prior the IPO for each carve-out in order to be able to compute total balance sheet
accruals for one year prior to the IPO.
BSAccrualsi, t 1 =
(4CAi, t 1   4CLi, t 1   4Cashi, t 1 + 4STDEBT i, t 1   DEPi, t 1)
Assetsi, t 2
where:
4CAi,t 1 is firm i’s change in the current assets from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand collected
from balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]4);
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4CLi,t 1 is firm i’s change in the current liabilities from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand
collected from balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]5);
4Cashi,t 1 is firm i’s change in cash from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand collected from
balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]1);
4STDEBTi,t 1 is firm i’s change in short-term debt from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand
collected from balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]34);
DEPi,t 1 is firm i’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t-1 that I hand col-
lected from income statement reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]14);
Assetsi,t 2 is firm i’s total assets in the year t-2 that I hand collected from balance sheet
reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]6).
Following Hribar and Collins. (2002) I hand collect cash flow total accruals directly
from the operating part of the cash flow statements reported in the prospectuses as
follows:
CFAccrualsi, t 1 =
 (CHGARi, t 1 +CHGINV i, t 1 +CHGAPi, t 1 +CHGT AX i, t 1 +CHGOTH i, t 1   DEPi, t 1)
Asset si, t 2
where:
CHGARi,t 1 firm i’s decrease/increase in accounts receivable (usual Compustat Item
]302);
CHGINVi,t 1 firm i’s decrease/increase in inventory (usual Compustat Item ]303);
CHGAPi,t 1 firm i’s increase/decrease in accounts payable (usual Compustat Item
]304);
CHGTAXi,t 1 firm i’s increase/decrease in taxes payable (usual Compustat Item ]305);
CHGOTHi,t 1 firm i’s net change in other current assets (usual Compustat Item ]307);
DEPi,t 1 is firm i’s depreciation expense reported in the cash flow statement (usual
Compustat Item ]125);
Assetsi,t 2 is firm i’s total assets in the year t-2 that I hand collected from balance sheet
reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat Item ]6).
The third type of accruals that I use as a measure of earnings management are discre-
tionary accruals. In fact not all accruals are sign of earnings management, most of them
are good mechanism to match revenues and expenses in the same fiscal year. Firstly
Jones (1991) decomposes the total accruals in two parts: normal and discretionary.
Than Dechow and Sweeney (1995) modified her model and Kothari and Wasley (2005)
adjusted it controlling also for the performance of the companies. I estimate discre-
tionary accruals using performance-adjusted modified Jones model. Total accruals for
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firm i in year t are measured same as balance sheet total accruals (BSAccrualsi,t ) in
the equation above. The discretionary (abnormal) accruals for firm i in year t are the
residuals ⇠i,t from the following regression, that I estimate for each of the 99 two-digit
SIC industry groups in each year t.
BSAccrualsi,t =  0J+  1J ( 1Assetsi, t 1 )+  2J (4Revi,t 4ARi,t )+  3JPPEi,t+  4J ROAi,t 1+⇠i,t
where:
4Revi,t firm i’s change in revenues (Compustat Item ]12) divided by Assetsi,t 1 (Com-
pustat Item ]6) ;
4ARi,t firm i’s change in account receivables (Compustat Item ]2) divided by Assetsi,t 1
;
PPEi,t firm i’s gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat Item ]7) divided
by Assetsi,t 1;
ROAi,t 1 firm i’s operating income before depreciation (Compustat Item ]13) on assets
in year t-1 ;
I use 2-digit SIC industry groups from the universe of firms in Compustat (IPOs are
excluded) to compute industry-specific parameter estimates ( J ). Applying the indus-
try estimates to company data give me firm-specific normal accruals. The diﬀerence
between company’s total accruals and estimated normal accruals are the discretionary
(abnormal) accruals. Residuals of the model are actually my variable of interest i.e.
discretionary (abnormal) accruals.
1.3.2.4 Other variables
The literature on IPOs is rich with studies exploring the determinants of the cross
section of the first-day return. However most of the studies do not use same control
variables. Butler and Kieschnick (2014) provide a benchmark specification and robust
evidence on the empirical importance of control variables that should be included in a
baseline regression on IPO underpricing. Starting from set of 48 possible controls used in
the literature, they identify 15 as robust determinants of IPO initial return that should
be included to minimize the risk of omitted variable bias. Most of the control variables
that I use in all regressions are based on their finding. I use the following controls in
all regressions: Ln of Firm Sales, Total Liabilities to Asset Ratio, Ln of one plus the
Ratio of Secondary Shares Retained to Shares Oﬀered, Ln of Oﬀer Price to Sales Ratio,
Underwriter Rank, Nasdaq Dummy, Internet IPO Dummy, Average Underpricing in
Previous 30 Days, Prior 30 Days Industry Return, Prior 30 Days Standard Deviation
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of Industry Return, Prior 30 Day CRSP EW Index, Ln of Industry Market Value to
Sales Ratio, Oﬀer Price Revision, Oﬀer Price Revision when Negative, % of IPOs with
Positive Price Revisions. The description of the control variables and data sources are
in the Appendix of the paper.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 First-day return and earnings management
I start my analysis by exploring the cross-sectional variation of the first-day return in
my sample of equity carve-outs over total accruals reported one year prior to the IPO
conditioned on IPO options grants. I find this test very interesting because accruals
one year prior the IPO are public information at the time of the IPO. I estimate the
following equation under diﬀerent specifications of accruals measures and IPO options
grants:
FDRi =  0 +  1IPOoptionsi +  2(Accrualst 1)i +  3(Accrualst 1)i ⇤ IPOoptionsi +  04Xi + "i
where FDRi is the first-day return of company i. (Accrualst 1)i is the total accruals
in one year prior the IPO of company i and IPOoptionsi are diﬀerent specifications of
IPO options grants. Xi is the battery of control variables that are likely to aﬀect the
first-day return. The variables of interest (first-day return, accruals and IPO option
grants) are winsorized at 1% level in order to make sure that the results are not driven
by the extremes of the distributions.
According to the earnings management explanation of IPO anomaly issuing firms
report high earnings around the IPO by reporting accruals aggressively, inflating the
earnings. In order to be able to do the manipulation companies create reserves of earn-
ings in pre-IPO period by using more conservative accounting techniques and reporting
negative accruals. If the company is manipulating the earnings then total accruals in
pre-IPO year predict the cross-sectional variation of the first-day return. Due to the
reversal of the accruals that inflate the earnings in the IPO year this relationship is neg-
ative. My hypothesis is that executives of equity carve-outs who receive options grants
with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price do not have an incentive to window dress the
company before going public. They would rather report more realistic or conservative
earnings in the IPO period in order to have exercise price of their options as low as
possible. This reporting behavior decreases the usual market overoptimism toward the
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new issues and leads to lower first-day return. In contrast, for carve-outs that did not
grant such compensation packages I observe negative relationship between total accru-
als in the pre-IPO year and their first-day return as a sign of earnings manipulation
(window dressing) in IPO period. The main results are in Table 1.3.
The first two columns are under specification where IPO options is a binary variable:
1 if anybody in the top executive team received an IPO option and 0 when nobody re-
ceived such grants. Third and forth columns are under specification where IPO options
is the number of IPO options (in million) granted to the top executives of the carveout
company while in the next two columns (5 and 6) it is the number of IPO options
granted just to the CEO. Columns 7 and 8 report the cross-sectional regressions where
IPO options is the number of options (in million) granted to the board members of the
carve-out. In all diﬀerent specifications of IPO options first columns (column 1, 3, 5
and 7 respectively) are regressions where total accruals are measured from the balance
sheet while in the second column (column 2, 4, 6 and 8 respectively) they are measured
from the cash flow statement.
In all regressions and for all diﬀerent specifications of IPO options and total accru-
als there is a negative statistically significant relationship between total accruals and
first-day return for companies that did not grant IPO options (coeﬃcient  2)5 that I
interpret as a sign of earnings management. For the other subset of carve-outs that
grant IPO options to the executives, coeﬃcient of interest is the sum of  2 and  3. In
all regressions both coeﬃcients are statistically significant. The negative relationship
between total accruals in the year preceding the IPO and first-day return ( 2) is oﬀset
by the coeﬃcient  3 that has opposite sign. This finding suggests that in the subsample
of equity carveout that grant IPO options there is no evidence of earnings management
in the period around the IPO.
Forty-eight companies grant IPO options also to the board members (non-employee
directors). For these companies I find a direct positive significant relationship (coeﬃ-
cient  1) between these grants and the first-day return even in absence of accruals. It
is a sign that these directors might have an influence over the oﬀer price of the IPO.
More IPO options grants leads to higher first-day return driven by the lower oﬀer price.
They do have an incentive to push down the oﬀer price because it is equal to the strike
price in their option packages. The cross-sectional regression of the first-day return on
directors IPO option grants unconditioned on the level of accruals is reported in Table
5Coeﬃcient  2 gives us the relationship between accruals and first-day return only for companies
that did not grant IPO options (IPO options variable is set to be zero).
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Table 1.3: Cross-sectional regressions of FDR on accruals conditioned on IPO options
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the first-day return defined as percentage diﬀerence between
first-day market closing price and the oﬀer price. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with exercise
price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received IPO options 0 otherwise (column 1
and 2). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives (column 3 and 4) while CEO Option
Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 5 and 6). Directors Options Grants is the number of IPO options
granted to the board members (column 7 and 8). BS Accruals are total accruals computed from the comparable balance sheet of each
carve-out one year prior to the IPO (columns 1,3,5 and 7) while CF Accruals are total accruals computed from the cash flow statements
one year prior to the IPO (columns 2,4,6 and 8). Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: FDRi =  0 +  1 I POoptionsi +  2 (Accrualst 1)i +  3 (Accrualst 1)i ⇤ I POoptionsi +  04Xi + "i
first-day Return (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ IPO options CEO Option Grants Directors Option Grants
BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals
Intercept 21.960 34.967 11.290 32.613 6.404 25.727 7.742 24.033
(0.558) (0.368) (0.764) (0.377) ( 0.865)
(0.488)
(0.834) (0.499)
IPO Options 1.369 2.531 3.002 6.888 2.222 9.526 135.637*** 187.691***
( 0.779) (0.607) (0.541) (0.196) (0.825) (0.372) (0.002) (0.000)
Accruals (t 1) -26.302*** -50.163*** -18.282** -48.523*** -18.559*** -47.297*** -15.225** -36.252***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) ( 0.004) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
IPO Options*Accruals (t 1) 35.185*** 49.473*** 48.751** 74.569*** 113.909*** 167.610*** 809.168*** 1534.165***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) ( 0.007) (0.000)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -3.631 -3.858 -3.331 -4.069 -2.872 -3.395 -3.103 -3.921
(0.174) (0.142) (0.234) (0.135) (0.304) (0.214) (0.244) (0.123)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -5.294** -5.837*** -4.669** -6.442*** -4.676** -6.351*** -3.967* -5.596***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.025) (0.002) (0.025) (0.003) (0.052) (0.006)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 6.365 7.359 7.773 7.242 7.486 6.863 4.660 4.011
(0.221) (0.151) (0.138) (0.154) (0.151) (0.177) (0.369) (0.415)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) -0.332 -1.721 0.917 -1.793 1.176 -1.300 1.234 -0.957
( 0.921) (0.611) (0.787) (0.597) (0.728) (0.701) (0.709) (0.768)
Underwriter Rank -0.342 -0.251 -0.304 -0.204 -0.292 -0.208 -0.329 -0.343
(0.636) (0.723) (0.674) (0.771) ( 0.686) (0.768) (0.655) (0.622)
Nasdaq Dummy -0.744 -0.436 -1.094 -1.042 -0.071 0.136 1.248 -1.294
( 0.899) (0.940) (0.852) (0.855) (0.990) (0.981) (0.835) (0.816)
Internet IPO Dummy 24.462** 20.873* 26.222** 21.974* 26.649** 22.484* 11.219 2.283
(0.045) (0.084) (0.034) (0.065) (0.030) (0.060) (0.361) (0.845)
Average Underpricing 0.320* 0.373** 0.270 0.371** 0.268 0.373** 0.346** 0.465***
(0.066) (0.030) (0.119) (0.029) (0.122) (0.028) (0.046) (0.006)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 20.173 13.945 19.705 12.645 19.442 12.302 22.591 20.249
(0.143) (0.304) (0.156) (0.350) (0.160) (0.364) (0.101) (0.124)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. -210.552 -250.921 -353.108 -411.862 -301.024 -351.591 165.336 229.619
(0.774) (0.728) (0.631) (0.563) (0.680) (0.621) (0.821) (0.742)
Prior 30 day EW Index -7.438 -1.159 -6.152 1.425 -6.156 2.891 -1.826 -3.378
(0.729) (0.956) (0.774) (0.945) (0.774) (0.890) (0.932) (0.868)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 4.186 3.861 7.280 6.573 7.567 7.098 -1.387 -6.137
(0.740) (0.755) (0.564) (0.591) (0.548) (0.562) (0.913) (0.615)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.322** 0.314** 0.294* 0.292** 0.297* 0.294** 0.351** 0.310**
(0.035) (0.037) (0.054) (0.048) (0.051) (0.046) (0.021) (0.031)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.227 0.318 0.191 0.277 0.173 0.254 0.343 0.337
(0.453) (0.285) (0.532) (0.349) (0.568) (0.392) (0.261) (0.250)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.151 -0.210 -0.141 -0.220 -0.146 -0.219 -0.086 -0.143
(0.287) (0.138) (0.317) (0.114) (0.299) (0.117) (0.535) (0.283)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 48.70% 50.67% 48.77% 51.84% 49.04% 51.65% 49.65% 54.33%
Adj. R-squared 22.18% 25.18% 22.30% 26.95% 22.70% 26.67% 23.63% 30.73%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.4. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. I do
not find this relationship for the grants to the top executives (including the CEO). This
is not surprising because top executives usually are previous division managers in the
conglomerate, so it is diﬃcult to say that they could influence the oﬀer price. However,
it is highly probable that they have an influence over the divisions’ reporting strategy.
Out of fifteen control variables that are likely to have impact over the first-day
return only the debt ratio is statistically significant at 1% level almost in all regres-
sions. Internet IPO dummy, average underpricing in previous month and oﬀer price
revision are only marginally significant. I control for time and industry fix eﬀect in all
regressions.
Haven seen coeﬃcients’ statistical significance, their economic magnitude is not that
obvious. In order to have an idea how much of the cross-sectional variation of first-day
return is explained by reporting distortions in the pre-IPO period I use average values
of accruals in the year prior to the IPO and average values of IPO option grants (see
Table 1.1). I plug those numbers in the regression equations used in Table 1.3 using
the coeﬃcient estimates.
Average accruals in one year prior the IPO can explain 2 to 4 percentage points
(balance sheet accruals and cash flow accruals respectively) of the first-day return in
absence of IPO options grants. In presence of IPO options grants this magnitude is
significantly lower approaching 0 to maximum 1 percentage points for diﬀerent spec-
ifications of total accruals and IPO option grants. This is in the line with the main
hypothesis of the paper that managers who received IPO options are not managing
earnings in the IPO period, so predictive power of the accruals on first-day return is
decreasing.
The magnitude of the direct positive significant relationship (coeﬃcient  1) between
grants to directors and the first-day return in absence of accruals is 5.4 percentage points
and 7.4 percentage points of the first-day return for an average option grant to board
members of 39,500 options (estimated coeﬃcient  1 is for one million of options). In
presence of accruals using the estimated coeﬃcients in column 7 and 8 of Table 1.3
for average accruals and average option grants the magnitude is around 2 percentage
points for both specifications of accruals. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient of directors’
IPO option grants unconditional on the accruals (see Table 1.4) is 3.6 percentage points
for an average option grant to board of directors members (39,500 options).
Figure 1.2 below shows graphically the predicted relationship between first-day re-
turn and total accruals calculated from the balance sheets for diﬀerent levels of IPO
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Table 1.4: Cross-sectional regression of the FDR on director’s IPO option grants
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the first-day return defined as percentage diﬀerence between
first-day market closing price and the oﬀer price. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with exercise
price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. Directors IPO Options is the number of IPO options granted to the board members. Controlling
variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable.: first-day Return FDRi =  0 +  1Director sI POoptionsi +  02Xi + "i
Intercept 6.018
(0.873)
Directors IPO Options 91.431**
(0.034)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -3.623
(0.184)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -2.654
(0.180)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 6.894
(0.191)










Prior 30 day Industry Return 24.94*
(0.078)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. 89.07
(0.906)
Prior 30 day EW Index -7.352
(0.737)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 1.692
(0.896)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.284*
(0.066)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.399
(0.202)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.0685
(0.630)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES




p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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option grants (25 percentile, median, mean and 75% percentile). For higher percentiles
of IPO options grants the predictive relationship of the total accruals over the first-day
return is changing and from negative it is becoming positive. The graphical relation-
ship between first-day return and total accruals calculated from the cash flow statement
looks very similar to Figure 1.2 and its not shown.
I estimate separate regressions for the two subsamples in order to support my finding
that total accruals one year prior to the IPO have predictive power over the first-day
return only for firms that did not grant IPO options to its executives. Table 1.5 reports
the results. First two columns stand for the subsample of carve-outs that did not grant
IPO options while column 3 and 4 are for the subsample of carve-outs that grant IPO
options. Coeﬃcient  1 is statistically significant and negative only in the subsample
of carve-outs that did not grant IPO options while for the other sample it is positive,
but statistically insignificant. This is a supporting evidence that IPO option granting
companies do not manage earnings in the IPO period and their first-day return cannot
be predicted by reporting distortions one year prior to the IPO. For companies that did
not grant IPO options to the executives accruals in one year prior the IPO are negative
predictors in the cross-sectional variation of the first-day return suggesting that these
companies are managing their earnings before going public.
Other possible way to test the hypotheses is to see whether the cross-sectional
diﬀerences of the first-day return are explained by the changes in the accruals between
the pre-IPO year (t-1 ) and IPO year (t) conditioned on whether the carved out company
grant IPO options or not. However accruals at the IPO year (t) are observed one
year after the IPO, so this test is providing only ex-post evidence and doesn’t have
predictive power over the first-day return. I estimate the following equation under
diﬀerent specifications of accruals measures and IPO options grants:
FDRi =  0 +  1IPOoptionsi +  2 M Accrualsi +  3 M Accrualsi ⇤ IPOoptionsi +  04Xi + "i
where FDRi is the first-day return of company i. M Accrualsi are changes in total
accruals between the pre-IPO year (t-1 ) and IPO year (t) of company i and IPOoptionsi
are diﬀerent specifications of IPO options grants. Xi is the battery of control variables
that are likely to aﬀect the first-day return. The variables of interest are winsorized at
1% level. For carve-outs that did not grant IPO options I expect positive relationship
between changes in total accruals from the pre-IPO year to the IPO year and their
first-day return as a sign of earnings manipulation (window dressing). More increased
accruals in the IPO year compared to the pre-IPO year should lead to higher first-day
return. The results are reported in Table 1.6.
27
Figure 1.2: Eﬀect of total BS accruals(t 1) on first-day return conditioned on IPO
options
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Table 1.5: Subsample regressions of first-day return on accruals
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the first-day return defined as percentage diﬀerence between
first-day market closing price and the oﬀer price. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with exercise
price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. First two columns stand for the subsample of carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options while second
two columns stand for the subsample of carve-outs that grant IPO options. BS Accruals are total accruals computed from the comparable
balance sheet of each carve-out one year prior to the IPO (columns 1 and 3) while CF Accruals are total accruals computed from the cash
flow statements one year prior to the IPO (columns 2 and 4). Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: FirstDayReturn FDRi =  0 +  1 (Accrualst 1)i +  02Xi + "i
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO IPO options subsample IPO options subsample
BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals
Intercept -0.435 31.072 13.709 13.441
(0.994) (0.582) (0.713) (0.719)
Accruals (t 1) -24.772** -54.631*** 7.492 10.450
(0.016) (0.000) (0.519) (0.603)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -6.863 -8.773* -2.244 -2.069
(0.210) (0.093) (0.606) (0.637)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -10.035*** -10.499*** 6.285 3.419
(0.001) (0.000) (0.657) (0.785)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 2.965 5.560 9.305 10.301
(0.742) (0.511) (0.300) (0.253)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) -2.920 -7.821 2.253 2.274
(0.628) (0.188) (0.713) (0.713)
Underwriter Rank 0.696 0.986 -1.703 -1.593
(0.516) (0.331) (0.284) (0.310)
Nasdaq Dummy -1.843 -3.663 -9.481 -8.451
(0.871) (0.731) (0.349) (0.400)
Internet IPO Dummy -28.076 -29.096 39.496* 39.117*
(0.217) (0.171) (0.081) (0.089)
Average Underpricing 0.640* 0.817** -0.140 -0.156
(0.057) (0.013) (0.666) (0.627)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 41.179* 33.468 -43.386 -45.135
(0.078) (0.126) (0.174) (0.155)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. 108.679 307.254 -1133.547 -1198.829
(0.947) (0.843) (0.320) (0.292)
Prior 30 day EW Index -30.193 -22.554 63.572 64.534
(0.466) (0.559) (0.145) (0.140)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y -30.958 -32.249 21.233 19.947
(0.170) (0.130) (0.334) (0.367)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.222 0.203 1.304** 1.330**
(0.243) (0.254) (0.016) (0.015)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.394 0.487 -0.983 -1.050
(0.376) (0.245) (0.217) (0.193)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.113 -0.217 -0.065 -0.062
(0.639) (0.346) (0.802) (0.810)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Observations 125 125 102 102
R-squared 64.26% 68.24% 64.26% 64.13%
Adj. R-squared 26.14% 34.35% 5.02% 4.65%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Cross-sectional regressions of FDR on changes of accruals conditioned on
IPO options
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the first-day return defined as percentage diﬀerence between
first-day market closing price and the oﬀer price. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with exercise
price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received IPO options 0 otherwise (column 1
and 2). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives (column 3 and 4) while CEO Option
Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 5 and 6). Directors Options Grants is the number of IPO options
granted to the board members (column 7 and 8). MBS Accruals are changes in total accruals from pre-IPO year to the IPO year computed
from the balance sheet of each carve-out (columns 1,3,5 and 7) while MCF Accruals are changes in total accruals from pre-IPO year to the
IPO year computed from the cash flow statements (columns 2,4,6 and 8). Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: FDRi =  0 +  1 I POoptionsi +  2 M Accrualsi +  3 M Accrualsi ⇤ I POoptionsi +  04Xi + "i
first-day Return (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ IPO options CEO Option Grants Directors Option Grants
MBS Accruals MCF Accruals MBS Accruals MCF Accruals MBS Accruals MCF Accruals MBS Accruals MCF Accruals
Intercept 3.638 7.697 2.940 3.900 -0.250 -3.253 4.399 7.750
(0.925) (0.841) (0.939) (0.918) ( 0.995)
(0.932)
(0.907) (0.834)
IPO Options 0.552 1.325 -0.934 0.293 -5.489 -4.922 90.810** 60.832
( 0.913) (0.793) (0.844) (0.950) (0.583) (0.617) (0.034) (0.173)
MAccruals (t ) (t 1) 8.471 21.503* 8.116* 24.795** 8.220* 24.035** 6.400 19.265**
(0.188) (0.082) (0.100) (0.017) ( 0.100) (0.019) (0.201) (0.040)
IPO Options*MAccruals (t ) (t 1) -6.645 -21.756 -27.365* -80.622*** -60.111* -179.692*** -81.563 -830.233**
(0.447) (0.241) (0.100) (0.009) (0.100) (0.009) ( 0.710) (0.020)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -3.156 -3.229 -3.292 -3.008 -2.947 -2.376 -3.525 -3.501
(0.258) (0.243) (0.260) (0.291) (0.313) (0.406) (0.201) (0.195)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -4.212* -2.936 -4.410* -3.020 -4.446* -2.973 -4.104* -3.090
(0.077) (0.150) (0.058) (0.131) (0.057) (0.137) (0.072) (0.119)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 6.319 7.181 7.406 9.103* 7.291 9.093* 6.262 7.054
(0.242) (0.184) (0.174) (0.092) (0.181) (0.093) (0.238) (0.175)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) 2.052 1.305 1.727 1.006 1.876 1.187 1.858 0.573
( 0.555) (0.707) (0.625) (0.772) (0.594) (0.732) (0.587) (0.867)
Underwriter Rank -0.307 -0.302 -0.222 -0.180 -0.226 -0.200 -0.472 -0.490
(0.697) (0.701) (0.777) (0.815) ( 0.773) (0.796) (0.549) (0.524)
Nasdaq Dummy -1.318 -0.880 -1.455 -0.670 -0.825 0.227 -1.783 -1.257
( 0.829) (0.885) (0.811) (0.911) (0.892) (0.970) (0.771) (0.832)
Internet IPO Dummy 19.118 19.330 22.511* 23.909* 22.454* 23.847* 10.421 11.409
(0.131) (0.123) (0.077) (0.054) (0.076) (0.052) (0.422) (0.357)
Average Underpricing 0.274 0.306* 0.249 0.345* 0.252 0.358** 0.289 0.348**
(0.126) (0.089) (0.161) (0.051) (0.155) (0.044) (0.101) (0.046)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 21.772 17.581 20.180 12.929 19.966 11.952 24.794* 19.008
(0.127) (0.219) (0.158) (0.364) (0.161) (0.402) (0.082) (0.175)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. -81.749 -138.747 -282.417 -182.854 -267.846 -113.229 179.455 220.714
(0.915) (0.854) (0.715) (0.805) (0.729) (0.878) (0.815) (0.766)
Prior 30 day EW Index -4.295 2.204 -3.689 7.692 -3.713 9.203 -6.343 1.486
(0.847) (0.921) (0.867) (0.726) (0.866) (0.676) (0.773) (0.945)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 4.824 3.019 5.371 5.359 5.182 6.501 0.204 -0.790
(0.712) (0.818) (0.679) (0.675) (0.690) (0.612) (0.988) (0.951)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.288* 0.275* 0.283* 0.229 0.288* 0.233 0.296* 0.228
(0.068) (0.079) (0.070) (0.138) (0.066) (0.130) (0.056) (0.137)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.238 0.293 0.252 0.294 0.238 0.267 0.376 0.479
(0.449) (0.347) (0.424) (0.340) (0.449) (0.385) (0.241) (0.121)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.078 -0.137 -0.097 -0.164 -0.102 -0.156 -0.065 -0.104
(0.592) (0.366) (0.501) (0.258) (0.482) (0.278) (0.651) (0.459)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 45.11% 45.58% 45.84% 47.59% 45.84% 47.61% 46.60% 48.76%
Adj. R-squared 16.74% 17.46% 17.84% 20.51% 17.86% 20.54% 19.00% 22.28%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The first two columns are under specification where IPO options is a binary variable.
Third and forth columns are under specification where IPO options is the number of
IPO options (in million) granted to the top executives of the carve-out company while
in the next two columns (5 and 6) it is the number of IPO options granted just to the
CEO. Columns 7 and 8 report the cross-sectional regressions where IPO options is the
number of options (in million) granted to the board members of the carve-out. In all
diﬀerent specifications of IPO options first columns (column 1, 3, 5 and 7 respectively)
are regressions where changes in total accruals are measured from the balance sheet
while in the second column (column 2, 4, 6 and 8 respectively) they are measured from
the cash flow statement. In almost all regressions and for all diﬀerent specifications of
IPO options and total accruals there is a positive statistically significant relationship
between the changes in total accruals and first-day return for companies that did not
grant IPO options (coeﬃcient  2) that I interpret as a sign of earnings management.
The positive relationship between changes in total accruals between the IPO year and
the pre-IPO year and the first-day return ( 2) is oﬀset by the coeﬃcient  3 that has
opposite sign. This finding gives an ex-post evidence that in the subsample of equity
carve-outs that grant IPO options there is no evidence of earnings management in the
period around the IPO (both in the pre-IPO year and in the IPO year).
1.4.2 Decomposition of the first-day return
I decompose the first-day return in two parts: first one comes from low oﬀer price (un-
dervaluation) and second one comes from high first-day market price (overpricing) by
using industry peers’ multiples. I explained the details of the methodology in section
3.2.2. Table 1.7 reports the average first-day return and its two parts for the entire
sample (column 1) and for the two subsamples of equity carve-outs: those that did not
grant IPO options (column 2) and those that grant IPO options (column 3). All vari-
ables are winsorized at 1% in order to make sure that extreme values of the distribution
don’t drive the results.6
6Due to winsorizing the sum of oﬀer price undervaluation and market price overpricing does not
give exactly the first-day return.
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Table 1.7: Summary statistics of the decomposed first-day return
Column 1 stands for the decomposed first-day return of the entire sample that runs from May 1996
to December 2013. Column 2 and 3 are for the subsamples of carve-outs conditioned on IPO option
grants. First-day return is defined as percentage diﬀerence between first-day closing market price and
the oﬀer price. Oﬀer price undervaluation is defined as percentage diﬀerence between intrinsic price
and the oﬀer price, while market price overpricing is percentage diﬀerence between first-day closing
market price and the intrinsic price. Intrinsic price is computed by the average value of the price-to-
sales ratios of three most similar (matched by sales and profitability) industry peers at the IPO date
multiplied by the sales of the respective carve-out.
Whole Sample No IPO Options IPO Options
(1) (2) (3)
Observations 227 125 102
First-Day Return (%) 17.99% 19.39% 16.27%
Oﬀer Price Undervaluation (%) -7.91% -12.12% -2.76%*
Market Price Overpricing (%) 25.21% 30.50% 18.73%*
*) Asterisks denote significant diﬀerences between two subsamples based on t-statistics.
Fir st Day Return =
f ir st day closing pr ice o f f er pr ice
o f f er pr ice ⇤ 100
Of f er Pr iceUndervaluat ion =
I ntr insic Pr ice Of f er Pr ice
Of f er Pr ice ⇤ 100
Market Over pr icing =
Fir st Day Closing Pr ice I ntr insic Pr ice
Of f er Pr ice ⇤ 100
I find that carve-outs that did not grant IPO options are actually overvalued by
12.12% on average compared to their industry peers i.e. their oﬀer price is set higher
than the price at which industry peers were trading at the day of the IPO. This result is
consistent with the finding of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) that the median
IPO was significantly overvalued at the oﬀer price from 14% and above depending
on the peer matching criteria. It is also in the line with my predictions that these
companies are inflating the earnings by using abnormal positive accruals in the IPO
period. Institutional investors are misled in the book-building process and as a result
the oﬀer price is set higher than the fair value of the company. Individual investors
are misled as well and they are overoptimistic toward the new issue resulting in very
high first-day secondary market closing price that deviates from the industry peers
on average by 30.5%. As expected the eﬀect on the individual investors is stronger
because they are less informed and more anchored to earnings than the institutional
investors. On the other hand, the oﬀer price of carve-outs that grant IPO options to
their executives is set close to their industry peers. They are overvalued only by 2.76%
on average and I interpret this as a sign for more realistic reporting in the IPO period.
Market overoptimism is significantly lower than the other subsample resulting in lower
first-day return.
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In order to test the second and third hypothesis of the paper (H2 and H3 ) whether
the overvaluation of the oﬀer price and overpricing by the market are aﬀected by re-
porting distortion in the year prior to the IPO and how this relationship diﬀers between
two subsets of equity carve-outs I estimate the following equations under diﬀerent spec-
ifications of IPO options grants:
O f f er price undervaluation =  0+  1IPOoptionsi+  2(DACt 1)i+  3(DACt 1)i⇤IPOoptionsi+  04Xi+"i
Market overpricing =  0 +  1IPOoptionsi +  2(DACt 1)i +  3(DACt 1)i ⇤ IPOoptionsi +  04Xi + "i ;
where IPOoptionsi are diﬀerent specifications of IPO options grants and Xi is the
battery of control variables that are likely to aﬀect the first-day return explained in
the Appendix. Note that here I am using discretionary accruals (DAC(t 1) )i as a more
direct measure of earnings management.7
The results are in Table 1.8. In the first three column I regress the oﬀer price
undervaluation under diﬀerent specifications of IPO options grants (binary, number of
options granted to executives and number of options granted to the CEO) while in the
next three columns the dependent variable is the market price overpricing.
In the first three regressions (column 1, 2 and 3) for all diﬀerent specifications of
IPO options there is a positive statistically significant relationship between discretionary
accruals and oﬀer price undervaluation for companies that did not grant IPO options
(coeﬃcient  2). Lower (for example negative) discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO
period lead to lower oﬀer price undervaluation or in my case of equity carve-outs on
average to overvaluation for the subsample of companies that did not grant IPO options
to their executives. I interpret this finding as a sign of earnings management. Lower
accruals in the pre-IPO period allow these companies to have “reserves” and report
higher accruals in the IPO year that increase the earnings. As a result of inflated
earnings the oﬀer price of the carve-out is set higher than the industry peers i.e. the
company is overvalued.
For the other subsample of carve-outs that granted IPO options to their executives
this relationship is oﬀset by the interaction term that has opposite sign (coeﬃcient of
interest is the sum of  2 and  3). As argued before these managers do not have an
7Total accruals are not always a sign for earnings management (their reversal and dynamics during
the time might be). I estimate the discretionary (abnormal) accruals using the performance-adjusted
modified Jones model as explained in section 3.2.3 using the industry peers and assuming that on
average their accruals should be considered as normal for respective company. The most simple way
to look at discretionary accruals is like a diﬀerence between total accruals and normal accruals. They
are clearly more direct measure to detect earnings managment than total accruals.
33
incentive to set higher oﬀer price, in contrast they have an incentive to set the oﬀer price
as low as possible because this is the strike price of their options and they will profit
more when they will exercise the options after the vesting period. There is no direct
relationship between the oﬀer price and the IPO options grants, but this is expected
because it’s hard to believe that previous division managers can influence directly the
oﬀer price. However, they do have an influence over the reporting practices of the
division. I argue that they do not use aggressive accounting techniques to inflate the
earnings in the IPO period. As a matter of fact I do find that on average their oﬀer
price is set more closely to their industry peers.
Next (in column 4, 5 and 6) I regress the market overpricing measure to see how
reporting distortions in the pre-IPO period aﬀect the first-day market closing price
conditioned on IPO option grants. As expected for all diﬀerent specifications of IPO
options there is a negative statistically significant relationship between discretionary
accruals and market overpricing for companies that did not granted IPO options (coef-
ficient  2). Low level of accruals in the pre-IPO period leads to higher first-day market
price and higher first-day return. Investors anchored to earnings are mislead by the
abnormal accruals and they are overoptimistic about those issues. In my sample of
equity carve-outs the average market overpricing is 30.5%.
In contrast, for carve-outs that grant IPO options to their executives overoptimism
is significantly lower than the other sample because these executives do not have an
incentive to inflate the earnings in the IPO year. Indeed, they have an incentive to
sacrifice the short-term performance for the sake of the long-run performance. My
results are supporting the hypothesis that companies that grant IPO options do not
manage earnings in the IPO period, so first-day market price cannot be predicted by
reporting distortion in the year prior to the IPO. In Table 1.6 the negative coeﬃcient
of discretionary accruals (that I interpret as a sign of earnings management) is oﬀset
by the interaction term that has opposite sign.
1.4.2.1 Instrumental variable estimation
Under the managerial influence hypothesis, reporting “habits” and the two components
of the first-day return are endogenously determined by subsidiary management. Table
1.9 addresses these endogeneity issues by estimating determinants of earnings manage-
ment and the components of the first-day return in two-stage least-squares system of
regressions. My focus is the subsample of carve-outs that grant IPO options. I want to
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Table 1.8: Regressions of the components of the first-day return on accruals conditioned
on IPO options
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the oﬀer price undervaluation
defined as percentage diﬀerence between the intrinsic price and the oﬀer price. The dependent variable in the last three columns is market
price overpricing defined as percentage diﬀerence between the first-day closing market price and the intrinsic price. Intrinsic price is
computed by the average value of the price-to-sales ratios of three most similar (matched by sales and profitability) industry peers at the
IPO date multiplied by the sales of the respective carve-out. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date
with exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received IPO options 0 otherwise
(column 1 and 4). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives (column 2 and 5) while
CEO Option Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 3 and 6). DAC are discretionary accruals computed using
performance-adjusted modified Jones model. Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: Oﬀer Price Undervaluation Dependent variable: Market Price Overpricing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ Options CEO’s Options IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ Options CEO’s Option
Intercept -127.355 -132.845 -131.346 121.839 125.947 123.348
(0.228) (0.209) (0.217) (0.261) (0.246) (0.258)
IPO Options -4.183 -8.430 -15.673 4.721 7.060 11.851
(0.762) (0.521) (0.572) (0.740) (0.600) (0.676)
DAC(t 1) 38.894** 25.685* 27.243* -39.666** -27.165* -29.272**
(0.033) (0.070) (0.058) (0.034) (0.062) ( 0.047)
IPO Options*DAC (t 1) -47.929** -61.588*** -143.831*** 47.961** 63.785*** 152.739***
(0.028) (0.009) (0.009) (0.033) (0.008) (0.007)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -2.458 -1.599 -2.098 0.418 -0.181 0.437
(0.745) (0.839) (0.791) (0.957) (0.982) (0.957)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -1.919 -2.126 -1.964 -0.306 -0.165 -0.370
(0.737) (0.706) (0.728) (0.958) (0.977) (0.949)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) -3.256 -3.004 -3.021 10.159 9.677 9.659
( 0.827) (0.840) (0.839) (0.506) (0.525) (0.526)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) -42.683*** -43.605*** -44.323*** 46.148*** 47.286*** 48.106***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ( 0.000)
Underwriter Rank 1.175 1.156 1.215 -1.614 -1.570 -1.623
(0.571) (0.575) (0.556) (0.448) (0.459) (0.443)
Nasdaq Dummy 30.349* 33.324** 33.060** -32.157* -35.022** -34.572**
(0.072) (0.047) (0.050) (0.063) (0.042) (0.045)
Internet IPO Dummy -9.636 -5.963 -6.148 15.193 12.294 12.551
( 0.776) (0.859) (0.854) (0.663) (0.722) (0.715)
Average Underpricing 0.733 0.741 0.741 -0.607 -0.615 -0.612
(0.135) (0.127) (0.128) (0.227) (0.217) (0.219)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 0.213 -6.710 -6.149 19.460 25.977 23.545
(0.996) (0.864) (0.854) (0.627) (0.518) (0.557)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. 1389.195 1340.535 1477.920 -1637.512 -1609.080 -1742.564
(0.507) (0.517) (0.475) (0.446) (0.449) (0.411)
Prior 30 day EW Index 44.020 50.237 50.280 -45.734 -52.300 -52.482
(0.473) (0.409) (0.408) (0.467) (0.402) (0.400)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y -23.084 -15.818 -14.955 30.909 23.754 22.870
(0.521) (0.657) (0.675) (0.403) (0.516) (0.531)
Oﬀer Price Revision -0.487 -0.460 -0.468 0.775* 0.750* 0.759*
(0.259) (0.282) (0.274) (0.081) (0.088) (0.084)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision -0.326 -0.289 -0.260 0.477 0.420 0.381
( 0.706) (0.739) (0.764) (0.591) (0.637) (0.668)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.193 -0.148 -0.136 0.191 0.141 0.125
(0.628) (0.708) (0.732) (0.640) (0.729) (0.758)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 57.91% 58.53% 58.51% 60.36% 60.99% 61.70%
Adj. R-squared 36.16% 37.10% 37.07% 39.88% 40.84% 40.96%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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support the finding that IPO option granting companies are less engaged in earnings
management in the IPO period and as a result their first-day return cannot be predicted
by reporting distortions in the pre-IPO period.
Finding an instrument that is correlated with earnings management (discretionary
accruals), but not correlated to the error term is a very challenging task. I hypothesize
that managers who are hiding the real performance of the company are trying to mislead
the audience by more complicate prospectuses for the issue. “Hotter” issues are followed
by more updates and more pages in each update compared to less “hot” issues. I find
that number of pages and updates of the prospectuses are positively correlated to the
earnings management measure but they are uncorrelated to the components of the first-
day return. I hand collect the number of pages in the prospectus for each carve-out and I
multiply it by the number of updates. The identifying variable for discretionary accruals
as measure for earnings management is total number of pages of the prospectuses for
each carve-out.
The dependent variable in the first-stage (column 1 in Table 1.8) is the discretionary
accruals in the year prior to the IPO. Total number of pages in the prospectuses for each
carve-out is significantly and positively related to the earnings management measure.
More pages in the prospectuses lead to higher accruals and less pages in the prospectuses
lead to lower accruals.
The second-stage regressions (column 2 and 3) address the managerial influence
hypothesis after controlling for endogeneity. The regression in Column 2 indicates
that lower discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO year lead to higher undervaluation of
the oﬀer price compared to industry peers i.e. lower oﬀer price than the peers. In the
subsample of carve-out that grant IPO options subsidiary management has an incentive
to push down the oﬀer price by using more conservative accounting techniques. On the
other hand, regression in Column 3 indicates that lower discretionary accruals in the
pre-IPO year lead to lower overpricing i.e. lower secondary market first-day price.
The estimated coeﬃcients of the discretionary accruals in the second stage regres-
sions (column 2 and 3) are symmetric. Both of them are statistically significant with
almost same magnitude but with opposite direction (sign). An average discretionary
accruals of 0.0377 in the pre-IPO year for the subsample of carve-outs that grant IPO
options to their management explains 3.5 percentage points of the oﬀer price under-
valuation compared to the industry peers. This is oﬀset by 3.6 percentage points of
secondary market overpricing. The total eﬀect on the first-day return is almost zero.
Therefore, even after controlling for potential endogeneity, I find that the predictive
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power of discretionary accruals in pre-IPO year on future returns for the companies
that grant IPO options decreases to zero on average. This finding supports the main
finding of the paper that IPO options are good governance mechanism to decrease
opportunistic reporting by the managers in the years around the IPO.
1.5 Robustness tests
1.5.1 Initial Return
Ruud (1993) points out that positive mean first-day returns are partially due to un-
observed left (negative) tail of distribution of initial return because of underwriters’
price support in the first days of the IPO. Underwrites legally can and do intervene to
support IPO prices (Rule 10b-7, Securities Act of 1934). The eﬀect of such support
is to reduce the number of negative initial returns from what would otherwise be ob-
served in the market. In sum, underwriter price support or stabilization are alternating
the distribution of initial returns (positively skewed): stock prices are allowed to rise
but are prevented from falling below the oﬀer price until the issue is fully sold. As
a conclusion, first-day closing market price might not be good proxy for the expected
market value of the company, it is also due to the short-term price pressure created by
the underwrites.
In order to make sure that this phenomena does not aﬀect my results I use second
day market price and seventh day secondary market price (when price will be stabilized
after the initial pressure) to measure initial return and market overpricing. I compute
the initial return as follow:
Initial Return (2nd Day Price) = second day market closing price o f f er priceo f f er price ⇤ 100
Initial Return(7th Day Price) = seventh day market closing price o f f er priceo f f er price ⇤ 100
I repeat all regressions reported in Table 1.3 by using second and seventh day return as
dependent variables. The results that total accruals in the pre-IPO year can partially
explain the cross-sectional variation of the initial return conditioned on IPO options
grants are robust also to these two specifications of initial returns. Table 1.10 reports
the results where the dependent variable is the initial return calculated by using second
day market price. The results are robust to this test. In some cases the magnitude is
even higher (for CEO and directors option grants).
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Table 1.9: Two-stage least-squares regressions explaining oﬀer price undervaluation and
market price overpricing for the subsample of companies that granted IPO options
The first column reports the results from the first stage regression where the dependent variable are dicreationary accruals computed
using performance-adjusted modified Jones model while the explainatory variable are total number of pages in prospectuses for each carve-
out that granted IPO options. The esimated value of the discretionary accruals is used to explain oﬀer price undervaluation (defined
as percentage diﬀerence between the intrinsic price and the oﬀer price) reported in column 2 and market price overpricng (percentage
diﬀerence between the first-day closing market price and the intrinsic price) reported in column 3 for the subsample of carve-outs that
grant IPO options. Intrinsic price is computed by the average value of the price-to-sales ratios of three most similar (matched by sales and
profitability) industry peers at the IPO date multiplied by the sales of the respective carve-out. Controlling variables are defined in the
Appendix of the paper.
First-stage results Second-stage results
Dep. var: DAC(t 1) Dep.var .: Oﬀer Price Undervaluation Dep.var .: Market Price Overpricing
Intercept 0.748 66.301 -52.268
(0.332) (0.347) (0.456)





ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -0.125 6.980 -9.371
(0.186) (0.389) (0.246)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -0.685*** -73.305** 77.901**
(0.007) (0.025) (0.016)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) -0.022 -23.470 33.360**
( 0.904) (0.169) (0.049)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) -0.165 -27.739** 29.335**
(0.187) (0.019) (0.013)
Underwriter Rank 0.016 0.218 -1.845
(0.613) (0.941) (0.530)
Nasdaq Dummy 0.073 56.381*** -65.614***
(0.725) (0.004) (0.001)
Internet IPO Dummy -0.156 -86.884** 112.713***
( 0.715) (0.026) (0.004)
Average Underpricing -0.005 -0.601 0.480
(0.428) (0.305) (0.409)
Prior 30 day Industry Return -0.256 -100.775* 58.271
(0.686) (0.081) (0.310)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. 7.030 1846.563 -3125.490
(0.764) (0.393) (0.146)
Prior 30 day EW Index 0.500 174.193** -111.819
(0.563) (0.030) (0.161)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y -0.132 -65.376 85.418**
(0.767) (0.103) (0.032)
Oﬀer Price Revision -0.023* -2.052** 3.413***
(0.058) (0.043) (0.001)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision -0.050** 2.559 -3.722**
( 0.011) (0.132) (0.028)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.001 -0.142 0.086
(0.896) (0.763) (0.855)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES
Observations 102 102 102
R-squared 70.64% 65.77% 73.14%
Adj. R-squared and Partial R-squared 21.95% / 14.95%
F-stat = 6.7 Wald chi2=240.1 Wald chi2=312.2
Prob>F=0.010 Prob>chi2=0.000 Prob>chi2=0.000
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Table 1.10: Cross-sectional regressions of the initial return (2nd day market price)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the initial return defined as percentage diﬀerence between
the second day market closing price and the oﬀer price. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with
exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received IPO options 0 otherwise
(column 1 and 2). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives (column 3 and 4) while CEO
Option Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 5 and 6). Directors Options Grants is the number of IPO options
granted to the board members (column 7 and 8). BS Accruals are total accruals computed from the comaprable balance sheet of each
carve-out one year prior to the IPO (columns 1,3,5 and 7) while CF Accruals are total accruals computed from the cash flow statements
one year prior to the IPO (columns 2,4,6 and 8). Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: I nit ial Returni =  0 +  1 I POoptionsi +  2 (Accrualst 1)i +  3 (Accrualst 1)i ⇤ I POoptionsi +  04Xi + "i
Initial Return-2nd day price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ IPO options CEO Option Grants Directors Option Grants
BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals
Intercept 26.144 47.063 15.190 42.559 8.836 32.846 11.528 29.623
(0.571) (0.155) (0.739) (0.340) ( 0.846) (0.463) (0.798) (0.488)
IPO Options 0.062 2.544 3.461 9.652 2.321 13.901 166.319*** 255.042***
( 0.992) (0.670) (0.561) (0.133) (0.849) (0.281) (0.002) (0.000)
Accruals (t 1) -21.295** -57.751*** -15.801** -55.2030*** -16.122** -53.674*** -10.433 -36.864***
(0.031) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) ( 0.038) (0.000) (0.154) (0.001)
IPO Options*Accruals (t 1) 36.561*** 72.656*** 65.433*** 109.230*** 152.789*** 249.146*** 924.781** 2201.529***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -2.497 -2.742 -2.128 -2.981 -1.557 -2.038 -2.014 -2.755
(0.447) (0.388) (0.530) (0.363) (0.645) (0.535) (0.536) (0.367)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -3.224 -4.516* -2.885 -5.366** -2.889 -5.252** -1.875 -4.082*
(0.219) (0.077) (0.252) (0.034) (0.249) (0.038) (0.450) (0.091)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 5.919 7.426 7.725 7.295 7.375 6.797 4.048 2.691
( 0.355) (0.232) (0.223) (0.234) (0.243) (0.267) (0.523) (0.649)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) 1.913 -0.884 2.446 -0.891 2.758 -0.222 2.803 0.359
(0.644) (0.829) (0.553) (0.828) ( 0.501) (0.957) (0.489) (0.927)
Underwriter Rank -0.414 -0.317 -0.366 -0.249 -0.353 -0.257 -0.442 -0.410
(0.642) (0.713) (0.677) (0.769) (0.687) (0.762) (0.623) (0.624)
Nasdaq Dummy -0.762 0.241 -0.941 -0.656 0.432 1.089 1.466 -0.928
(0.916) (0.973) (0.895) (0.924) (0.952) (0.875) (0.842) (0.890)
Internet IPO Dummy 53.829*** 53.502*** 58.692*** 54.989*** 59.147*** 55.849*** 38.355** 27.542*
( 0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.052)
Average Underpricing 0.298 0.381* 0.242 0.381* 0.239 0.385* 0.336 0.510**
(0.163) (0.067) (0.249) (0.062) (0.254) (0.060) (0.111) (0.011)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 32.919* 24.985 31.950* 22.959 31.712* 22.485 36.161** 33.602**
(0.053) (0.130) (0.058) (0.161) (0.059) (0.170) (0.033) (0.034)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. -684.453 -744.971 -884.549 -967.468 -809.901 -878.770 -215.435 -71.040
(0.450) (0.394) (0.321) (0.261) (0.361) (0.306) (0.810) (0.933)
Prior 30 day EW Index -25.941 -19.845 -24.927 -15.652 -24.960 -13.478 -20.085 -22.047
(0.328) (0.437) (0.338) (0.533) (0.337) (0.592) (0.444) (0.367)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 13.044 11.630 16.724 15.611 17.088 16.381 5.899 -1.987
(0.402) (0.439) (0.275) (0.290) (0.263) (0.268) (0.704) (0.892)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.297 0.308* 0.270 0.278 0.274 0.281 0.336* 0.303*
(0.114) (0.089) (0.143) (0.118) (0.136) (0.113) (0.071) (0.079)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.288 0.355 0.219 0.288 0.199 0.254 0.427 0.360
( 0.440) (0.326) (0.553) (0.420) (0.589) (0.476) (0.253) (0.306)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.186 -0.283* -0.190 -0.295* -0.196 -0.295* -0.114 -0.182
(0.288) (0.099) (0.267) (0.079) (0.250) (0.080) (0.500) (0.257)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 46.99% 50.60% 48.75% 52.27% 49.06% 52.13% 48.68% 55.00%
Adj. R-squared 19.60% 25.07% 22.26% 27.60% 22.73% 27.39% 22.15% 31.74%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The negative statistically significant relationship between total accruals and initial re-
turn for companies that did not grant IPO options (coeﬃcient  2) is preserved even if
initial price pressure caused by underwriters intervention is eliminated. The negative
relationship between total accruals in the year preceding the IPO and the initial return
( 2) is oﬀset by the coeﬃcient  3 that has opposite sign as in the main finding of the
paper (Table 1.3). This finding confirms the main result that in the subsample of equity
carveout that granted IPO options there is no evidence of earnings management in the
period around the IPO. The results are also robust when the initial return is measured
using the market price one week (7 days) after the IPO. The results are reported in
Table 1.11.
Next I compute the market overpricing measure using second and seventh day closing
market pricing:
Market Overpricing (2nd Day Price) = Second DayClosing Price Intrinsic PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100
Market Overpricing (7th Day Price) = Seventh DayClosing Price Intrinsic PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100
I repeat the regressions from Table 1.8 (column 4, 5 and 6) in order to see weather
reporting distortions in the pre-IPO period that aﬀect the market overoptimism are
not driven only by initial price pressure caused by the underwriters. The results are in
Table 1.12. For all diﬀerent specifications of IPO options there is a negative statistically
significant relationship between discretionary accruals and market overpricing for com-
panies that did not grant IPO options. Investors anchored to earnings are mislead by
the abnormal accruals and they are overoptimistic about those issues. This relationship
is oﬀset by the coeﬃcient  3 for carve-outs that grant IPO options. The results are
also robust when the market overpricing is measured using the market price one week
(7 days) after the IPO.
1.5.2 Matching procedure
I compute the intrinsic (fair) value of the carve-outs using three matching firms from
same industry (3-digit SIC) as explained in section 3.1 and 3.2.2. Taking an average
of three matches might not be the best solution. The ideal way is to find company
with same characters as the subject company and see at which multiple it was trading
at the day of the IPO of the carveout. In order to see weather the results are robust
to the matching procedure I change it as follows: from the set of matching firms from
same industry, for each carveout I keep three (instead of five) comparable firms that
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Table 1.11: Cross-sectional regressions of the initial return (7th day market price)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable is the initial return defined as percentage diﬀerence between
seventh day market closing price and the oﬀer price. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with
exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received IPO options 0 otherwise
(column 1 and 2). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives (column 3 and 4) while CEO
Option Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 5 and 6). Directors Options Grants is the number of IPO options
granted to the board members (column 7 and 8). BS Accruals are total accruals computed from the comaprable balance sheet of each
carve-out one year prior to the IPO (columns 1,3,5 and 7) while CF Accruals are total accruals computed from the cash flow statements
one year prior to the IPO (columns 2,4,6 and 8). Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: I nit ial Returni =  0 +  1 I POoptionsi +  2 (Accrualst 1)i +  3 (Accrualst 1)i ⇤ I POoptionsi +  04Xi + "i
Initial Return-7th day price (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ IPO options CEO Option Grants Directors Option Grants
BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals BS Accruals CF Accruals
Intercept 20.390 33.040 9.131 27.198 3.531 18.844 8.975 19.452
(0.636) (0.441) (0.829) (0.521) (0.934) (0.657) (0.831) (0.629)
IPO Options -0.755 1.089 0.079 4.850 -3.423 5.286 136.847*** 221.773***
(0.893) (0.848) (0.989) (0.426) (0.163) (0.666) (0.007) (0.000)
Accruals (t 1) -12.930 -35.944*** -9.964 -35.824*** -10.053 -34.219*** -5.644 -21.84**
(0.158) (0.009) (0.169) (0.004) (0.163) (0.006) (0.407) (0.041)
IPO Options*Accruals (t 1) 27.205** 53.180*** 52.86*** 85.343*** 122.532*** 192.718*** 802.529** 2041.24***
(0.037) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) -2.244 -2.298 -1.487 -2.009 -1.050 -1.274 -1.839 -2.217
(0.463) (0.447) (0.637) (0.519) (0.739) (0.683) (0.544) (0.441)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.993 0.289 1.143 -0.434 1.161 -0.310 1.973 0.559
(0.684) (0.905) (0.625) (0.856) (0.619) (0.897) (0.394) (0.805)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 5.284 6.491 6.406 6.157 6.149 5.780 3.662 2.469
(0.375) (0.271) (0.278) (0.290) (0.296) (0.321) (0.535) (0.658)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) 1.726 0.059 2.456 0.330 2.659 0.838 2.397 0.995
(0.654) (0.988) (0.522) (0.932) (0.486) (0.829) (0.525) (0.787)
Underwriter Rank -0.617 -0.561 -0.549 -0.479 -0.539 -0.484 -0.622 -0.607
(0.457) (0.493) (0.502) (0.553) (0.509) (0.549) (0.458) (0.442)
Nasdaq Dummy -2.816 -2.086 -2.713 -2.532 -1.469 -1.026 -0.711 -2.742
(0.677) (0.754) (0.683) (0.698) (0.826) (0.876) (0.917) (0.664)
Internet IPO Dummy 44.736*** 44.972*** 49.902*** 47.358*** 49.861*** 47.639*** 32.919** 24.438*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.020) (0.067)
Average Underpricing 0.353* 0.408** 0.313 0.413** 0.313 0.418** 0.388** 0.531***
(0.077) (0.040) (0.110) (0.033) (0.110) (0.032) (0.049) (0.005)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 29.126* 23.927 27.217* 20.959 27.186* 20.778 31.574** 30.292**
(0.066) (0.127) (0.083) (0.178) (0.082) (0.182) (0.045) (0.043)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. -829.16 -860.53 -1010.13 -1053.77 -928.21 -962.28 -441.284 -281.470
(0.326) (0.301) (0.224) (0.198) (0.261) (0.239) (0.597) (0.722)
Prior 30 day EW Index -32.813 -28.828 -31.555 -24.817 -31.455 -23.050 -27.709 -30.073
(0.185) (0.236) (0.193) (0.299) (0.194) (0.336) (0.257) (0.193)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 10.413 9.350 13.514 12.563 13.812 13.178 4.362 -3.100
(0.472) (0.513) (0.343) (0.370) (0.332) (0.349) (0.763) (0.823)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.351** 0.361** 0.336* 0.344** 0.338** 0.345** 0.388** 0.361**
(0.046) (0.037) (0.051) (0.042) (0.049) (0.042) (0.025) (0.027)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.149 0.180 0.066 0.103 0.055 0.081 0.254 0.158
(0.667) (0.598) (0.849) (0.762) (0.874) (0.812) (0.464) (0.634)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.219 -0.281* -0.229 -0.299* -0.233 -0.296* -0.164 -0.208
(0.181) (0.086) (0.152) (0.062) (0.144) (0.065) (0.300) (0.170)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 46.13% 47.71% 48.00% 49.54% 48.20% 49.36% 47.93% 53.13%
Adj. R-squared 18.30% 20.69% 21.13% 23.47% 21.43% 23.20% 22.15% 28.91%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.12: Regressions of the market price overpricing computed with alternative
market prices
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the market price overpricing
defined as percentage diﬀerence between the second day closing market price and the intrinsic price. The dependent variable in the last
three columns is market price overpricing defined as percentage diﬀerence between the seventh day closing market price and the intrinsic
price. Intrinsic price is computed by the average value of the price-to-sales ratios of three most similar (matched by sales and profitability)
industry peers at the IPO date multiplied by the sales of the respective carve-out. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options
grants at the IPO date with exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received
IPO options 0 otherwise (column 1 and 4). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives
(column 2 and 5) while CEO Option Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 3 and 6). DAC are discretionary
accruals computed using performance-adjusted modified Jones model. Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dep.var.: Market Overpricing (2nd day price) Dep.var.: Market Overpricing (7th day price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ Options CEO’s Options IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ Options CEO’s Option
Intercept 135.209 138.271 135.293 136.979 135.984 132.642
(0.215) (0.205) (0.217) (0.228) (0.232) (0.246)
IPO Options 3.341 5.957 9.318 2.198 3.427 4.684
(0.815) (0.659) (0.744) (0.883) (0.808) (0.875)
DAC(t 1) -34.216* -24.119* -26.148* -35.181* -24.104* -26.118*
(0.069) (0.098) ( 0.077) (0.073) (0.100) ( 0.090)
IPO Options*DAC (t 1) 43.334* 61.979** 148.197*** 47.454** 66.554*** 158.234***
(0.054) (0.011) (0.009) (0.044) (0.009) (0.007)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) 0.344 -0.119 0.513 0.378 -0.420 1.030
(0.965) (0.988) (0.950) (0.963) (0.960) (0.903)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -0.287 -0.237 -0.432 3.592 3.688 3.495
(0.961) (0.967) (0.941) (0.560) (0.543) (0.565)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 9.147 8.777 8.738 8.908 8.147 8.172
(0.552) (0.566) (0.567) (0.578) (0.610) (0.608)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) 44.923*** 46.109*** 46.911*** 44.507*** 46.237*** 47.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Underwriter Rank -1.649 -1.602 -1.651 -1.863 -1.776 -1.833
(0.441) (0.451) (0.437) (0.404) (0.423) (0.409)
Nasdaq Dummy -32.671* -35.283** -34.766** -34.240* -36.878** -36.194**
(0.061) (0.041) (0.045) (0.060) (0.041) (0.045)
Internet IPO Dummy 16.965 14.775 14.949 26.733 24.835 24.585
(0.628) (0.670) (0.664) (0.465) (0.492) (0.494)
Average Underpricing -0.537 -0.540 -0.536 -0.432 -0.431 -0.425
(0.288) (0.279) (0.283) (0.412) (0.408) (0.414)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 15.748 21.834 19.435 18.112 23.451 21.102
(0.696) (0.388) (0.629) (0.667) (0.577) (0.615)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. -1876.0 -1843.2 -1966.3 -2122.6 -2089.9 -2199.4
(0.385) (0.388) (0.356) (0.347) (0.348) (0.322)
Prior 30 day EW Index -50.467 -56.969 -57.041 -64.482 -70.342 -70.287
(0.425) (0.363) (0.362) (0.329) (0.282) (0.282)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 32.110 25.548 24.722 31.427 24.549 23.662
(0.387) (0.486) (0.500) (0.417) (0.522) (0.536)
Oﬀer Price Revision 0.773* 0.755* 0.764* 0.833* 0.820* 0.827*
(0.084) (0.087) (0.083) (0.074) (0.075) (0.073)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.574 0.495 0.458 0.448 0.338 0.305
(0.519) (0.579) (0.607) (0.630) (0.717) (0.742)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up 0.133 0.083 0.068 0.049 0.005 -0.019
(0.747) (0.838) (0.867) (0.910) (0.992) (0.964)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 60.03% 60.79% 60.86% 58.41% 59.18% 59.26%
Adj. R-squared 39.37% 40.53% 40.63% 36.92% 38.09% 38.20%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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are closest in sales scaled by total assets in the year prior to the IPO. Out of the three
selected peers I keep only one (instead of three) comparable firm with closest operating
income scaled by total assets to the respective carveout. I consider this firm as best
match for each carveout. Table 1.13 compares the fundamentals of the carve-outs and
their best match.
Under this matching procedure matching firms again share similar sales and operating
income distribution characteristics as the carve-outs for the both subsamples: IPO
option graters and no IPO option granters. However they trade at diﬀerent price to
sales ratio.
The subsample of carve-outs that did not grant IPO options seems overvalued compared
to their industry peers. This is in the line with my hypothesis that those companies
manage earnings in the IPO period and inflated earnings mislead the market partici-
pants resulting in overvaluation compared to the industry peers.
Then I decompose the first-day return in two parts under the new matching proce-
dure: undervalued oﬀer price and overpriced first-day market price by using industry
peers’ multiples. Table 1.14 reports the average first-day return and its two parts for
the entire sample (column 1) and for the two subsamples of equity carve-outs: those
that didn’t grant IPO options (column 2) and those that granted IPO options (column
3). All variables are winsorized at 1% in order to make sure that extreme values of the
distribution don’t drive the results.
I find again that carve-outs that did not grant IPO options are actually overvalued
by 10.33% on average compared to their best matched firm (on sales and profitability)
from same industry on the same date. On the other hand the carve-outs that grant
IPO options have oﬀer price very close to the their industry peer (they are overvalued
only by 2.7% on average). The deviation of the first-day market closing price from
the intrinsic (fair) price is much higher for the subsample of carve-outs that did not
grant IPO options indicating that for these carve-outs the market overoptimism is much
higher than for carve-outs that grant IPO options to their executives.
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Table 1.13: Characteristics of the carve-outs and their best match
The sample of carve-outs runs from May 1996 to December 2013. For each carve-out there is only
one matching firm that is industry peer with most similar sales and profitability. Price-to-Sales ratio
of the carve-outs is the product of the oﬀer price and shares outstanding (all share classes) over the
reported sales one year prior to the IPO. Price-to-Sales ratio of the matching firm is computed as a
product of the trading price of the respective firm at IPO date times shares outstanding over the sales
reported one year prior the cohort IPO year.
Carve-outs Matching Firms
Characteristics mean 25% 50% 75% mean 25% 50% 75%
Whole Sample (227obs.)
Sales(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 1.28 0.55 0.98 1.73 1.23 0.61 1.06 1.68
Operat ing Income(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.17
Price(t )
Sales(t 1) 13.63 1.11 2.24 6.24 3.61 0.44 1.11 2.74
IPO Options=0 (125 obs.)
Sales(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 1.11 0.53 0.89 1.55 1.11 0.54 0.94 1.53
Operat ing Income(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.17
Price(t )
Sales(t 1) 20.09 1.39 2.83 8.10 4.12 0.54 1.41 3.31
IPO Options=1 (102 obs.)
Sales(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 1.49 0.63 1.27 1.97 1.37 0.67 1.23 1.88
Operat ing Income(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.17
Price(t )
Sales(t 1) 5.71 0.84 1.76 3.75 2.98 0.36 0.88 2.37
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Table 1.14: Summary statistics of the decomposed first-day return under diﬀerent
matching criteria (using single match)
Column 1 stands for the decomposed first-day return of the entire sample that runs from May 1996
to December 2013. Column 2 and 3 are for the subsamples of carve-outs conditioned on IPO option
grants. First-day return is defined as percentage diﬀerence between first-day closing market price and
the oﬀer price. Oﬀer price undervaluation is defined as percentage diﬀerence between intrinsic price
and the oﬀer price, while market price overpricing is percentage diﬀerence between first-day closing
market price and the intrinsic price. Intrinsic price is computed by the price-to-sales ratio of the most
similar (matched by sales and profitability) industry peer at the IPO date multiplied by the sales of
the respective carve-out.
Whole Sample No IPO Options IPO Options
(1) (2) (3)
Observations 227 125 102
First-Day Return (%) 17.99% 19.39% 16.27%
Oﬀer Price Undervaluation (%) -6.90% -10.33% -2.70%*
Market Price Overpricing (%) 24.80% 29.43% 19.13%*
*) Asterisks denote significant diﬀerences between two subsamples based on t-statistics.
Fir st Day Return =
f ir st day closing pr ice o f f er pr ice
o f f er pr ice ⇤ 100
Of f er Pr iceUndervaluat ion =
I ntr insic Pr ice Of f er Pr ice
Of f er Pr ice ⇤ 100
Market Over pr icing =
Fir st Day Closing Pr ice I ntr insic Pr ice
Of f er Pr ice ⇤ 100
In order to test weather the overvaluation of the oﬀer price and overpricing by the
market are aﬀected by reporting distortion in the year prior to the IPO and how this
relationship diﬀers between two subsets of equity carve-outs I estimate the same linear
models as in Table 1.8 with dependent variables computed under the new matching
procedure (see Table 1.15). Positive statistically significant relationship remained un-
changed between discretionary accruals and oﬀer price undervaluation for companies
that did not grant IPO options (coeﬃcient  2) under the new matching procedure.
Lower discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO period lead to lower oﬀer price undervalua-
tion or in my case of equity carve-outs on average to overvaluation for the subsample of
companies that did not grant IPO options to their executives. For the other subsample
of carve-outs that granted IPO options to their executives this relationship is oﬀset by
the interaction term that has opposite sign (coeﬃcient of interest is the sum of  2 and
 3). The results are also robust when I use second and seventh day market price to
compute market overpricing measure.
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Table 1.15: Regressions of the components of the first-day return under diﬀerent match-
ing procedure (using single match)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The dependent variable in the first three columns is the oﬀer price undervaluation
defined as percentage diﬀerence between the intrinsic price and the oﬀer price. The dependent variable in the last three columns is
market price overpricing defined as percentage diﬀerence between the first-day closing market price and the intrinsic price. Intrinsic price
is computed by the value of the price-to-sales ratio of the most similar (matched by sales and profitability) industry peer at the IPO
date multiplied by the sales of the respective carve-out. IPO Options are defined as incentive stock options grants at the IPO date with
exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. IPO Options(0,1) is dummy variable set to 1 if executives received IPO options 0 otherwise
(column 1 and 4). Executives’ IPO options is the number of IPO options (in millions) grants to the executives (column 2 and 5) while
CEO Option Grants is the number of IPO options granted to the CEO (column 3 and 6). DAC are discretionary accruals computed using
performance-adjusted modified Jones model. Controlling variables are defined in the Appendix of the paper.
Dependent variable: Oﬀer Price Undervaluation Dependent variable: Market Price Overpricing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ Options CEO’s Options IPO Options (0,1) Executives’ Options CEO’s Option
Intercept -174.376 -206.348 -206.192 177.083 205.172 203.029
(0.189) (0.120) (0.123) (0.193) (0.131) (0.138)
IPO Options -2.488 -32.480** -59.102* 2.044 30.289* 52.994
(0.886) (0.049) (0.090) (0.909) (0.073) (0.138)
DAC(t 1) 50.942** 28.474 31.647* -58.624** -34.194* -38.024**
(0.026) (0.107) (0.079) (0.013) (0.060) ( 0.040)
IPO Options*DAC (t 1) -59.867** -63.171** -156.210** 67.748** 72.661** 181.505***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010)
Controls:
ln(Firm Sales(t 1) ) 1.645 6.790 5.751 -4.720 -9.364 -8.111
(0.863) (0.491) (0.562) (0.628) (0.355) (0.425)
Total Liabil it ies(t 1)
Total Asset s(t 1) -0.302 -1.042 -0.725 -2.945 -2.154 -2.524
(0.966) (0.883) (0.918) (0.689) (0.766) (0.728)
ln(1 + Shares RetainedShares Of f ered ) 23.841 20.754 21.236 -18.677 16.081 -16.617
( 0.204) (0.264) (0.254) (0.330) (0.399) (0.384)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) ) -34.362*** -32.330*** -33.854*** 36.310*** 34.931*** 36.632***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) ( 0.003)
Underwriter Rank 2.272 2.588 2.620 -2.594 -2.863 -2.892
(0.383) (0.478) (0.312) (0.331) (0.280) (0.276)
Nasdaq Dummy 44.183** 49.682** 50.463** -45.816** -51.538** -51.961**
(0.038) (0.018) (0.017) (0.035) (0.017) (0.017)
Internet IPO Dummy -43.346 -29.899 -33.658 61.490 48.230 51.894
( 0.310) (0.478) (0.423) (0.161) (0.265) (0.229)
Average Underpricing 0.609 0.631 0.644 -0.334 -0.353 -0.362
(0.322) (0.298) (0.289) (0.596) (0.570) (0.561)
Prior 30 day Industry Return 6.233 -10.409 -6.309 14.863 31.162 26.648
(0.899) (0.832) (0.897) (0.767) (0.535) (0.596)
Prior 30 day SD of Ind.Ret. 1771.973 1484.642 1808.756 -1903.227 -1620.240 -1943.089
(0.501) (0.566) (0.485) (0.480) (0.542) (0.465)
Prior 30 day EW Index 79.155 87.366 88.699 -84.980 -93.097 -94.380
(0.304) (0.251) (0.245) (0.282) (0.233) (0.227)
ln( PriceSales(t 1) )industr y 1.944 13.147 14.086 4.426 -7.615 -8.624
(0.966) (0.768) (0.752) (0.924) (0.868) (0.851)
Oﬀer Price Revision -0.552 -0.485 -0.509 0.845 0.780 0.805
(0.308) (0.364) (0.342) (0.129) (0.156) (0.143)
Negative Oﬀer Price Revision 0.181 -0.013 0.085 0.017 0.175 0.066
( 0.868) (0.990) (0.938) (0.988) (0.875) (0.953)
% of IPOs Price Revision Up -0.514 -0.509 -0.485 0.453 0.440 0.411
(0.306) (0.304) (0.329) (0.378) (0.387) (0.419)
Industry Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227
R-squared 54.34% 55.46% 55.31% 55.81% 56.74% 56.68%
Adj. R-squared 30.74% 32.44% 32.22% 32.97% 34.38% 34.29%
p-values in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the hypothesis that managers select accruals at the time around
the IPO opportunistically depending on their compensation packages. I use the specific
environment when a conglomerate is selling one of it’s devision to the public (equity
carve-out) to show that division managers are choosing diﬀerent accounting policy that
depends on how they are incentivized and these policies influence the initial performance
of the company. I find that the first-day return of the newly issued subsidiary stock is
partially explained by the reporting distortions in the pre-IPO period conditioned on
whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock options with an
exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price (IPO options). In case of equity carve-outs
IPO options give unique one-side incentive to executives to push down the oﬀer price
as much as possible, unlike in standard IPOs where there are two sides of the incentives
story of the executives that are in striking contrast: profit from the IPO options and
loss from the diluted previous holdings in the company. Since division managers are
mid-level executives in the parent company they do not have an influence over the oﬀer
price directly. I find a sign of such relation only for carve-outs that granted IPO options
to their board members (positive and statistically significant relationship between IPO
option grants and initial return). However, I find that managers incentivized by IPO
options are using less aggressive accounting techniques in the years around the IPO.
Their reported earnings are more realistic compared to the other subsample of managers
that did not receive such option grants. I find that pre-IPO total accruals are negatively
related to initial return only for carve-outs that did not grant IPO options to their
executives which I interpret as earnings management. Additionally, I find that only
these carve-outs are overvalued compared to their industry peer. In presence of IPO
options the negative relationship between total pre-IPO accruals and initial return is
reversed to become positive indicating that managers that are incentivized by IPO
options are sacrificing the short term performance (initial return) and trying to have
an oﬀer price as low as possible. They do not seek to increase their oﬀering proceeds,
by temporarily deceiving investors by opportunistically manipulating earnings through
accruals management before going public. Further, I find that these issues are followed
by less overoptimism (overpricing) in the secondary market resulting in lower first-day
return and it is partially explained by the discretionary accruals in the year prior to
the IPO. I conclude that incentive stock options are good governance mechanism to
decrease opportunistic reporting by the managers in the years around the IPO.
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The findings contribute to the vast literature of earnings management. I show that
predictive power of accruals diﬀers depending on the executives compensation packages.
This is an indirect proof that earnings are managed intentionally by the management.
Accruals as a measure of earnings management and as predictor of future returns should
be seen trough lens of the executives and how they are incentivized. My findings are
potentially useful for investors and regulators. Investors are concerned about whether
they are trading at the fair initial price and at which direction earnings management
aﬀects the short-term return. Accounting and financial regulators must be concerned
about the informativeness of the accounting numbers and how accurately accounting










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Are Incentive Stock Options Signaling Better
Corporate Governance? - An Evidence from Equity
Carve-outs
Abstract
I analyze the long-run performance and earnings management behavior of equity carve-
outs conditioned on whether the executives received incentive stock options at the IPO
date. Carve-outs that did not grant incentive stock options subsequently underperform
both relative to the overall market and relative to a sample of carve-outs that granted
stock options. I show that in absence of incentive stock options, companies adopt more
income-increasing accounting techniques around the IPO. Accruals in years around the
IPO explain the cross-sectional variation of the long-run stock market and accounting
underperformance. Contrarily, carve-outs that grant incentive stock options to their
executives at the IPO date do not underperform appropriate benchmarks over three-
year period following the IPO and use less aggressive accounting around the IPO. My
results point that incentive stock options are signaling better corporate governance to
the market that result in better long-run stock market and accounting performance.
JEL classifications: M41; G12; G24; G34; J33
Keywords: Earnings management; Initial public oﬀerings; IPO long-run performance; Equity
carve-outs; Executive compensation; Incentive stock options
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2.1 Introduction
An equity carve-out is a type of corporate reorganization, in which a conglomerate is
selling one of its devision to the public (IPO). As a part of the reorganization the division
(middle-level) managers become CEOs of a publicly listed company. Compensation
contracts of the subsidiary managers are revised in order to incorporate subsidiary
share prices and profits as measure of performance. New contracts are becoming more
eﬃcient. Often incentive stock options granted at the IPO date are part of the revised
contracts. Those options usually have an exercise (strike) price equal to the IPO oﬀer
price (IPO options in the rest of the paper) with payoﬀ equal to max (0, St - Oﬀer
Price). Subsidiary managers who received such incentive stock options don’t have an
incentive to push up the oﬀering price of the IPO because it will decrease their future
payoﬀ. At the other side, subsidiary managers who don’t have IPO options (have
only shares) in their new contracts have an incentive to window dress the company
before going public by using more aggressive accounting techniques in order to pump-
up the performance around the IPO. As a result of their earnings management behavior
around the IPO subsequently these carve-outs experience long-run stock market and
accounting underperformance both relative to the overall market and relative to the
sample of carve-outs that granted incentive stock options. I find that the long-run
underperformance is explained by the earnings management measure (level of accruals,
both total and discretionary) around the IPO.
In this paper I study the long-run performance of equity carve-outs conditioned
on whether they award the ex-subsidiary managers incentive stock options at the IPO
date. I show that incentive stock options are signaling better corporate governance
to the market (less managed earnings) resulting in better long-run stock market and
accounting performance.
Carve-outs that don’t grant stock options at the IPO date underperform both in
terms of stock returns and in terms of accounting profits (return on assets). The
underperformance is significant both relative to the overall market and relative to the
sample of carve-outs that granted stock options. The long-run underperformance is
explained by the high accruals around the IPO. Absence of incentive stock options in
the revised contracts is a signal for bad corporate governance measured with earnings
management (accruals) resulting in poor long-run performance.
Long-run underperformance of standard IPOs has been confirmed by several studies:
Stern and Bornstein (1985); Ritter (1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995). Furthermore,
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Teoh and Wong (1998) provide an evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals
in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter.
There is an evidence in the literature that equity carve-outs do not share same char-
acteristics as standard IPOs. Namely, Vijh (1999) shows that newly issued subsidiary
stock beat appropriate benchmarks over a three-year period following the carve-out.
In this paper I show that only better governed carve-outs that don’t have incentive to
manage earnings during the IPO outperform appropriate benchmarks. On the other
hand, carve-outs with poor corporate governance that manipulate earnings around the
IPO underperform appropriate benchmarks sharing same stylized fact of long-run un-
derperformance as standard IPOs.
Only in case of equity carve-outs incentive stock options granted at the IPO date
(usually with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price) give unique one-side incentive to the
executives not to push up the oﬀer price by using income-increasing techniques around
the IPO because it will decrease their future payoﬀs. Higher oﬀer price will not increase
their previous holdings because they remained in the conglomerate. In standard IPOs
there are two sides of the incentive story of the executives that are in striking contrast:
executives who received options will loose from higher oﬀer price, but at the same time
they will benefit if they hold shares or options granted before the IPO. Lowry and
Murphy (2007) look at all IPOs and their hypothesis is that if executives can influence
the IPO oﬀer price there should be a positive relationship between IPO option grants
and the first-day return. They do not find evidence of a such relationship.
Seistrajkova (2015) finds that carve-out companies that grant IPO options on aver-
age experience less initial underpricing compared to companies that did not grant IPO
options. She interpret the smaller underpricing as a function of less managed earnings
in the years around the IPO. Furthermore she finds that for carve-outs that granted
IPO options, the oﬀer price is set more closely to the price of their industry peers,
while for carve-outs that did not grant options the oﬀer price overvalues the company
on average by 12% compared to their industry peers. This paper is continuity of the
her previous work that shows that carve-outs that didn’t incentivezed their managers
with IPO options underperform on long-run compared to diﬀerent benchmarks. The
underperformance is explained by earnings management behavior around the IPO.
My sample covers all carve-outs for period from May 1996 to December 2013. I
hand collect data on IPO options grants from prospectuses of the issues and from
proxy statements at the IPO year. I show first that there is a decline in performance
(both stock market and accounting) for carve-outs that did not granted IPO options.
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Their cumulative abnormal returns following the IPO are significantly negative over
three year window that begins one week after the IPO. On the other hand, companies
that grant IPO options do not suﬀer a significant decline in performance. This result
holds both for stock market return and accounting returns.
The stock returns are robust to alternative specifications of abnormal returns. In
particular, I consider the returns to a zero-investment strategy which takes a long
position in the stock of equity carve-outs that granted IPO options and short position
in carve-outs that did not grant IPO options. I show that the alpha of following this
strategy for three years (using value-weighted or equal-wighted returns) is positive in a
four factor time-series return regression.
According to Barber and Lyon (1997) long-term investor experience is better cap-
tured by compounding short-term returns to obtain long-term buy-and-hold returns.
The long run event studies aim to assess the value of investing in the average sample
firm with respect to an appropriate benchmark over the horizon of interest. Thus the
correct measure should be the buy-and-hold return. I show that the results are ro-
bust also to this specification of abnormal returns. Companies that did not grant IPO
options have significantly negative BHAR over six months, one year, two years and
three years window beginning one week after the IPO using both value-weighted and
equally-weighted returns.
In all long-run event studies joint hypothesis problem may cloud the interpretation
of the results for abnormal returns. Thats why I measure the eﬀect of option grants
using accounting returns (return on assets) as well. I find that ROA declines over the
three years following the IPO only for carve-outs that did not grant IPO options. For
those companies ROA three years after the IPO is roughly 13 percentage points lower
than in the year of the IPO. A decline in ROA following the IPO for companies that did
not grant incentive stock options should capture only the decline in real performance
without having joint hypothesis problem of mispecified model. Furthermore, I show
that ROA significantly increases in the IPO year compared to pre-IPO year only for
carve-outs that did not grant IPO options, that is in the line with the hypotheses that
these companies are window dressing the company before going public.
Finally, I argue that bad stock market and accounting long-run performance of
companies that didn’t grant incentive stock options at the IPO date can be explained
by reporting distortions around the IPO. These companies are window dressing the
company before going public by using income-increasing accounting techniques that
result in high accruals. High accruals around the IPO are followed by poor long-run
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stock market and accounting performance. Contemporaneously, executives of carved
out companies that received IPO options don’t have an incentive to window dress the
company because it will increase the oﬀer price that will have negative impact on their
future payoﬀ. They are not managing earnings around the IPO resulting in better long-
run performance compared to the other subsample of carve-outs that didn’t incentivezed
their managers with IPO options.
All of these results suggest a mechanism by which incentive stock options have
real eﬀect on the performance. Further, they have important implication for corporate
governance. In this specific case of equity carve-outs I show that incentive stock options
are signaling the market better corporate governance in light of less managed earnings.
2.2 Data
The core of my data set is a hand-collected information about the incentive stock
option grants to any executive at the IPO date for each respective carve-out. I define
an incentive stock option as IPO option only if the exercise price is equal to the oﬀer
price of the IPO. The dummy variable is set to one if any executive received such
incentive stock option. Data on IPO options are hand collected from the prospectuses
of the initial public oﬀerings (filing type S-1 in EDGAR database) . If this information
is not available in the prospectuses than I hand collected it from the proxy statements
(filing type DEF 14A in EDGAR database) in the year of the IPO.
I restrict the sample of carve-outs from May 1996 to December 2013 because IPO
prospectuses are available on SEC’s (Securities and Exchange Commission) EDGAR
system (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system) starting from May
1996. I use data from the Thomson One SDC (Securities Data Company) database
for US’s issues.1 I require that the newly carved out subsidiary has available CRSP’s
(Center for Research in Security Prices) tapes and has available financial statements
in Compustat database. Further, I exclude finance firms (SIC Codes 6000-6999) and
units oﬀers. I hand collect data from financial statements of the subsidiary in the
prospectuses (filing type S-1 in EDGAR database) for two years preceding the IPO in
order to be able to compute the accruals in the pre-IPO year. My final sample has 225
equity carve-outs out of which 100 firms grant IPO options to their executives. The
final sample has aggregate proceeds of $69 billion that represents 11.7% of the total
1In the Screening&Analysis common stock part, subsidiary IPO’s (spinoﬀs) restriction is set “Yes”.
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IPO market (Ritter (2013) reported $591.8 billion of aggregate proceeds for the same
period).
To measure company characteristics and performance, I merge in data from CRSP
and Compustat. In cross-sectional regressions with annual data I define firm size as the
natural logarithm of total assets (Compustat item 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year.
In returns data, I define firm size as market capitalization (price*shares outstanding).
Book value of equity is shareholders’ equity (Compustat item 216), while book-to-
market is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity. Return on
asset is calculated as income before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) over total
assets (Compustat item 6).
The CRSP value-weighted and equally-weighted index respectively are used as proxy
for market returns. To estimate the past performance of the carve-outs in the market
model and four-factor model I used estimation window of 756 days (36 months or 3
years) before the IPO. Since subsidiary was not separate public company, stock data
was not available for the estimation window. Thats why I match appropriate carve-out
with the most similar company in the same industry based on market capitalization
and book-to-market ratio. I used the returns of the matched firms in order to estimate
the parameters in the estimation window.
I also merge in the Fama-French return factors. SMB and HML factors are con-
structed using six Fama-French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. SMB
(small minus big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average
return on the three big portfolios. HML (high minus low) is the average return on the
two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios. Mkt-Rf is
the excess return on the market (proxied by CRSP indexes) minus Treasury bill rate
from Ibbotson Associates. UMD (up minus down) is the average return on the two high
prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low portfolios.
Standard measure for earnings management in the literature are accruals. The
simplest way to think about the accruals is that they are diﬀerence between earnings and
cash flows. When this amount is positive for example, it can be a sign (not necessarily)
of artificially inflated earnings by use of “creative” legal accounting techniques. One
popular way in which managers can window dress the company before going public is
to borrow earnings from future periods. He could speed earnings growth in the year of
the IPO by recognising sales deals for which cash will be received in in one year after
the IPO or posponing expensing some current expenses for which cash was paid in the
IPO year. This will create higher earnings in the IPO year that will be eventually
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reversed in the following years. The time-shifting of earnings will be reflected in the
financial statements trough the accruals. For example, accelerated sales will increase
the current assets in the IPO year and this will lead to higher accruals (see formulas
below) and higher earnings in the IPO year.
There are many methodologies how one can compute the accruals. I use two mea-
sures of accruals. The first one are total accruals at each firm level that I compute from
their balance sheet statements. Total accruals are computed with information found
in the comparable balance sheets of each carve-out. I hand collect data from balance
sheets for two years prior the IPO for each carve-out in order to be able to compute
total balance sheet accruals for one year prior to the IPO.
Total Accrualsi, t 1 =
(4CAi, t 1   4CLi, t 1   4Cashi, t 1 + 4STDEBT i, t 1   DEPi, t 1)
Assetsi, t 2
where:
4CAi,t 1 is firm i’s change in the current assets from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand collected
from balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat item 4);
4CLi,t 1 is firm i’s change in the current liabilities from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand
collected from balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat item 5);
4Cashi,t 1 is firm i’s change in cash from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand collected from
balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat item 1);
4STDEBTi,t 1 is firm i’s change in short-term debt from year t-2 to t-1 that I hand
collected from balance sheets reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat item 34);
DEPi,t 1 is firm i’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t-1 that I hand col-
lected from income statement reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat item 14);
Assetsi,t 2 is firm i’s total assets in the year t-2 that I hand collected from balance sheet
reported in the prospectus (usual Compustat item 6).
The second type of accruals that I use as a measure of earnings management are
discretionary accruals. In fact not all accruals are sign of earnings management, most
of them are good mechanism to match revenues and expenses in the same fiscal year.
Firstly Jones (1991) decomposes the total accruals in two parts: normal and discre-
tionary. Than Dechow and Sweeney (1995) modified her model and Kothari and Wasley
(2005) adjusted it controlling also for the performance of the companies. I estimate dis-
cretionary accruals using performance-adjusted modified Jones model. Total accruals
for firm i in year t are measured same as balance sheet total accruals (Total Accrualsi,t )
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in the equation above. The discretionary (abnormal) accruals for firm i in year t are the
residuals ⇠i,t from the following regression, that I estimate for each of the 99 two-digit
SIC industry groups in each year t.
Total Accrualsi, t =  0J+  1J ( 1Asset si, t 1 )+  2J (4Revi, t 4ARi, t )+  3JPPEi, t+  4JROAi, t 1+⇠i, t
where:
4Revi,t firm i’s change in revenues (Compustat item 12) divided by Assetsi,t 1 (Com-
pustat item 6);
4ARi,t firm i’s change in account receivables (Compustat item 2) divided by Assetsi,t 1;
PPEi,t firm i’s gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat item 7) divided
by Assetsi,t 1;
ROAi,t 1 firm i’s operating income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) on assets
in year t-1 ;
I use 2-digit SIC industry groups from the universe of firms in Compustat (IPOs are
excluded) to compute industry-specific parameter estimates ( J ). Applying the indus-
try estimates to company data give me firm-specific normal accruals. The diﬀerence
between company’s total accruals and estimated normal accruals are the discretionary
(abnormal) accruals. Residuals of the model are actually my variable of interest i.e.
discretionary (abnormal) accruals, DAC in rest of the paper.
Table 2.1 gives summary statistics of the data for the overall sample and the two
subsamples conditioned whether the company grants stock options to their executives
with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price. IPO options granters on average are smaller
companies in terms of assets and market capitalization but they are trading at statis-
tically significant lower price-to-book ratio (sign for undervaluation). As for the issue
characteristics, both subsamples share similar characteristic in terms of average pro-
ceeds and oﬀer price. However carve-out companies that grant IPO options on average
experience less initial underpricing compared to companies that did not grant IPO op-
tions. In terms of stock market performance carve-outs that grant IPO options to their
executives always outperform carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options using diﬀerent
event windows (6 months, one, two and three years). Same holds also for the accounting
performance measured in return on assets (ROA). Companies that grant IPO options
have lower accruals in the pre-IPO period and they do not have huge increase of the
accruals in the IPO year suggesting that they use less aggressive accounting techniques
compared to the huge increase of accruals in the IPO year for companies that did not
grant IPO options. These diﬀerences in means are statistically significant.
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Table 2.1: Summary Sample Statistics
Whole Sample No IPO Options IPO Options
(1) (2) (3)
Observations 225 125 100
Company and IPO characteristics:
Total Assets (t ) (mil.) 1,438.43 1,627.78 1,201.75
Market Capitalization(t ) (mil.) 1,318.32 1,443.44 1,161.92
Price-to-Book Ratio (t ) 9.96 14.34 4.50
First Day Return (%) 18.21% 19.67% 16.38%
Oﬀer Price 15.36 15.42 15.30
Average Proceeds (mil.) 286.53 288.70 283.81
Stock Market Raw Returns:
6 months Cumulative Return (%) 7.79% 2.74% 7.92%
1 Year Cumulative Return (%) 16.76% 10.29% 15.11%
2 Years Cumulative Return (%) 33.75% 26.44% 26.93%
3 Years Cumulative Return (%) 54.06% 39.95% 71.63%
Accounting Performance:
ROA (t 1) -0.1161 -0.2154 0.0026
ROA (t ) -0.0020 -0.0150 0.0142
ROA (t+1) -0.0485 -0.0856 -0.0050
ROA (t+2) -0.0590 -0.1148 0.0070
ROA (t+3) -0.0734 -0.1548 0.0113
Earnings Management Measures:
Total Accruals (t 1) -0.0659 -0.0665 -0.0652
Total Accruals (t ) 0.0088 0.0435 -0.0345
Change in Total Accruals 0.0745 +0.1100 0.0301
DAC (t 1) 0.0319 0.0146 0.0528
DAC (t ) 0.0531 0.0694 0.0332
Change in Discretionary Accruals 0.0211 +0.0548 -0.0196
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Figure 2.1a shows the raw returns in event time of the subsidiary stocks conditioned
on whether the top executives received incentive stock options at the IPO date. Carve-
outs that grant IPO options to their executives always outperform carve-outs that didn’t
incentivize their managers with IPO options.
2.3 Long-run Performance Conditioned on IPO Op-
tions
2.3.1 Stock Market Performance
2.3.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns
My goal is to understand the eﬀect of incentive stock options granted on the IPO date
on the subsequent performance of top executives and their companies. At beginning
I measure investors reaction to IPO options grants over the three years following the
IPO i.e. option grant date. To measure investor reaction I compute the cumulative
abnormal returns around the IPO over diﬀerent intervals. I calculate the abnormal
returns using the standard market model and four-factor model. As event window, I
consider six months (+6,+132), one year (+6,+258), two years (+6,+510) and three
years (+6,+762) following the IPO with day 0 as the event date. I exclude the initial
returns (first 6 trading days) until the stock price is stabilized after the initial booth.2
For estimating the parameters a and b I used estimation window of 756 days before the
IPO using returns of the most similar companies in the same industry that didn’t went
public. I matched based on market capitalization and price-to-book ratio. The CRSP
value-weighted index is used to proxy for market returns in both models. In the four-
factor model beside the market I include the other three factors: SMB (small minus
big), HML (high minus low) and UMD (up minus down). Cumulative abnormal returns
are calculated as the sum of abnormal returns for each company over the specific event
window and then taking a cross-sectional average in both models.
Figures 2.1b and 2.1c show the cumulative abnormal returns in event time of the
subsidiary stocks conditioned on whether the top executives received incentive stock
options at the IPO date computed using the standard market model and four-factor
2The allotment of new shares at the oﬀering price is not guaranteed. Thus, including initial return
will overstate the returns that many investors can earn. Intervention of underwriters in sense of price
support in this period is also more probable.
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model. Using both models, carve-outs that granted IPO options outperform the carve-
outs that didn’t granted such incentive stock options in event time. The cumulative
abnormal returns display diﬀerent drift. Carve-outs that didn’t granted IPO options
are experiencing dramatic decline in returns in three years after the IPO, while there
is an absence of a drift in abnormal returns for carve-outs that granted IPO options
(the line is almost flat). The figure is very similar when using monthly returns. This is
in the line with the main hypothesis that absence of IPO options signal to the market
bad corporate governance resulting in poor long-run performance.
In Table 2.2, I present the results when using standard market model, while Table 2.3
presents results when using four-factor model. I find negative, statistically significant,
cumulative abnormal performance over all used event windows only for carve-outs the
didn’t grant IPO options to their executives using both models. Carve-outs that granted
IPO options do not earn abnormal return in three years after the IPO. The diﬀerence
in performance between two subsamples is statistically significant in three years event
window. Thus, firm performance, measured using stock return data, is lower for carve-
outs that didn’t grant IPO options. The results are robust to returns specification
(using monthly instead of daily returns).
2.3.1.2 Calendar Time-Series Portfolios Approach
The comparison of carve-outs that granted IPO options and carve-outs the didn’t grant
IPO options to their executives should mitigate the joint hypothesis problem because
we can assume that that any error in estimated expected return is the same across the
two samples. Thats why I re-estimate the eﬀect following a time-series portfolio ap-
proach and controlling for the Fama-French four factors. I consider the zero investment
strategy that goes long the subsidiary stocks that granted IPO options and goes short
the subsidiary stocks that didn’t grant IPO options. I estimate the return regression
keeping the stocks in the two portfolios for three years starting one week after the
IPO. For window of three years I estimate the time series return regression using both,
value-weighted and equally-weighted daily returns3 in the two portfolios as dependent
variable and size, book-to-market and momentum return factors as controls. The re-
3Loughran and Ritter (2000) show that the choice of the weighting method is a relevant question. If
the interest is focused on quantifying the change in the average wealth of the investor as a consequence
of a certain event, the correct method would be value weighting. However, if the interest lies in the
implications of a potential stock market mispricing, a method based on equally weighted returns would
be more appropriate. In order to give the greatest possible robustness to the results obtained I have
used both methods.
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Figure 2.1: Stock Market Performance
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Table 2.2: Cumulative Abnormal Return (Market Model)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The event dates are the IPO dates of appropriate
carve-out. IPO options are defined as carve-out companies that granted incentive stock options grants
to the subsidiary managers with exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. No IPO options are defined
as carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to their subsidiary managers. Abnormal daily returns are
calculated using standard market model. The CRSP value-weighted index is used to proxy for market
returns in the estimation of each firm alpha and beta. Estimation window is 756 days before the
event date using daily returns of the most similar companies in the same industry to each respective
carve-out (matched based on market capitalization and price-to-book ratio). Cumulative abnormal
returns are calculated as the sum of abnormal returns over the event window. Average cumulative
abnormal returns and t-statistics are presented below.
Market Model CAR
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+6,+132] [+6,+258] [+6,+510] [+6,+762]
No IPO options -0.153*** -0.272*** -0.339*** -0.479***
(3.61) (3.71) (3.81) (3.00)
IPO options -0.051 -0.125* -0.225* 0.014
(1.14) (1.73) (1.80) (0.06)
Diﬀerence -0.102* -0.146 -0.289 -0.493*
(1.638) (1.399) (0.763) (1.840)
Observations 225 220 199 128
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Table 2.3: Cumulative Abnormal Return (Four-Factor Model)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The event dates are the IPO dates of appropriate
carve-out. IPO options are defined as carve-out companies that granted incentive stock options grants
to the subsidiary managers with exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. No IPO options are defined
as carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to their subsidiary managers. Abnormal daily returns are
calculated using four-factor model. The excess return on the market is the CRSP value-weighted index
minus treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. Other three factors are SMB (small minus big),
HML (high minus low) and UMD (up minus down). Estimation window is 756 days before the event
date using daily returns of the most similar companies in the same industry to each respective carve-
out (matched based on market capitalization and price-to-book ratio). Cumulative abnormal returns
are calculated as the sum of abnormal returns over the event window. Average cumulative abnormal
returns and t-statistics are presented below.
Four-Factor Model CAR
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+6,+132] [+6,+258] [+6,+510] [+6,+762]
No IPO options -0.125*** -0.244*** -0.304*** -0.437***
(3.14) (3.23) (3.13) (2.61)
IPO options -0.035 -0.111 -0.180 0.052
(0.77) (1.55) (1.45) (0.24)
Diﬀerence -0.090 -0.133 -0.124 -0.489*
(1.499) (1.25) (0.794) (1.830)
Observations 225 220 199 128
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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sults are in Table 2.4. I find as expected that the alpha of the zero investment portfolio
is positive over the three year horizon both using value-weighted and equally-weighted
daily returns. However the alpha is statistically insignificant. The results look almost
the same when using monthly returns.
2.3.1.3 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
There is no consensus in the literature about which method is better: use of cumu-
lative abnormal returns (CARs) or buy-and-hold returns (BHAR). Some of the works
(for example, Fama (1998)) justify the use of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).
However, Barber and Lyon (1997) emphasize the advantage of BHARs for measuring
the investor’s experience, because the use of mean calendar-time returns or their sum
(cumulative returns) does not adequately measure the returns obtained by an investor
who holds a stock for a long period of time. According to these authors, the returns
obtained by an investor in the long-run are better approximated by the compounding
of the simple returns in the short run. Given that there does not exist consensus about
the approach and in order to give robustness to the results I used both CAR and BHAR
approach. Since I want to assess the value of investing in the average sample firm with
respect to an appropriate benchmark over the horizon of interest and capture long-term
investor experience I give small advantage to BHAR approach.
I calculate long-run returns by daily compounding during 126, 252, 514 and 756 days
starting 6 days after the IPO, and I adjust them by the normal return approximated





t=ti (1 + Rit )   1
g  PNi=1 fQTit=ti (1 + E(Rit ))   1g
Where Rit is the return on security i in day t, N is the number of securities, T is the
number of days (126, 252, 514 and 756 days), ti is the date of the closing price on the
first day of trading and E(Rit ) is the expected or normal return (CRSP value-weighted
or equally-weighted index). Weights are defined as 1/N where N is the number of stocks
in the portfolio.
Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 report the results computed using value-weighted and
equally-weighted daily returns respectively. I find negative, statistically significant,
buy-and-hold returns over all used event windows only for carve-outs the didn’t grant
IPO options to their executives using both models. Buy-and-hold returns for carve-outs
that granted IPO options are insignificant almost always. Thus, firm performance, mea-
sured using buy-and-hold compounded stock return data, is lower for carve-outs that
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Table 2.4: Calendar Time-Series Portfolios Approach
The buy-portfolio consists of IPO options granters over three year horizon from the day of the IPO.
The sell-portfolio consists of carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to their executives over three
years horizon from the date of the IPO. Stocks in the first panel are weighted by their relative mar-
ket capitalization. In the second panel stocks are equally weighted. The Fama/French factors are
constructed using 6 Fama-French value-weighted portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. SMB
(Small Minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on
the three big portfolios. HML (High Minus Low) is the average on the two value portfolios minus the
average return on the two growth portfolios. MktRf, the excess return on the market, is value-weighted
CRSP return minus the Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). UMD (Up Minus Down) is the
average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior
return portfolios.
Value-Weighted Returns 3 Years Equally-Weighted Returns 3 Years
No IPO Options IPO Options Diﬀerence No IPO Options IPO Options Diﬀerence
Mkt-Rf 0.0104*** 0.0107*** 0.0004 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0001
(50.25) (44.61) (1.29) (52.06) (52.14) (0.10)
SMB 0.0069*** 0.0082*** 0.0013** 0.0085*** 0.0081*** -0.0004
(17.82) (18.09) (2.47) (23.46) (22.23) (1.05)
HML -0.0018*** -0.0004 0.0014*** -0.0011*** 0.0023*** 0.0034***
(4.43) (0.82) (2.62) (2.90) (6.05) (7.80)
UMD -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0001 -0.0025*** -0.0023*** 0.0002
(4.65) (4.21) (0.20) (9.81) (9.00) (0.69)
Constant -0.0091*** -0.0089*** 0.0002 -0.0088*** -0.0087*** 0.0001
(37.41) (31.71) (0.38) (38.82) (38.54) (0.23)
Observations 4938 4941 4938 4938 4941 4938
R-squared 41.88% 36.47% 0.28% 46.22% 44.96% 1.42%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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didn’t grant IPO options. The results are very similar when using monthly returns.
I can conclude that the findings about the long-run stock market performance of
carve-outs conditioned on incentive stock option grants at the IPO date are robust to
diﬀerent estimation approaches (CAR, calendar time-series and BHAR). The results
are always in the line with the main hypothesis that carve-outs that didn’t granted
IPO options are underperforming both relative to the overall market and relative to a
sample of carve-outs that granted IPO options.
2.3.2 Accounting Performance
2.3.2.1 Return on Assets
Next I consider whether there is a similar decline in performance following the IPO
for companies that didn’t grant IPO options using accounting data (instead of stock
returns). Specifically, I consider whether the return on assets also declines in the three
years following the IPO. Measuring the eﬀect using accounting returns should capture
only the decline in real performance mitigating the joint hypothesis problem. Return
on asset is calculated as income before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) over
total assets (Compustat item 6).
Figure 2.2 shows the development of the mean return on assets for the two subsam-
ples: IPO options granters and non-granters over five year period (one year before the
IPO, at the IPO year and next three years following the IPO). There is a pronounced
decline in return on assets after the IPO for the subsample of carve-outs that didn’t
grant IPO options even simply comparing the means. ROA is dramatically increasing
in the IPO year compared to the pre-IPO year for this subsample and afterwards it
is decreasing. This is in the line with earnings management hypothesis in the paper.
These companies are window dressing the company by using creative income-increasing
accounting techniques in the IPO year resulting in poor long-run performance in the
years following the IPO. The subsample of carve-outs that granted IPO options to their
executives at the other side, have very stable mean of ROA during observed period. The
mean diﬀerences in ROA between the two subsamples for all periods are statistically
significant at 5% level.
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Table 2.5: Buy-and-Hold Returns Using Value-Weighted Daily Returns
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The event dates are the IPO dates of appropriate
carve-outs. IPO options are defined as carve-out companies that granted incentive stock options
grants to the subsidiary managers with exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. No IPO options
are defined as carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to their subsidiary managers. Buy-and-hold






(1 + Rit )   1
g  PNi=1 fQTit=ti (1 + E(Rit ))   1g .
Where weights are defined as ratio of issuer’s common stock market value and sum of the market
values of all stocks. Rit is the daily return of each individual stock while E (Rit ) is the CRSP daily
value-weighted index that is used as proxy for expected or normal returns.
BHAR (value-weighted daily returns)
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+6,+132] [+6,+258] [+6,+510] [+6,+762]
No IPO options -0.0337*** -0.0762*** -0.0899*** -0.0795***
(2.73) (5.18) (5.03) (3.62)
IPO options 0.0236 -0.0048 -0.0582*** -0.0560**
(1.27) (0.26) (3.51) (2.50)
Diﬀerence -0.0573*** -0.0714*** -0.0318 -0.0235
(2.66) (3.05) (1.28) (0.74)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Table 2.6: Buy-and-Hold Returns Using Equally-Weighted Daily Returns
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. The event dates are the IPO dates of appropriate
carve-outs. IPO options are defined as carve-out companies that granted incentive stock options
grants to the subsidiary managers with exercise price equal to the IPO oﬀer price. No IPO options
are defined as carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to their subsidiary managers. Buy-and-hold






(1 + Rit )   1
g  PNi=1 fQTit=ti (1 + E(Rit ))   1g .
Where weights are defined as 1/N (N is the number of stocks in the portfolio). Rit is the daily return
of each individual stock while E (Rit ) is the CRSP daily equally-weighted index that is used as proxy
for expected or normal returns.
BHAR (equally-weighted daily returns)
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+6,+132] [+6,+258] [+6,+510] [+6,+762]
No IPO options -0.0386* -0.0672** -0.1539*** -0.2034***
(1.8) (2.02) (3.17) (2.71)
IPO options 0.0194 -0.0428 -0.0769 -0.1098
(0.39) (1.28) (1.40) (1.58)
Diﬀerence -0.0480 -0.0245 -0.0769 -0.0935
(1.48) (0.51) (1.05) (0.89)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Figure 2.2: Accounting Performance: Return on Assets
The eﬀect is also persistent to more rigorous regression framework. In the first four
columns of Table 2.7, I look at return on assets of carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO
options over four diﬀerent windows around the IPO: the fiscal year proceeding the IPO
trough the fiscal year of the IPO, the fiscal year of the IPO trough the fiscal year one
year after the IPO, the fiscal year of the IPO trough the fiscal year two years after the
IPO and the fiscal year of the IPO trough the fiscal year three years after the IPO.
I regress ROA over each window on firm size, the lagged value of ROA, year fixed
eﬀects, industry fixed eﬀects and a dummy variable for each fiscal year. The dummy
variable allows me to identify the change in ROA for each respective year. Standard
errors are clustered by firm. In column 1 the result shows that ROA is increasing in the
IPO year compared to the pre-IPO year by 7.4 percentage points for the subsamples
of carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options. In column 3 the result shows that ROA
decreased two years after the IPO compared to the IPO year by 7.74 percentage points
while in column 4 we can see that it decreased three years after the IPO compared
to the IPO year by 13.52 percentage points. These results are statistically significant
at 5% level. Next four columns (from 5 to 8) of Table 2.7 are for the subsamples
of carve-outs that granted IPO options to their executives. The dummy variables of
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fiscal years for these carve-outs are small in magnitude, almost always positive and
statistically insignificant. So, the eﬀect of increased ROA in the IPO year and then
constantly decreasing in the subsequent three years after the IPO holds only for the
carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options. Firm performance deteriorates following the
IPO only for these carve-outs. Executives of carve-outs that received IPO options don’t
have incentive to manage earnings in the IPO year because it will decrease their future
payoﬀ and thats why they have an incentive to manage the firm in a way that it will
add value on the long run.
2.4 Earnings Management and Long-run Performance
Earnings from financial reports (income statement) of each public company consist the
cash flows from operations and accounting adjustments called accruals. Managers have
certain legal discretion over the accruals. On shorter run they can increase the accru-
als (leading to increased earnings), for example, by recognition of revenues earned on
credit (before cash is received), delaying recognition of expenses (cash paid in advance),
realizing unusual gains, decelerating depreciation. On longer run all of these account-
ing adjustments will be reversed resulting in lower earnings. Earnings management is
certainly a sign for bad corporate governance. The bottom line is that accounting ac-
cruals are negative predictors of the future performance: so-called investor fixation on
earnings theory documented by Sloan (1996). However, some accruals adjustments are
appropriate and necessary in order to have expenses and revenues correctly matched
in the same period. Thus, it is diﬃcult for the investors to know which part of the
accruals are “normal” for the company given the business conditions.
The simplest way to think about the accruals is that they are diﬀerence between
earnings and cash flows. When this amount is positive for example, it can be a sign
(not necessarily) of artificially inflated earnings by use of “creative” legal accounting
techniques. First, I evaluate total accruals using balance sheet data described in sec-
tion 2. Total accruals are not always a sign for earnings management, their dynamics
during the time might be. One part of the total total accruals is consider as normal.
Thus, I estimate the discretionary (abnormal) accruals using the performance-adjusted
modified Jones model as explained in section 2 using the industry peers and assuming
that on average their accruals should be considered as normal for respective company.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































accruals. They are clearly more direct measure to detect earnings management than
total accruals.
Teoh and Wong (1998) provide evidence that IPOs with unusually high accruals in
the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter.
The hypothesis that accounting accruals predict post-IPO returns underperformance
requires the presence of both earnings management and investor credulity. Their ev-
idence does not prove that managers intentionally are adjusting accruals to exploit
market credulity. In order to disentangle and find evidence that earnings are managed
intentionally by the management I use the unique environment surrounding the equity
carve-outs. If earnings management behavior diﬀers depending on manager’s compen-
sation contracts and their diﬀerent incentives to manage earnings it can be interpreted
as indirect evidence that earnings are managed intentionally by the managers.
My hypothesis is that executives of equity carve-outs who receive incentive stock
options grants with exercise price equal to the oﬀer price do not have an incentive to
window dress the company before going public. They would rather report more realistic
or conservative earnings in the IPO period in order to have exercise price of their options
as low as possible. Thus, IPO options should signal better corporate governance. On
the other hand, carve-outs that did not grant such compensation packages are the ones
with worse corporate governance and I should observe unusually high accruals around
the IPO as a sign for earnings manipulation (window dressing) in IPO period. Degeorge
and Zeckhauser (1993) point out that managers who have stake (shares) in the company
have extraordinary incentives to make their firms “shine” before floating. To use their
example, consider a manager who owns 10 per cent of a firm that normally earns $1
million and that will sell at eight times earnings when it goes public. Every $1.000
increase in earnings before going public means another $800 for the manager. Then
it is not surprising that managers want to present the best possible figures in their
prospectuses.
Consistent with the prediction, I find the following development of accruals (see
Figure 2.3): companies that did not grant IPO options have pick of high accruals in the
year of the IPO suggesting that these companies are inflating the earnings around the
IPO, while for companies that grant IPO options I do not observe such pick suggesting
that they report more realistic earnings. The first graph represents the total accruals
scaled by assets from companies’s balance sheet statements in event time, while the
second graph represents development of the discretionary (abnormal) part of the total
accruals computed using performance-adjusted modified Jones model (DAC).
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Figure 2.3: Mean of Accruals in Event Time Conditioned on IPO Options
To examine the influence of the accruals on post-issue performance I performed the
cross-sectional regressions of the stock market performance and accounting performance
on accruals for both subsamples of carve-outs (IPO options granters and non granters).
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2.4.1 Cross-Section of Stock Market Returns and Earnings Man-
agement
I regress cross-sectionally the IPO three-year post issue buy-and-hold returns on total
and discretionary accruals before the IPO controlling for the size. The results are
reported in Table 2.8 where BHAR is computed using daily returns and Table 2.9
where BHAR is computed using monthly returns.
Total and discretionary accruals have significantly negative estimated coeﬃcients
only for the subsample of carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to their executives.
One standard deviation increase in total and discretionary accruals in pre-IPO year
implies a 15 percent and 30 percent 3-year return diﬀerence respectively when using
daily returns, while using monthly returns the percentage increases to 20 and 38 return
diﬀerence in three year. This is an indicator that only carve-outs without IPO options
are the ones with high earnings management proxy in year preceding the IPO and
they subsequently show greater stock underperformance. These companies are window
dressing the company before going public resulting in long-run underperformance. For
the subsample of carve-outs that grant IPO options to their executives estimated co-
eﬃcients are very small and statistically insignificant indicating that these carve-outs
are not managing earnings in the pre-IPO period that I interpret as a sign for better
corporate governance. The results are robust when using the accruals at the IPO year
as well, indicating that in absence of IPO options managers are window dressing the
company one year before the IPO and in the IPO year.
2.4.2 Cross-Section of Accounting Returns and Earnings Man-
agement
In order to give the greatest possible robustness to the results about the relationship
between earnings management and long-run performance I used accounting returns
(instead of stock returns) as well. I regress return on assets (ROA) for diﬀerent windows
on changes of total and discretionary accruals between the IPO year and pre-IPO year
for the two sample separately (IPO options granters and non granters). The goal
is to see whether the change in earnings management behavior around the IPO is
predicting long-run accounting performance and how the relationship diﬀers between
the two groups of equity carve-outs. The results are reported in Table 2.10 where panel
A is showing the results for the subsample of carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options
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Table 2.8: Cross-section of BHAR on Lagged Accruals (Using Daily Returns)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. IPO options are defined as carve-out companies
that granted incentive stock options grants to the subsidiary managers with exercise price equal to
the IPO oﬀer price. No IPO options are defined as carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to
their subsidiary managers. The table below shows results from cross-sectional regression where the
dependent variable is 3-year BHAR computed with daily returns. DACt 1 are discretionary accruals
one year prior to the IPO year computed using modified Jones model. Total Accrualst 1 are defined
as total accruals one year prior to the IPO computed from the prospectus’ balance sheet statement.
Size is defined as natural logarithm of total assets one year prior to the IPO.
Dependent variable: 3-years BHAR (daily returns)
No IPO Options IPO Options
DAC Total Accruals DAC Total Accruals
DACt 1 -0.3105** -0.0262
(2.06) (0.24)
Total Accrualst 1 -0.7443*** -0.0621
(4.31) (0.34)
Size 0.0822*** 0.0930*** -0.0398 -0.0405
(2.57) (3.08) (1.13) (1.15)
Constant -0.6124*** -0.7163*** -0.3220 -0.3307
(3.50) (4.27) (1.60) (1.62)
Observations 125 125 100 100
R-squared 7.15% 16.66% 1.29% 1.36%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Table 2.9: Cross-section of BHAR on Lagged Accruals (Using Monthly Returns)
The sample runs from May 1996 to December 2013. IPO options are defined as carve-out companies
that granted incentive stock options grants to the subsidiary managers with exercise price equal to
the IPO oﬀer price. No IPO options are defined as carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options to
their subsidiary managers. The table below shows results from cross-sectional regression where the
dependent variable is 3-year BHAR computed with monthly returns. DACt 1 are discretionary accruals
one year prior to the IPO year computed using modified Jones model. Total Accrualst 1 are defined
as total accruals one year prior to the IPO computed from the prospectus’ balance sheet statement.
Size is defined as natural logarithm of total assets one year prior to the IPO.
Dependent variable: 3-years BHAR (monthly returns)
No IPO Options IPO Options
DAC Total Accruals DAC Total Accruals
DACt 1 -0.3946** -0.0290
(2.35) (0.30)
Total Accrualst 1 -0.9314*** -0.0787
(4.90) (0.50)
Size 0.0504 0.0637* 0.0203 0.0214
(1.42) (1.92) (0.66) (0.69)
Constant -0.3272* -0.4562** -0.1199 0.1324
(1.68) (2.47) (0.68) (0.74)
Observations 125 125 100 100
R-squared 5.11% 17.11% 0.47% 0.63%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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to their executives, while panel B is showing the results for carve-outs that granted IPO
options.
The changes of the total and discretionary accruals between IPO year and pre-IPO
year (proxy for changes in the earnings management behavior around the IPO) have
significantly negative estimated coeﬃcients only for the subsample of carve-outs that
didn’t grant IPO options to their executives for almost all windows: year of the IPO,
one year after the IPO and three years after the IPO. Only return on assets two years
after the IPO is not explained by the changes of accruals between the IPO year and
pre-IPO year (the relationship is statistically insignificant). One standard deviation
increase in the changes of total and discretionary accruals around the IPO implies
a 9 percent and 13 percent return on assets diﬀerence respectively three years after
the IPO. This is an indicator that only carve-outs without IPO options are changing
their reporting habit around the IPO (managing earnings) and they subsequently show
greater accounting underperformance. These companies are window dressing the com-
pany before going public resulting in long-run underperformance. For the subsample of
carve-outs that grant IPO options to their executives estimated coeﬃcients are smaller
and almost always statistically insignificant indicating that these carve-outs are not
managing earnings in the pre-IPO period because changes in accruals can not predict
the future accounting performance. There is a statistically significant but positive re-
lationship for this subsample only when I regress return on assets two years after the
IPO, that is completely opposite finding of earnings management. This positive rela-
tionship is oﬀset the next year (three years after the IPO) because the two significant
coeﬃcients are with very similar magnitude but opposite signs. The results obtained
when using accounting returns (instead of stock returns) support the main hypotheses
of this paper that carve-outs that grant IPO options are better governed companies
that are performing better on longer run compared to carve-outs that did not grant
IPO options.
2.5 Conclusion
The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is well docu-
mented in the literature. Performance based compensation contracts are for decades
one of the most popular solution to align interests of the principal (shareholders) and


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































increasing value of the firm. While remuneration can be a solution to agency prob-
lem it can be also a source of a pricipal-agent problem like earnings manipulation.
Relationship between executive pay and earnings management (pay to manipulation
relationship) is also documented in the literature. However, there has been little em-
phasis in the literature on understanding if executive pay is signaling to the market
better corporate governance and it’s eﬀect on ex-post performance.
This paper examines the relationship between long-run post-IPO return of equity
carve-outs and incentive stock options grants at the IPO date. Furthermore, it uses
earnings management as a measure of the level of corporate governance. I use very
specific environment when a conglomerate is selling one of it’s division to the public (eq-
uity carve-out) to show that division managers are choosing diﬀerent income-increasing
accounting policy depending on whether they were incentivized with incentive stock
options or not. I show that the long-run performance is explained by the reporting dis-
tortions around the IPO conditioned on incentive stock option grants. Bottom line is
that I find an evidence that incentive stock options are signaling better corporate gov-
ernance, measured in earnings manipulation, resulting in better long-run performance.
The results are suggesting that incentive stock options are signaling better corporate
governance to the market.
Incentive stock options granted at the IPO date usually have an exercise price equal
to the IPO oﬀer price (IPO options). In case of equity carve-outs IPO options give an
unique one side incentive to the executives to set the oﬀer price as real as possible. In
standard IPOs there are two sides of the incentive story that are in striking contrast:
more realistic oﬀer price will lead to profit from the IPO options but at the same
time to loss from the diluted previous holdings. Previous holdings of the executives of
equity carve-outs are influenced less by the oﬀer price because these holdings are in the
conglomerate. Executives of equity carve-outs incetiviezed with IPO options don’t have
an incentive to manipulate earnings around the IPO and they are using less aggressive
income-increasing accounting techniques.
I show that equity carve-outs who grant IPO options to their executives exhibit
diﬀerent earnings management behavior and performance compared to the equity carve-
outs that didn’t grant IPO options:
• Carve-outs that didn’t award their executives with IPO options suﬀer declining
performance. The decline is observed in stock market performance for three years
following the IPO and in accounting performance (return on assets) over the same
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horizon. The decline is observed both relative to the firm’s own performance prior
the IPO and to the performance of equity carve-outs in which executives were
awarded with IPO options. IPO options granters do not suﬀer decline both in
stock market and accounting performance.
• Carve-outs that didn’t grant IPO options have unusually high accruals in the
IPO year (sign for earnings management) and it explains the poor stock return
and the poor accounting performance in the three years thereafter. At the same
time carve-outs that incentivized their managers with IPO options do not manage
earnings around the IPO and their long-run performance is not explained by the
changes in the reporting behavior around the IPO.
Together these results suggest that there is distortion in behavior induced by the com-
pensation packages of the executives and it does aﬀect ultimate firm performance.
Incentive stock options are good governance mechanism to decrease opportunistic re-
porting by the managers in the years around the IPO resulting in better long-run stock
market and accounting performance. IPO options are signaling better corporate gover-
nance to the market.
My findings are potentially useful for investors and regulators. Investors may want to
use the information on IPO options that is public before the IPO to discriminate among
issuers. Particularly, this information is very useful because for most of the investors it
is diﬃcult to detect earnings management i.e. which part of the accruals are “normal”
or unusually high for a given company given the business conditions. IPO options by it
self should signal them less managed earnings i.e. better corporate governance. Finally,
regulators must be concerned about the informativeness of the accounting numbers and
how accurately accounting information communicates firm performance to the markets.
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Chapter 3
Short Selling and the Subsequent Performance of
Initial Public Oﬀerings
Abstract
This paper examines short sales transaction volumes on the first trading day of 610
initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) from 2011 to 2015. The tests provide evidence of informed
trading immediately at the IPO. Results reveal that short selling volume on the first
trading day of the IPO is significantly negatively linked to subsequent stock returns
and accounting performance. Heavily-shorted IPOs underperform lightly-shorted IPOs
by a risk-adjusted average of 22.68% annualized return. Heavily-shorted IPOs have the
highest probability of analyst downgrades within the first year after the IPO. Short
selling is higher in hot IPOs with higher demand and higher first-day return. These
stocks are overpriced at the end of the first trading day, implying that short sellers are
sophisticated investors taking advantage of the overpricing. Overall, the results indicate
that short sellers are important contributors to eﬃcient stock prices.
JEL classifications: G14; G12; G24; M41
Keywords: Short Selling; Initial public oﬀerings; IPO performance; Analysts Recommendations
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3.1 Introduction
The focus of this paper is on short selling activity on the first trading day of initial public
oﬀerings (IPOs). Initial underpricing and long-run underperformance of IPOs has been
confirmed by many studies (Stern and Bornstein (1985); Ritter (1991); Loughran and
Ritter (1995); Rock (1986); Ritter (1984); Loughran and Ritter (2002)). The main
idea of the paper is that IPOs represent potential examples of deviations of stock
prices from fundamental values. The research question is whether the short sellers are
more sophisticated than other investors in taking advantage of the mis-pricing, acting
on time and making profits, ultimately resulting in bringing back stock prices to their
fundamental values. I provide evidence of informed trading by short sellers immediately
on the first trading day of the IPO. Results reveal that the short selling volume on the
first trading day is significantly negatively linked to subsequent long-run stock returns
and accounting performance.
Shares sold short, as a percentage of shares outstanding, has more than doubled
in the past 30 years. One information provider, Markit, provides data on $2 trillion
securities on loan as of the end of 2015. A short sale is generally a sale of a security
by an investor who does not own the security. To deliver the security to the buyer, the
short seller borrows the security and is charged interest for the loan. Short sales are
usually trades in which the short seller anticipates subsequent underperformance of the
security in order to make a profit.
There has been high interest in short selling in the academic literature in the past
decade. Academics generally share the view that short sellers help markets correct
deviations of stock prices from fundamental values. It is widely accepted that if short
selling is costly and there are heterogeneous investors beliefs, a stock can be overpriced
by the market and generate low subsequent returns. This hypothesis originated with
Miller (1977) and his predictions have motivated many recent empirical studies.
The oldest literature finds that high short interest ratios forecast low returns (?Desai
(2002)). Dechow (2001) documents that short sellers position themselves in stocks
with low ratios of fundamentals (earnings and book value) to market values and cover
their positions when ratios revert. Diether and Werner (2008) show that a trading
strategy that buys stocks with low short selling activity and sells short stocks with
high short selling activity generates an abnormal return of roughly 1.4% per month. To
my knowledge my paper is a first attempt to measure long-run performance of IPOs
conditioned on short selling activity on the first trading day.
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Miller (1977) argues that there are restrictions on short selling following an IPO
resulting in pricing ineﬃciencies in the short term which are subsequently reversed in
the long term as these constraints are relaxed. Duﬃe and Pedersen (2002) in their
theoretical model argue that if lendable securities are diﬃcult to locate (for example
after an IPOs, among other cases) then the price of the security is initially elevated, and
expected to decline over time. On the other hand, Edwards and Hanley (2010) show
that short selling occurs simultaneously with the open of trading (in 99.5% of IPOs)
and without delay as previously thought, implying that other factors may account for
underpricing.
I use short sale data available from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA). Pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) request, FINRA has
agreed to make reported short sale trade data publicly accessible beginning September
30, 2009 (Regulation SHO) . I use the daily short sale volume files for the period starting
from March 2011 until December 2015.
I restrict the sample to this period because staring from February 28, 2011 FINRA
reports separately short sale volumes that are exempted from the restriction (Rule 201)
of short selling. The SEC adopted Rule 201, so-called “Alternative Uptick Rule” in
February 2010, which imposed restrictions on short selling. This rule is a variation of
the 70-year-old “Uptick Rule” that was eliminated in 2007. The rule applies to securities
following an intra-day price decline of more than 10% from the previous day’s closing
price. For such stocks, the SEC allows short selling only if the transaction price is above
the national best bid.
There are transactions that are exempted from the restrictions of Rule 201. These
transactions involve activities such as arbitrage of positions on options exchanges or
foreign markets, hedging of derivatives due within a few days and the distribution by
an underwriter of an IPO. Underwriters have an option to purchase additional shares
from the issuer following the IPO (over-allotment or “green shoe” option). They may
cover the overallocation either through the exercise of the over-allotment option (when
the stock price is higher than the oﬀer price) or through open market purchases (when
the stock price is lower than the oﬀer price), also known as syndicate short covering.
Syndicate short covering is regulated by another rule by the SEC called Rule 104 of
Regulation M and it is exempted from Rule 201.
By restricting the sample to start from March 2011 I can test which trades are
more informative. Transactions that are subject to the restrictions of Rule 201 are
trades in which short sellers anticipate subsequent underperformance. The main result
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of this paper reveal that only transactions that are subject to short sale restrictions are
significantly negatively linked to subsequent stock returns and accounting performance.
As expected, trades that are exempted from restrictions are not informative about the
true value of the respective IPO and its future return on the long run. They are more
short-term oriented and they do not necessarily anticipate future underperformance.
I retrieved the data for IPOs and their characteristics from the Thomson Reuters
Eikon database. After merging with FINRA short sale daily tapes, CRSP and Compu-
stat, my final sample has 610 IPOs.
The stock returns are robust to alternative specifications of abnormal returns. First,
I consider the returns to a zero-investment strategy which takes a long position in the
stock of lightly-shorted IPOs (quartile 1) and short position in heavily-shorted IPOs
(quartile 4) on the first trading day. I show that the alpha of following this strategy
for one year is positive and statistically significant in a four-factor time-series return
regression averaging 9 basis points using daily returns (22.68% annualized return) and
1.72% using monthly returns (20.64% annualized return).
Then I compute the cumulative abnormal returns using the standard market model
and the four-factor model. One-year cumulative abnormal returns of IPOs that are
heavily shorted on the first trading day are always negative and statistically significant
for trades that are subject to the Rule 201 restrictions, averaging 15% annually both
using the market and four-factor model. Short sellers of IPOs seems to be more long-
term oriented with respect to short sellers of other securities. The approximate duration
of the positions in this sample is on average 100 trading days. In fact, the shortest
window for which I obtain negative statistically significant returns for heavily-shorted
IPOs is 6 months (126 trading days). This result indicates that IPOs need longer period
of time to return to their fundamental values.
According to Barber and Lyon (1997), long-term investor experiences are better
captured by compounding short-term returns to obtain long-term buy-and-hold returns.
Long-run event studies aim to assess the value of investing in the average sample firm
with respect to an appropriate benchmark over the horizon of interest. Thus, the correct
measure should be the buy-and-hold return. I show that the results are robust to this
specification of abnormal returns. IPOs that were the most shorted on the first trading
day have significantly negative BHAR of 7.74% and 6.01% with a one year window
using both daily and monthly returns respectively. In the cross section BHAR is also
negatively related to short sale volume on the first trading day.
In all long-run event studies, joint hypotheses problems may cloud the interpreta-
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tion of the results for abnormal returns. This is why I measure the eﬀect of short selling
volume on the first trading day on accounting measures such as net income, earnings
per share and accounting returns (return on assets, or ROA). I find that net income,
earnings per share and ROA decline significantly in the quarter after the IPO for com-
panies that were the most shorted on the first trading day. A decline in ROA following
the IPO for companies that were heavily shorted should capture only the decline in
real performance without having the joint hypothesis problem of a misspecified model.
Furthermore, I show that ROA significantly increases in the quarter after the IPO only
for companies that were lightly shorted on the first trading day.
To support the main finding of the paper, I show that there is a positive statistically
significant relationship between the short selling volume on the first trading day and the
first consensus analysts’ recommendation (between 1 (Strong Buy) and 5 (Strong Sale))
that occur on average 28 trading days after the IPO. Heavily-shorted IPOs get the least
favorable initiation of analysts’ recommendations. Further, I show that heavily-shorted
IPOs have the highest probability of downgrade by analysts within the first year after
the IPO. A probit model shows that the predicted probability of a downgrade increases
with the short selling volume on the first trading day. Heavily-shorted IPOs have the
highest (32.12%) predicted probability to be downgraded within the first year after the
IPO.
I explore on which basis short sellers choose IPOs on the oﬀer day and why and how
they anticipate long-run underperformance of these issues. In other words, I explore
which types of IPOs are subject to more short selling on the oﬀer day. I provide
evidence that short sellers are picking hot issues with high demand. They go against
the sentiment of individual investors for hot issues.
Similarly to Edwards and Hanley (2010) I find a positive relationship between first-
day return and short selling on the first trading day of the IPOs. This finding at first
glance seems to be against the hypothesis that short sellers correct observed underpric-
ing. Underpricing measured as first-day return assumes that the market price on the
first trading day is the correct one while the oﬀer price is set too low by the underwrit-
ers. However, similarly to Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004), I find that IPOs
are overvalued at the oﬀer price relative to industry peers.
The first-day return is a function of both: (i) the first-day market price (driven
by individual investors) and (ii) the oﬀer price (driven by the underwriters, issuing
company and institutional investors that are more informed compared to an individual
investor). I find that for IPOs that were heavily shorted, the initial oﬀer price is set
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more closely to the price of their industry peers. On the other hand the first-day closing
market price displays significant deviations relative to the industry peers. Heavily-
shorted IPOs are overpriced at the end of the first trading day on average by 35%
relative to their industry peers, while overpricing of lightly-shorted IPOs is significantly
smaller (averaging 12%). The diﬀerence is statistically significant and the relationship
between the overpricing and the short sale volume on the first trading day is positive and
statistically significant. This result indicates that short sellers are more sophisticated
than other investors, who seem to be overoptimistic regarding the new issues. Keeping
in mind the poor long-run performance of the heavily-shorted IPOs shown in this paper,
I can conclude that short sellers go against the potential behavioral biases of the rest
of the market and exploit overpricing to their benefit.
Overall the results indicate that, on average, short sellers are sophisticated investors
and important contributors to eﬃcient stock prices. This finding should encourage
regulators to provide more timely disclosure of short selling to all investors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample in
more detail. Section 3 examines the long-run stock market performance of the IPOs
conditioned on short selling activity on the first trading day. Section 4 analyzes the
accounting performance conditioned on short selling volume. Section 5 provides tests
of the relationship between the short selling volume and consensus analysts’ recommen-
dations. Section 6 discusses the connection between diﬀerent IPO characteristics and
short selling volume on the oﬀer day with an emphasis on the first-day return. Section
7 concludes.
3.2 Data and Summary Statistics
To examine whether short selling volumes on the first trading day of IPOs are infor-
mative and predict the subsequent performance of the IPOs, I use daily short sale
data publicly available from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). I
restrict the sample from March 2011 to December 2015 because, beginning on Febru-
ary 28, 2011, FINRA reports separately short sale volume that are exempted from the
short sale restrictions of the Alternative Uptick Rule 201.1 These transactions are not
informative about the future long-run performance because such positions are usually
1Transactions that are exempted from short sale restrictions under the Rule 201 are: arbitrage of
positions on options exchanges or foreign markets, hedging of derivatives due within a few days and
the distribution by an underwriter of an IPO.
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closed shortly after the IPO. On the other hand, trades that are subject to short selling
restrictions2are considered to be informative, and are expected to predict the future
long-run underperformance of the respective stock.
The data from FINRA include ticker, date, total short sale volume, short volume
that is exempted from short sale restrictions and reporting facility identifier (NASDAQ,
NYSE, ADF – Alternative Display Facility and ORF – Over-the-counter Reporting
Facility). I aggregate individual short sale transactions for each day and company into
daily short sale volume for each IPO on the first trading day.
Summary statistics for the full sample are presented in Column 1 of Table 3.1. In
the next four columns, the sample is partitioned into quartiles based on the short sale
volume on the oﬀer day subject to short sale restrictions (excluding the shares that are
exempted from short sale restrictions).
Panel A of Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the short sale volume on the
oﬀer day of the 610 IPOs analyzed in this paper. There are on average 0.526 million
shares shorted on the oﬀer day that are subject to short sale restrictions. This represents
3.7% of total shares oﬀered or 1% of the shares outstanding on the oﬀer day.
If we assume that shareholders are homogeneous and short interest is constant, the
length of time between opening and unwinding the position (D- duration of the position)
can be approximated by using this formula:
D = 1ShortSale Turnover ; where ShortSale Turnover =
Shares Shorted
Shares Outstanding .
Using the average number of 1% short sale turnover on the oﬀer day and assuming
that 1% of the shares will be shorted each day, it would then take 100 trading days for
the entire stock of outstanding shares to turn over. The average holding period of the
short sellers of the IPOs in my sample is 100 trading days. This is significantly higher
than reported by Boehmer and Zhang (2008), who find an average trading duration of
37 days for the positions of short sales in 2004 at NYSE.
The sample of IPOs and their oﬀering characteristics is collected from Thomson
Reuters Eikon database. Only U.S. issues with oﬀer prices higher than five dollars
are taken into consideration, excluding units oﬀerings and closed-end funds. An IPO is
included in the final sample only if it has prices available on CRSP (Center for Research
in Security Prices) and has available financial statements in the Compustat database.
2Rule 201 applies to securities following an intra-day price decline of more than 10% from the
previous day’s closing price. For such stocks, SEC allows short selling only if the transaction price is

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































After merging all four databases (FINRA, Eikon, CRSP and Compustat), the final
sample has 610 IPOs. Additional IPO characteristics, like a negative price revision
dummy and an internet IPO dummy, are retrieved from Jay Ritter’s webpage.3
Table 3.1, Panel B presents initial statistics on the IPO characteristics for the full
sample (column 1) and each quartile based on the short sale volume on the oﬀer day
(columns 2-5). Heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) are bigger in all terms: market capi-
talization, oﬀer price, number of shares oﬀered and gross proceeds. At the same time,
they also have the highest first-day return.
Panel C of Table 3.1 reports the abnormal returns of the IPOs using one-year window
under diﬀerent specifications of abnormal returns. To measure one-year subsequent buy-
and-hold return of IPOs, I use CRSP value-weighted index as a proxy for the normal
return. Heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) are the only ones with negative (-7.74%) and
statistically significant BHAR with a one-year window.
To estimate the past performance of the IPOs according to the market model and
four-factor model, I use an estimation window of 504 trading days (two years) before
the IPO using daily returns of the most similar company in the same FF48 industry
matched based on market capitalization. I also merge with Fama-French return factors.
The SMB and HML factors are constructed using six Fama-French portfolios formed
on size and book-to-market. SMB (small minus big) is the average return on the three
small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios. HML (high minus
low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the
two growth portfolios. Mkt-Rf is the excess return on the market (proxied by CRSP
indexes) minus the Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. UMD (up minus down)
is the average return on the two highest-performing portfolios minus the average return
on the two lowest performing portfolios. Cumulative average abnormal return for one
year, using both the market and four-factor model, are negative (-15.42% and -14.89%
respectively) and statistically significant only for heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4).
The first two rows of Panel D in Table 3.1 compare the quarterly return on assets
(ROA) for the quarter of and quarter after the IPO date. Quarterly ROA is calculated
as quarterly net income over total assets. Lightly-shorted IPOs (first two quartiles)
significantly improve their average accounting performance in the quarter after the
IPO, while heavily-shorted IPOs do not improve their average accounting performance.
Mean analysts’ recommendation for each IPO are taken from I/B/E/S U.S. Recom-
3I thank Professor Ritter for making these data publicly available. See
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm.
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mendation database. All recommendations are between 1 (Strong Buy) and 5 (Strong
Sale). Lightly-shorted IPOs have an average initial consensus recommendation of 1.60,
meaning between Strong Buy and Buy, while heavily-shorted IPOs have an average
initial consensus recommendation of 2.13, that is, between Buy and Hold. Initial rec-
ommendations appear on average 28 trading days after the oﬀering. I use a probit
model to investigate which IPOs are more likely to be downgraded by the analysts
within the first year after the IPO. As expected, the marginal probability of downgrade
is positively related to the short sale volume on the oﬀer day. Heavily-shorted IPOs
have the highest probability (32.12%) of being downgraded in the year following the
IPO.
Thus far, the initial statistics are consistent with the main hypothesis of this paper,
that short selling on the oﬀer day is negatively correlated to the future performance of
the IPOs.
3.3 Long-Run Stock Market Performance of IPOs Con-
ditioned on Short Selling Activity on the Oﬀer
Day
3.3.1 Calendar Time-Series Portfolios Approach
To compare the performance of IPOs that were heavily shorted on the oﬀer day with
IPOs that were lightly shorted, I first follow a time-series portfolio approach controlling
for the Fama-French four factors. I consider the zero investment strategy that goes long
the lightly-shorted IPOs and goes short the heavily-shorted IPOs.
I start with this approach because it is potentially free of the joint hypothesis prob-
lem of a misspecified model. We can assume that any error in the estimated expected
return is the same across the two portfolios and, by taking the diﬀerence, the error
should be minimized.
I estimate return regressions by holding constant the stocks in the two portfolios
for one year (252 trading days) starting on the oﬀer day. I estimate the time-series
return regressions using daily returns reported in Table 3.2 and using monthly returns
reported in Table 3.3. The stocks are weighted relative to their market capitalization.
The sample of 610 IPOs is partitioned into quartiles based on three types of short














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































empted from short sale restrictions under the Rule 201, short sale volume that is ex-
empted from the short sale restrictions and total short sale volume. As expected, the
most informative short trades on the oﬀer day are those that are subject to short sale
restrictions, as shown in the first three columns of Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
The alphas of the corresponding portfolio of heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) are
negative and statistically significant, averaging -7 basis points per day and -1.6% when
using monthly returns. This finding suggests that short sellers are good at picking
IPOs that are overvalued and that they are presumably bringing prices back to their
fundamental values.
The alphas of the portfolio of lightly-shorted IPOs (quartile 1) are positive but sta-
tistically insignificant, and are small in magnitude when using both daily and monthly
returns.
The alpha of a zero investment portfolio (column 3) that goes long the lightly-shorted
IPOs (quartile 1) and goes short the heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) is positive and
statistically significant using both daily and monthly returns. This finding suggests that
short sellers are good at the relative valuation of IPOs. On a risk-adjusted basis, heavily-
shorted IPOs underperform lightly-shorted IPOs by an average of 9 basis points daily
(22.68% annualized return) and 1.72% monthly average (20.64% annualized return).
As expected, short sale trades of IPOs that are exempted from short sale restrictions,
such as the arbitrage of positions on options exchanges or foreign markets, hedging of
derivatives due within a few days and the distribution by an underwriter of an IPO,
are not informative about the long-run performance of IPOs.
3.3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns
The goal of this paper is to understand the eﬀect of short selling volume on the oﬀer day
on the subsequent performance of IPOs. I measure the performance of IPOs conditioned
on short selling volume on the oﬀer day over diﬀerent windows following the IPO: one
month, three months, six months and one year. I compute the cumulative abnormal
returns after the IPOs using the standard market model and four-factor model.
For estimating the parameters a and b, I use an estimation window of 504 trading
days (two years) before the IPO using daily returns of the most similar company in
the same FF48 industry, matched based on market capitalization. The CRSP value-
weighted index is used to proxy for market returns in both models. For the four-factor
model, in addition to the market factor, I include three additional factors: SMB (small
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minus big), HML (high minus low) and UMD (up minus down). Cumulative abnormal
returns are calculated as the sum of abnormal returns for each company over the specific
event window, which are then averaged cross-sectionally for both models.
I rank and split the sample of 610 IPOs into quartiles based on three types of
short selling volume on the oﬀer day: short sale volume excluding short sales that are
exempted from short sale restrictions under the Rule 201, short sale volume that is
exempted from short sale restrictions and total short sale volume.
Table 3.4 presents results when using the standard market model, while Table 3.5
presents results when using the four-factor model. As can be seen from Panel A of
Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, the most informative short trades are those that are subject
to short sale restrictions under the Alternative Uptick Rule 201.
I find negative, statistically significant, cumulative abnormal return using a six-
month and one-year window for heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) on the oﬀer day
using both models. This is approximately in line with the average duration of positions
in the sample (100 trading days). Short sellers of IPOs, relative to short sellers of
other stocks, are more long-term oriented. As shown in the previous literature, IPOs
underperform in the longer run. It takes more time for the prices of IPOs to return to
their fundamental values, serving as an example of long-term market ineﬃciencies.
Using a one-year window for the market model, heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4)
underperform lightly-shorted IPOs (quartile 1) by an average of 15.12%. Using the four-
factor model, the diﬀerence is 12.37%. Both diﬀerences are statistically significant.
On the other hand, lightly-shorted IPOs experience positive and statistically signif-
icant cumulative abnormal return for shorter windows (one and three months) using
both models. In the longer run, the diﬀerences in their performances is statistically
insignificant.
Thus, the stock market performance of IPOs, measured using stock return data,
is lower for heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day. This finding is in the line with
the hypothesis that short sellers are sophisticated investors who anticipate subsequent
underperformance of the IPOs in order to make a profit and contribute to eﬃcient stock
prices. Graphical evidence of this finding is in Figure 3.1.
Raw returns are presented in Figure 1a, while cumulative abnormal returns using
the market model and the four factor model are in Figures 1b and 1c respectively. The
IPOs are ranked and split into quartiles based on short selling volume on the oﬀer day
(excluding short sales exempted from Rule 201). In all three graphs, heavily-shorted
IPOs (quartile 4) always underperform the remaining IPOs using a one-year window.
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Table 3.4: Cumulative Abnormal Return (Market Model) to Short Sale Volume
The sample runs from March 2011 to December 2015. The event dates are the issue dates of the appropriate IPOs. In the Panel A., IPOs
are ranked and split into quartiles based on short sale volume (excluding short exempt volume) on the first trading day. In the Panel B.,
IPOs are ranked and split into quartiles based on aggregate reported share volume of executed short sale exempt trades during the first
trading day. In the Panel C., quartiles are formed based on both aggregate reported short volume of executed short sale and short sale
exempt trades during the first trading day of the IPOs. Abnormal daily returns are calculated using the standard market model. The
CRSP value-weighted index is used to proxy for market returns in the estimation of each firm alpha and beta. The estimation window
is 504 days before the event date using daily returns of the most similar companies in the same FF48 industry to each respective IPO
(matched based on market capitalization). Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as the sum of abnormal returns over the event
window. Average cumulative abnormal returns and t-statistics for event windows of 21, 63, 126 and 252 trading days are presented below.
Panel A. Market Model CAR
Short Sale Volume Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
Excluding Short Exempt [+1,+21] [+1,+63] [+1,+126] [+1,+252]
1st quartile - 153 obs. 0.0178 -0.0101 -0.0148 -0.0029
(1.50) (0.41) (0.43) (0.05)
2nd quartile - 152 obs. 0.0656*** 0.0871*** 0.0235 0.0066
(3.92) (3.35) (0.62) (0.11)
3rd quartile - 153 obs. 0.0356*** 0.0422* -0.0173 -0.0393
(2.96) (1.80) (0.51) (0.75)
4th quartile - 152 obs. -0.0086 -0.0170 -0.0764*** -0.1542***
(0.66) (0.76) (2.66) (3.75)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th ) 0.0263 0.0070 0.0615 0.1512**
(1.50) (0.21) (1.38) (2.19)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Panel B. Market Model CAR
Short Exempt Volume
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+1,+21] [+1,+63] [+1,+126] [+1,+252]
1st quartile - 350 obs. 0.0366*** 0.0397*** 0.0075 -0.0350
(4.62) (2.58) (0.33) (0.99)
2nd quartile - 0 obs. n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a
3rd quartile - 109 obs. 0.0134 0.0188 -0.0588 -0.0312
(0.75) (0.59) (1.38) (0.46)
4th quartile - 151 obs. 0.0169 -0.0025 -0.0606** -0.0877*
(1.06) (0.10) (1.99) (1.97)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th ) 0.0197 0.0422 0.0681* 0.0526
(1.23) (1.48) (1.70) (0.86)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Panel C. Market Model CAR
Total Short Sale Volume
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+1,+21] [+1,+63] [+1,+126] [+1,+252]
1st quartile - 153 obs. 0.0217* -0.0042 -0.0061 -0.0011
(1.69) (0.17) (0.17) (0.02)
2nd quartile - 152 obs. 0.0616*** 0.0812*** 0.0147 0.0047
(3.84) (3.21) (0.40) (0.08)
3rd quartile - 153 obs. 0.0339*** 0.0434* -0.0200 -0.0341
(2.84) (1.84) (0.35) (0.65)
4th quartile - 152 obs. -0.0069 -0.0183 -0.0817*** -0.1594***
(0.53) (0.82) (2.85) (3.88)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th ) 0.0286 0.0141 0.0757* 0.1584**
(1.56) (0.42) (1.64) (2.29)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Table 3.5: Cumulative Abnormal Return (Four-Factor Model) to Short Sale Volume
The sample runs from March 2011 to December 2015. The event dates are the issue dates of the appropriate IPOs. In the Panel A., IPOs
are ranked and split into quartiles based on short sale volume (excluding short exempt volume) on the first trading day. In the Panel B.,
IPOs are ranked and split into quartiles based on aggregate reported share volume of executed short sale exempt trades during the first
trading day. In the Panel C., quartiles are formed based on both aggregate reported short volume of executed short sale and short sale
exempt trades during the first trading day of the IPO. Abnormal daily returns are calculated using the four-factor model. The excess
return on the market is the CRSP value-weighted index minus treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. Other three factors are SMB
(small minus big), HML (high minus low) and UMD (up minus down). The estimation window is 504 days before the event date using
daily returns of the most similar companies in the same FF48 industry to each respective IPO (matched based on market capitalization).
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as the sum of abnormal returns over the event window. Average cumulative abnormal returns
and t-statistics for event windows of 21, 63, 126 and 252 trading days are presented below.
Panel A. Four-Factor Model CAR
Short Sale Volume Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
Excluding Short Exempt [+1,+21] [+1,+63] [+1,+126] [+1,+252]
1st quartile - 153 obs. 0.0139 -0.0143 -0.0278 -0.0252
(1.23) (0.59) (0.81) (0.45)
2nd quartile - 152 obs. 0.0684*** 0.0906*** 0.0331 0.0246
(4.00) (3.46) (0.87) (0.44)
3rd quartile - 153 obs. 0.0331*** 0.0410* -0.0223 -0.0494
(2.85) (1.89) (0.74) (1.08)
4th quartile - 152 obs. -0.0067 -0.0187 -0.0754*** -0.1489***
(0.52) (0.82) (2.63) (3.67)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th ) 0.0206 0.0044 0.0476 0.1237*
(1.21) (0.13) (1.07) (1.78)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Panel B. Four-Factor Model CAR
Short Exempt Volume
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+1,+21] [+1,+63] [+1,+126] [+1,+252]
1st quartile - 350 obs. 0.0342*** 0.0380** 0.0046 -0.0302
(4.35) (2.50) (0.20) (0.85)
2nd quartile - 0 obs. n/a n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a n/a n/a
3rd quartile - 109 obs. 0.0189 0.0254 -0.0521 -0.0358
(1.04) (0.82) (1.32) (0.57)
4th quartile - 151 obs. 0.0167 -0.0071 -0.0664** -0.1048***
(1.06) (0.29) (2.30) (2.68)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th ) 0.0175 0.0451* 0.0710* 0.0745
(1.11) (1.60) (1.79) (1.25)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Panel C. Four-Factor Model CAR
Total Short Sale Volume
Event Window: Event Window: Event Window: Event Window:
[+1,+21] [+1,+63] [+1,+126] [+1,+252]
1st quartile - 153 obs. 0.0179 -0.0083 -0.0189 -0.0228
(1.44) (0.33) (0.52) (0.40)
2nd quartile - 152 obs. 0.0644*** 0.0845*** 0.0243 0.0223
(3.93) (3.32) (0.67) (0.40)
3rd quartile - 153 obs. 0.0314*** 0.0421* -0.0163 -0.0432
(2.72) (1.94) (0.54) (0.94)
4th quartile - 152 obs. -0.0050 -0.0199 -0.0815*** -0.1551***
(0.39) (0.87) (2.85) (3.84)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th ) 0.0229 0.0116 0.0625 0.1323*
(1.28) (0.34) (1.36) (1.90)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Figure 3.1: Stock Market Performance
The sample of 610 IPOs is partitioned into quartiles based on short sale volume on the oﬀer day that
is subject to short sale restrictions under the Alternative Uptick Rule 201.
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3.3.3 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
There is no consensus in the literature about which method is better: use of cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) or buy-and-hold returns (BHAR). Some of the works, for
example Fama (1998), justify the use of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). However,
Barber and Lyon (1997) emphasize the advantage of BHARs for measuring an investor’s
experience, because the use of mean calendar-time returns or their sum (cumulative
returns) does not adequately measure the returns obtained by an investor who holds a
stock for a long period of time. According to these authors, the returns obtained by
an investor in the long run are better approximated by compounding short-run simple
returns. Given this lack of consensus, in order to give robustness to the results, I use
both CAR and BHAR approaches. Again, IPOs are ranked according to restricted,
unrestricted, and total short selling volume on the oﬀer day.
I calculate long-run returns for each quartile by compounding daily and monthly
returns over, respectively, 252 trading days and 12 months, starting on the oﬀer day. I





t=ti (1 + Rit )   1
g  PNi=1 fQTit=ti (1 + E(Rit ))   1g ,
where Rit is the return of security i on day or month t, N is the number of securities,
T is the number of days (252 trading days) or months (12 months), ti is the first day
of trading and E(Rit ) is the expected or normal return (CRSP value-weighted index).
Weights (wi) are defined as the ratio of issuer i’s common stock market value and sum
of the market values of all stocks. Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 report the results computed
using daily and monthly returns respectively.
I find negative and statistically significant buy-and-hold returns for all three types
of short sale volume only for heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day (quartile 4) using
both daily and monthly returns. Thus, firm performance, measured using buy-and-hold
compounded stock return data, is lower for IPOs that were heavily shorted on the oﬀer
day of the IPO. If an investor buys and holds a security that was heavily shorted on
the oﬀer day, he will lose on average 7.74% in one year.
The diﬀerence between heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) and lightly-shorted IPOs
(quartile 1) on the oﬀer day is always positive and statistically significant, with the
highest magnitude for short sales that are subject to short sale restrictions (the first
columns in both Table 3.6 and Table 3.7).
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Table 3.6: Buy-and-Hold Returns Using Value-Weighted Daily Returns
The sample runs from March 2011 to December 2015. The event dates are the issue dates of the
appropriate IPOs. In the first column IPOs are ranked and split into quartiles based on short sale
volume (excluding short exempt volume) on the first trading day. In the second column IPOs are ranked
and split into quartiles based on aggregate reported share volume of executed short sale exempt trades
during the first trading day. In the third column quartiles are formed based on both aggregate reported
short volume of executed short sale and short sale exempt trades during the first trading day of the
IPOs. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns and t-statistics are presented below.






(1 + Rit )   1
g  PNi=1 fQTit=ti (1 + E(Rit ))   1g .
Weights are defined as the ratio of issuer’s common stock market value to the sum of the market
values of all stocks. Rit is the daily return of each individual stock, while E (Rit ) is the CRSP daily
value-weighted index, which is used as a proxy for expected or normal returns.
BHAR (value-weighted daily returns)
Event Window: [+1,+252]
Short Sale Volume
Short Exempt Volume Total Short Volume
Excluding Short Exempt
1st quartile -153 obs. -0.0039 -0.0223*** -0.0054
(0.76) (4.48) (1.00)
2nd quartile - 152 obs. 0.0641*** n/a 0.0608***
(8.22) n/a (8.67)
3rd quartile - 153 obs. 0.0190*** 0.0320*** 0.0193***
(2.61) (4.74) (2.65)
4th quartile -152 obs. -0.0774*** -0.0421*** -0.0778***
(10.76) (6.24) (10.82)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th) 0.0736*** 0.0197** 0.0723***
(8.36) (2.24) (8.04)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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Table 3.7: Buy-and-Hold Returns Using Value-Weighted Monthly Returns
The sample runs from March 2011 to December 2015. The event dates are the issue dates of the
appropriate IPOs. In the first column IPOs are ranked and split into quartiles based on short sale
volume (excluding short exempt volume) on the first trading day. In the second column IPOs are ranked
and split into quartiles based on aggregate reported share volume of executed short sale exempt trades
during the first trading day. In the third column quartiles are formed based on both aggregate reported
short volume of executed short sale and short sale exempt trades during the first trading day of the
IPOs. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns and t-statistics are presented below.






(1 + Rit )   1
g  PNi=1 fQTit=ti (1 + E(Rit ))   1g .
Weights are defined as the ratio of issuer’s common stock market value to the sum of the market
values of all stocks. Rit is the daily return of each individual stock, while E (Rit ) is the CRSP monthly
value-weighted index, which is used as a proxy for expected or normal returns.
BHAR (value-weighted monthly returns)
Event Window: [+1,+12]
Short Sale Volume
Short Exempt Volume Total Short Volume
Excluding Short Exempt
1st quartile -153 obs. -0.0069 -0.0189*** -0.0137**
(1.20) (4.19) (2.36)
2nd quartile - 152 obs. 0.0423*** n/a 0.0425***
(5.22) n/a (5.76)
3rd quartile - 153 obs. 0.0119* 0.0228*** 0.0124*
(1.82) (3.62) (1.90)
4th quartile -152 obs. -0.0601*** -0.0413*** -0.0606***
(10.82) (6.78) (10.93)
Diﬀerence (1st-4th) 0.0532*** 0.0224*** 0.0469***
(6.62) (2.82) (5.85)
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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I conclude that the finding that heavily-shorted IPOs perform worse than lightly-
shorted IPOs is robust to diﬀerent estimation approaches (calendar time-series, CAR
and BHAR). The results are always in line with the main hypotheses that heavily-
shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day underperform both relative to the overall market and
relative to a sample of IPOs that were lightly shorted on the oﬀer day, as short sellers
subject to Rule 201 are more informed about future IPO performance.
3.3.3.1 Cross-section of Abnormal Returns on Short Sale Volume
To address whether short selling volume on the oﬀer day can explain cross-sectional
diﬀerences in future abnormal returns of IPOs, I regress one-year post-issue buy-and-
hold abnormal return of each IPO on the three types of short sale volume on the oﬀer
day: short sale volume that is subject to short sale restrictions, short sale volume that
is exempted from restrictions and total short sale volume. I control for the size of each
company on the oﬀer day, measuring size as natural logarithm of the subject company’s
market value.
The results are presented in Table 3.8. In first three columns, the dependent variable
is one-year BHAR compounded using daily returns, while in the last three columns
BHAR is compounded using monthly returns.
The results show that short sale volume that is subject to Rule 201 significantly
and negatively predicts BHAR. This result indicates that higher short selling volume
on the oﬀer day predicts a future decline in abnormal returns. In terms of economic
significance, a 100,000 increase in shares shorted on the oﬀer day predicts 0.17% decline
in one-year abnormal return when using daily returns, or a 0.12% decline when using
monthly returns.
3.4 Accounting Performance of IPOs Conditioned on
Short Selling Activity on the Oﬀer Day
Next, I consider whether there is a similar decline in performance following the IPO for
companies that were heavily shorted on the oﬀer day by using accounting data (instead
of stock returns). Specifically, I consider whether net income, earnings per share and
return on asset (ROA) decline in the quarter following the IPO. Measuring the eﬀect
using accounting data should capture only the decline in real performance, mitigating
the joint hypothesis problem.
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Table 3.8: Cross-section of Abnormal Returns on Short Sale Volume
The sample runs from March 2011 to December 2015. In the first three columns the dependent variable
is the average one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return as a percentage using daily returns, while in the
next three columns the dependent variable is the average one-year buy-and-hold abnormal return as a
percentage using monthly returns. Short sale volume excluding short exempt volume is the aggregate
reported share volume of executed short sale excluding short exempt trades scaled by 100,000 shares.
Short exempt volume is the aggregate reported share volume of executed short exempt trades scaled
by 100,000 shares. Total Sort Sale Volume is the aggregate reported share volume of executed short
sales and short sales exempt trades scaled by 100,000 shares. Size is defined as the natural logarithm
of the market value of the company on the day of the IPO.
Dependent variable: 1 year Abnormal Return
BHAR (daily returns) BHAR (monthly returns)
Short Sale Volume
Excluding Short Exempt -0.1731*** -0.1203***
(5.27) (4.03)
Short Exempt Volume -4.0285 -2.4769
(1.15) (1.47)
Total Short Sale Volume -0.1726*** -0.1199***
(5.28) (4.04)
Size (lnMV) -0.8180** -1.4808*** -0.8164** -0.7298** -1.1971*** -0.7291**
(2.28) (4.37) (2.27) (2.24) (3.92) (2.24)
Constant 5.8920*** 9.1507*** 5.8873*** -4.7131** 7.0040*** 4.7119**
(2.75) (4.42) (2.75) (2.43) (3.75) (2.43)
Observations 610 610 610 610 610 610
Adjusted R-squared 7.32% 3.82% 7.35% 4.93% 2.73% 4.94%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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I use an autoregressive (AR) regression framework using windows of four quarters
(one year) for each accounting variable and each partition of the sample (quartiles).
Quartiles are formed based on short sale volume on the oﬀer day that are subject to
short sale restrictions under the Alternative Uptick Rule 201. I focus only on these
type of trades because results from the previous analysis using stock market returns
showed them to be more informative about the long-run underperformance of the IPO.
The results are presented in Table 3.9.
Table 3.9 shows results from a regression of quarterly accounting variables (net
income, earnings per share and ROA) on their lagged values over a period of four
quarters (one year) starting from the IPO date. A dummy variable, which is set to
one for the quarter following the IPO and zero otherwise, allows me to identify the
change in accounting performance in the quarter following the IPO. Year and 48 Fama
and French industry fixed eﬀects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and the accounting variables are winsorized at 1% in order to avoid
extreme values driving the results.
In Panel A of Table 3.9 I regress quarterly net income on its lagged values for
four quarters and for each quartile formed based on restricted short sale volume on
the oﬀer day. The dummy variable for the quarter following the IPO is negative and
statistically significant for heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4), indicating that there is
a significant decline in the profitability of these stocks in the quarter after the IPO.
The eﬀect is decreasing in magnitude along with the short sale volume on the oﬀer day
(quartile 2 and quartile 3), showing a positive coeﬃcient or increased profitability for
lightly-shorted IPOs (quartile 1).
Panel B of Table 3.9 shows results from a regression of quarterly earnings per share
on its lagged values for four quarters starting from the IPO date. More specifically, I use
quarterly diluted earnings per share including extraordinary items.4 Similarly to when
using net income, the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable for the quarter after the IPO
is negative and statistically significant for heavily-shorted and medium-shorted IPOs
while for lightly-shorted IPOs the coeﬃcient is turning into positive but statistically
insignificant. To conclude, short sale volume on the IPO oﬀer day has a negative impact
on the earnings per share in the quarter after the IPO. Heavily-shorted IPOs show a
significant decrease in accounting performance in the quarter following the IPO.
Panel C of Table 3.9 reports results from an autoregressive (AR) model of quar-
4The results are robust also when using basic earnings per share both including or excluding ex-
traordinary items.
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Table 3.9: Accounting Performance
The table below shows results from autoregressive panel regressions for a a one-year window (4 quarters) after the IPO.
The dependent variables are: quarterly net income (Panel A.), quarterly diluted earnings per share (Panel B.) and
quarterly return on assets (Panel C.) defined as net income over the total assets. Size is defined as the natural logarithm
of total assets at the beginning of each quarter. The dependent variables are winsorized at 1%. The dummy variable is
set to 1 for the quarter after the IPO, and 0 otherwise. Year and 48 Fama and French industry fixed eﬀects are included
in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by firms. The sample is partitioned into quartiles based on short sale
trades on the oﬀer day that are subject to short sale restrictions under the Alternative Uptick Rule 201.
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Net Income (t)
Panel A.
Quartile 4 Quartile 3 Quartile 2 Quartile 1
Heavily-Shorted Medium-Shorted Medium-Shorted Lightly-Shorted
Quarterly Net Income (t-1) 0.2570*** 0.4055*** 0.4665*** 0.3012***
(12.02) (11.75) (16.14) (7.57)
Dummy (Quarter after the IPO) -12.3040*** -5.7545*** -3.8505*** 1.5925*
(3.04) (2.82) (3.11) (1.91)
Size 5.4754*** 2.9408*** -0.0489 0.3139
(3.94) (3.46) (0.10) (1.10)
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Industry FF48 Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Observations 549 555 546 408
Adjusted R-squared 38.35% 37.22% 63.48% 39.71%
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Earnings per Share (t)
Panel B.
Quartile 4 Quartile 3 Quartile 2 Quartile 1
Heavily-Shorted Medium-Shorted Medium-Shorted Lightly-Shorted
Quarterly Earnings per Share (t-1) -0.0028* 0.1369*** 0.1721*** 0.0401***
(1.96) (7.29) (4.27) (3.54)
Dummy (Quarter after the IPO) -0.1282*** -0.1285*** -0.1091*** 0.0279
(3.51) (4.17) (2.94) (0.65)
Size 0.0204* 0.0486*** -0.0012 0.0311**
(1.66) (3.78) (0.08) (2.11)
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Industry FF48 Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Observations 540 555 548 408
Adjusted R-squared 21.23% 40.77% 31.28% 38.54%
Dependent Variable: Quartarly ROA (t)
Panel C.
Quartile 4 Quartile 3 Quartile 2 Quartile 1
Heavily-Shorted Medium-Shorted Medium-Shorted Lightly-Shorted
Quarterly ROA (t-1) 0.2697*** 0.4456*** 0.1008*** 0.1084***
(9.90) (18.26) (4.88) (8.14)
Dummy (Quarter after the IPO) -0.0089** 0.0055 0.0300*** 0.0414***
(2.19) (1.25) (3.66) (3.99)
Size 0.0031** 0.0060*** 0.0154*** 0.0125***
(2.21) (3.12) (3.83) (3.27)
Year Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Industry FF48 Fixed Eﬀects YES YES YES YES
Observations 545 554 544 406
Adjusted R-squared 44.56% 63.43% 40.37% 50.64%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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terly ROA, calculated as quarterly net income over total assets. Heavily-shorted IPOs
(quartile 4) show a decline in ROA of 0.89% in the quarter following the IPO, while
lightly-shorted IPOs (quartile 1) show an increase in ROA of 4.14% in the quarter after
the IPO. Both results are statistically significant, indicating that short sellers are good
both at picking stocks that will underperform in the future and avoiding stocks that
will outperform in the future.
After using accounting data instead of stock market data, I conclude that, in terms
of profitability and accounting returns, heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day always
underperform relative to the sample of IPOs that were lightly shorted on the oﬀer
day. Accounting performance is declining in the increased short sale volume on the
oﬀer day, indicating that short sellers are sophisticated investors who anticipate future
underperformance in order to make profits. Presumably, these investors are bringing
prices back to their fundamental values.
3.5 Consensus Analysts’ Recommendations and Short
Selling Activity of IPOs
The semi-strong form of market eﬃciency theory states that investors should not be
able to trade profitably on the basis of publicly available information, such as analysts’
recommendations. However, research departments of brokerage houses spend large
sums of money on security analysis, presumably because these firms and their clients
believe that it can generate superior returns. The possibility that profitable investment
strategies based on publicly available information could exist is suggested by the early
findings of Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996). Furthermore, Barber (2001) documents
that selling short stocks with the least favorable consensus recommendations and buy-
ing stocks with the most favorable recommendations yields abnormal returns. All these
findings suggest that investors can profit from publicly available analysts’ recommen-
dations and that these recommendations possess additional information about the true
value of securities.
In the case of IPOs, there is a so-called "quiet period" for a period of 25 trading
days following the IPO, when the issuing firm and the members of the underwriting
syndicate are not allowed to issue opinions concerning valuation, including research
recommendations. In my sample of IPOs the first initiation of recommendations on
average appears 42 calendar days after the oﬀer day. This corresponds to 28 trading
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days, similar to the quiet period.
In order to show that short sellers are well-informed, as much as analysts, I hy-
pothesize that there should be a relationship between short sale volume on the first
trading day and the analysts’ initiation of recommendations that occur after the quiet
period or on average after 28 trading days in my sample. The goal is to show that
heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day afterwards receive the least favorable consensus
recommendations.
To test this hypothesis I regress the first mean analysts’ recommendation of a com-
pany that went public on the short sale volume on the oﬀer day. Mean analysts’
recommendations are retrieved from the I/B/E/S U.S. Recommendation database. All
recommendations are between 1 - Strong Buy and 5 - Strong Sale. After merging with
the recommendations database my sample decreases to 529 IPOs that are present in
I/B/E/S database.
In the table for summary statistics (Table 1), it was shown that heavily-shorted
IPOs on the oﬀer day have an average initiation of consensus recommendation of 2.13,
that is, between Buy and Hold, while lightly-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day have an
average initiation of 1.60, that is, between Strong Buy and Buy. This provides initial
evidence that short sellers are good at picking overvalued IPOs relative to undervalued
ones.
This evidence is also robust to more rigorous regression framework reported in Table
3.10.
Table 3.10 show results from a cross-sectional regression in which the dependent
variable is the first consensus (mean) analysts’ recommendation for each IPO. The
variable of interest is the short sale volume on the oﬀer day scaled by 100,000 shares,
after controlling for diﬀerent IPO characteristics and time and industry fixed eﬀects.
IPO characteristics that I control for include: first-day return (defined as percentage
diﬀerence between first-day closing market price and the oﬀer price), gross proceeds in
million of dollars, shares oﬀered scaled by 100,000 shares, size (defined as the natural
logarithm of the market value on the day of the IPO), issue price range (dummy variable
equal to 0 if the oﬀer price is set within the initial price range, 1 if the oﬀer price is set
above the initial price range and -1 if it is below the price range), over-allotment shares
sold scaled by 100,000 shares and over-allotment amount in million of dollars. Negative
price revision is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the oﬀer price was revised downwards
and 0 otherwise. The Nasdaq dummy is set to 1 if the company was initially listed on
the Nasdaq stock exchange and 0 otherwise. The internet IPO dummy is equal to 1 if
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Table 3.10: Cross-section of Mean Analysts Recommendation on Short Sale Volume
The table shows results from regression in which the dependent variables is mean (consensus) analysts recommendation
for each IPO taken from I/B/E/S Recommendation database. All recommendations are between 1 (Strong Buy) and 5
(Strong Sale). The first column shows results for the full sample, while in the next four columns the sample is partitioned
into quartiles based on short sale trades on the oﬀer day that are subject to short sale restrictions under the Alternative
Uptick Rule 201. Short sale volume is scaled by 100,000 shares. First-day return is defined as the percentage diﬀerence
between first-day closing market price and the oﬀer price. Gross proceeds are in millions of dollars. Shares oﬀered are
scaled by 100,000 shares. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of the company at the day of the
IPO. Issue price range is a dummy variable taking 0 if the oﬀer price is set within the initial price range, 1 if the oﬀer
price is set above the initial price range and -1 if it is below the price range. Over-allotment shares sold are scaled by
100,000 shares and over-allotment amount is in millions of dollars. Negative price revision is a dummy variable taking
value 1 if the oﬀer price was revised downwards and 0 otherwise. Nasdaq dummy is set to 1 if the company was initially
listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange and 0 otherwise. Internet IPO dummy is taking value of 1 if the IPO is categorized
as an internet firm on Jay Ritter’s webpage and 0 otherwise. Year of the IPO and 48 Fama and French industry fixed
eﬀects are included in all regressions.
Dependent Variable: Mean Analysts’ Recommendations
Full Sample Quartile 4 Quartile 3 Quartile 2 Quartile 1
Short Sale Volume
Excluding Short Exempt 0.0170*** 0.0140*** 0.0523 0.0299 0.4773
(6.18) (3.82) (0.98) (0.30) (1.61)
First-Day Return 0.0232*** 0.0028* 0.0037** 0.0012 -0.0013
(2.71) (1.86) (2.42) (0.48) (0.19)
Gross Proceeds -0.0003 0.0008 0.0043 0.0058 0.0003
(0.29) (0.47) (1.50) (1.32) (0.09)
Shares Oﬀered 0.0003 0.0007 0.0050*** 0.0003 -0.0025
(0.74) (1.21) (2.85) (0.17) (0.80)
Size (lnMV) 0.0099 -0.0682 0.1813** -0.0256 -0.1343
(0.37) (1.20) (2.59) (0.41) (1.51)
Issue Priced Range 0.0767 0.0645 -0.0445 0.1434 -0.0402
(1.23) (0.60) (0.44) (0.57) (0.35)
Over-allotment Sold Shares 0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0264*** -0.0073 0.0115
(0.70) (0.54) (2.99) (0.92) (0.88)
Over-allotment Amount -0.0006 -0.0078 -0.0383* -0.0446 0.0011
(0.09) (0.67) (1.79) (1.34) (0.07)
Negative Price Revision -0.0005 -0.2212 -0.2723 0.1022 0.0000
(0.01) (0.97) (1.65) (0.39) (0.00)
Nasdaq Dummy -0.0029 -0.0421 0.0308 0.0945 -0.1155
(0.06) (0.41) (0.32) (0.80) (0.69)
Internet IPOs Dummy 0.0101 -0.1252 -0.1421 -0.2312 -0.1780
(0.12) (0.80) (0.93) (1.07) (0.61)
Intercept 2.4059*** 3.9835*** -0.9834 1.7524*** 3.1778***
(4.86) (5.57) (1.24) (3.22) (4.39)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry (FF48) Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 529 142 145 136 106
Adj. R-squared 24.44% 29.96% 18.53% 17.53% 0.05%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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the IPO is categorized as an internet firm on Jay Ritter’s webpage and 0 otherwise.
The first column of Table 3.10 considers the full sample, while in the next four
columns the sample is partitioned into quartiles based on short sale volume on the oﬀer
day that is subject to short sale restrictions under the Rule 201 (considered as the most
informative short sale trades).
I find a positive statistically significant relationship between the value of the first
analyst recommendation after the IPO and the short sale volume on the oﬀer day in
the full sample. This result is mainly driven by the heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile
4), which are the only IPOs to have a positive statistically significant relationship with
mean analysts recommendations.5 The positive relationship means that heavily-shorted
IPOs on the oﬀer day afterwards receive less favorable analysis recommendations.
For each 100,000 increase in shares shorted on the oﬀer day, the first consensus
recommendation is higher (meaning less favorable) by 0.017.
This finding indicates that short sellers are sophisticated investors that possess in-
formation about the respective IPOs, and are at least as informed as analysts. Since the
first initiation of recommendations after the IPO starts after the quiet period, I assume
that most of the analysts that initiate the recommendations of IPOs in my sample are
aﬃliated analysts that were part of the underwriting syndicate. These analysts are
considered to have superior information over unaﬃliated analysts and the rest of the
market.
It is important to note that in this section I do not claim causality between short
selling volume on the oﬀer day and the initiations of analysts’ recommendations because
it is likey that both of them are driven by the deviations of the security prices from
their fundamental values on the oﬀer day. Undervaluations or overvaluations of IPOs
on the oﬀer day are discussed in more detail in the next section where I analyze the
first-day return.
I have shown that heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day receive less favorable initial
recommendations by analysts relative to lightly-shorted IPOs. A further goal is to
show that heavily-shorted IPOs are also bad investments in the longer run of one year.
I hypothesize that, if short sellers are good at picking overvalued IPOs on the oﬀer day
and if they contribute to bringing prices back to their fundamental values, consequently
5The consensus analysts’ recommendation is bounded dependent variable taking continuous values
from 1 to 5. For simplicity I use and present the ordinary least squares (OLS) model because the
predicted values are always in the range from 1 to 5. However, the results are robust also when using
a tobit model or an ordered logit model.
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these stocks should be downgraded by analysts. For this purpose I use a probit model
in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the IPO firm was downgraded with
respect to its lagged recommendation within one year. Results from the probit model
are reported in Table 3.11.
A stock is considered as downgraded and the dummy is set to 1 if the diﬀerence
between the respective mean recommendation and the previous mean recommendation
is positive. For example, if the current recommendation is Strong Sale (5) and the
previous mean recommendation was Strong Buy (1), the diﬀerence is positive and equal
to 4 (5-1), and the stock is considered as downgraded.
The explanatory variable is a factor variable that takes categorical values from 1
to 4 depending on the quartile in which the IPO is classified based on the short sale
volume on the oﬀer day. The reference group of the factor variable are lightly-shorted
IPOs on the oﬀer day (quartile 1).
Being sorted as heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) on the oﬀer day versus lightly-
shorted IPOs (quartile 1) increases the z-score for downgrade by 0.4193. This eﬀect is
statistically significant and decreases in magnitude for medium-shorted IPOs (quartile
2 and quartile 3). The eﬀect decreases as short sale volume on the oﬀer day decreases.
In order to better understand the eﬀect of short selling on the oﬀer day on the
probability of being downgraded, I also compute predicted probabilities, which are
reported in the second column of Table 3.11. The predicted probability of an IPO to
be downgraded by analysts within one year is the highest for the heavily-shorted IPOs
(32.12%). The predicted probabilities of being downgraded decrease with the short sale
volume, so lightly-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day have the smallest predicted probability
of being downgraded (18.84%) within one year after the IPO.
This evidence supports the main finding of the paper, that short sellers are well-
informed investors, are good at picking overvalued stocks anticipating future underper-
formance, and they are important contributors to eﬃcient stock prices.
3.6 Short Selling Volume on the Oﬀer Day and IPO
Characteristics
The previous sections have shown that short sellers are good at picking IPOs that un-
derperform in the longer run, both relative to the market and relative to other IPOs.
However, thus far little has been said regarding the basis upon which short seller choose
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Table 3.11: Probit Model of Analysts’ Downgrades on Short Sale Volume Quartiles
The table reports results from a probit model in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the
IPO firm was downgraded with respect to the previous month’s mean analysts recommendation in
time period of one year. All recommendations are between 1 (Strong Buy) and 5 (Strong Sale)
taken from the I/B/E/S Recommendation database. The stock is considered as downgraded and the
dummy is set to 1 if the diﬀerence between the respective mean recommendation and previous mean
recommendation is positive (example: Strong Sale (5) in current month - Strong Buy(1) in previous
month gives a positive result of 4). The explanatory variable takes categorical values from 1 to 4
depending on in which quartile the stock is classified based on short sale volume on the oﬀer day that
is subject to short sale restrictions under the Alternative Uptick Rule 201. I report both coeﬃcient
estimates and marginal eﬀects. Since explanatory variables takes categorical values (from 1 to 4), the
marginal eﬀect gives the discreet change in the dependent variable as it changes from 1 to 4.
Dependent Variable: Downgraded=1, Otherwise=0
Coeﬃcients Marginal Eﬀects
Quartile 1 (lightly-shorted IPOs) 0.1884***
(15.66)
Quartile 2 (medium-shorted IPOs) 0.1016* 0.2171***
(1.76) (20.06)
Quartile 3 (medium-shorted IPOs) 0.1701*** 0.2378***
(3.00) (22.00)







Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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these IPOs on the oﬀer day and why and how they know to anticipate long-run un-
derperformance of these issues. In other words, in this section I explore which types
of IPOs are subject to more short selling on the oﬀer day. To analyze this issue in
more detail, I use a cross-sectional regression framework in which I regress the short
sale volume on the oﬀer day on diﬀerent IPO characteristics. The dependent variables
are three types of short selling volumes on the oﬀer day: short sale volume excluding
short sales that are exempted from short sale restrictions under Rule 201, short sale
volume that is exempted from short sale restrictions, and total short sale volume. All
the volumes are scaled by 100,000 shares.
The IPO characteristics that I examine are variables that were used as controls in the
previous analysis in Section 5: first-day return, gross proceeds, number of shares oﬀered,
size, issue price range, over-allotment shares sold, over-allotment amount, negative price
revision, Nasdaq dummy and the internet IPO dummy. I control for year and industry
fixed eﬀects. The results are reported in Table 3.12.
As shown in the first column of Table 3.12, again the most informative short trades
on the oﬀer day are those that are subject to short sale restrictions under the Rule 201.
There is no statistically significant relationship between short trades that are exempted
from Rule 201 and any of the IPO characteristics that I examine. The only significant
coeﬃcient (at a 10% confidence level) is the number of shares oﬀered at the IPO.
On the other hand, the first column of Table 3.12 shows that short sale volume that
is subject to short sale restrictions is correlated to almost all IPO characteristics. In
terms of statistical significance, the most relevant IPO characteristics that influence the
short sale volume on the oﬀer day are: first-day return, number of shares oﬀered, issue
price range, over-allotment amount and the internet IPO dummy. Short sale volume
on the oﬀer day increases with the number of shares oﬀered. Bigger issues are more
likely to be shorted on the oﬀer day. Issue price range has a positive and significant
coeﬃcient, meaning that, for IPOs with oﬀer prices set above the initial price range,
short sale volume on the oﬀer day is higher. My interpretation of this result is that
short sellers go against the rest of the market for IPOs that exhibit strong demand prior
to going public (their price is usually set above the initial price range).6 Over-allotment
amount also has a positive and statistically significant coeﬃcient. Underwriters have an
option to purchase additional shares from the issuer following the IPO (over-allotment
or “green shoe” option). They may cover the overallocation through the exercise of the
6See Hanley (1993) for reference.
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Table 3.12: Cross-section of Short Sale Volume on IPO Characteristics
The table below shows results from regressions in which the dependent variables are: short sale volume
excluding short exempt volume (aggregate reported share volume of executed short sale excluding short
exempt trades), short exempt volume (aggregate reported share volume of executed short exempt
trades) and total short sale volume (aggregate reported share volume of executed short sales and short
sales exempt trades). Only trades on the first trading day of the IPO are included, and are scaled by
100,000 shares. First-day return is defined as the percentage diﬀerence between the first-day closing
market price and the oﬀer price. Gross proceeds are in millions of dollars. Shares oﬀered are scaled by
100,000 shares. Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the market value of the company at the day
of the IPO. Issue price range is a dummy variable equal to 0 if the oﬀer price is set within the initial
price range, 1 if the oﬀer price is set above the initial price range and -1 if it is below the price range.
Over-allotment shares sold are scaled by 100,000 shares and over-allotment amount is in millions of
dollars. Negative price revision is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the oﬀer price was revised downwards
and 0 otherwise. Nasdaq dummy is set to 1 if the company was initially listed on the Nasdaq stock
exchange and 0 otherwise. Internet IPO dummy is equal to 1 if the IPO is categorized as an internet
firm on Jay Ritter’s webpage and 0 otherwise. Year of the IPO and 48 Fama and French industry fixed
eﬀects are included in all regressions.
Short Sale Volume
Short Exempt Volume Total Short Volume
Excluding Short Exempt
First-Day Return 0.0602*** 0.0005 0.0608***
(4.63) (1.50) (4.63)
Gross Proceeds -0.0064 0.0001 -0.0063
(1.22) (0.16) (1.20)
Shares Oﬀered 0.0213*** 0.0003* 0.0216***
(3.72) (1.81) (3.73)
Size (lnMV) -0.4706 -0.0096 -0.4803
(1.20) (0.87) (1.21)
Issue Price Range 2.5223*** 0.0414 2.5637***
(2.66) (1.56) (2.67)
Over-allotment Sold Shares -0.0469** 0.0005 -0.0463**
(2.35) (0.94) (2.30)
Over-allotment Amount 0.0936*** -0.0006 0.0929***
(2.89) (0.70) (2.84)
Negative Price Revision 2.6034** 0.0374 2.6407**
(1.98) (1.01) (1.99)
Nasdaq Dummy 1.3160* -0.0174 1.2986*
(1.69) (0.80) (1.65)
Internet IPOs Dummy 4.6663*** 0.0345 4.7008***
(3.56) (0.94) (3.55)
Intercept 1.7649 0.0999 1.8649
(0.23) (0.46) (0.24)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Industry (FF48) Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 610 610 610
Adj. R-squared 68.76% 10.17% 68.46%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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over-allotment option. Higher over-allocation also means a higher demand for the IPO.
This implies that short sellers go against the other market participants for IPOs with
strong demand. The internet IPO dummy is also positive and statistically significant.
Internet IPOs are considered to be hot issues with high demand. Short sellers are more
likely to short these types of IPOs.
One striking result is that the first-day return is positively related to the short sale
volume on the oﬀer day. IPOs with the highest first-day return are the ones that are
the most shorted on the oﬀer day. This finding is also confirmed by Edwards and
Hanley (2010). My interpretation of this result is that IPOs with the highest first-day
return are hot issues with high demand. These IPOs are overpriced by the market
at the end of the first trading day. Short sellers are more sophisticated than other
types of investors, and they go against the behavioral biases, such as overoptimism,
that surrounds hot issues in order to profit in the longer run. In the longer run, IPOs
with the highest first-day return underperform relative to the market and other IPOs,
as shown by Ritter (1991). I can conclude that, in the case of IPOs, short sellers are
contributing to eﬃcient stock prices in the longer run and presumbly are bringing prices
to their fundamental value. I examine the connection between the first-day return and
the short sale volume on the oﬀer day in more detail in the next sub-section, in order
to support my interpretation of the result.
3.6.1 First-Day Return and Short Selling Volume
Following the literature, I define the first-day return as the percentage diﬀerence be-
tween the first-day secondary market closing price and the oﬀer price.
First Day Return = First DayClosing Price O f f er PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100
A positive first-day return is a result of the following possibilities: either the oﬀer price
is set too low, the first-day closing market price is too high or both. In order to be able
to see which part is driving the first-day return and how it is connected to short sale
volume on the oﬀer day, I decompose the first-day return into two parts.
The first step is to find a measure of a “fair” price of the oﬀering. I compute the intrinsic
(fair) price of each IPO by finding the most similar industry peer (in terms of market
capitalization) that did not go public in the respective year. I am restricted to useing
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only price-to-sales ratios (P/S) because only sales figures are available for all companies.
For each matching firm I compute the P/S ratio as follows:
( PS )Match =
Market Price⇤Shares Outstanding
Prior Fiscal Year Sales ,
where the market price is the CRSP stock price for the matching firm at the close of
the respective IPO oﬀer date of the company.
The intrinsic (fair) value of each IPO is computed by multiplying the P/S ratio of the
industry peer with the prior year fiscal sales of the appropriate IPO:
Intrinsic Value = ( PS )Match ⇤ Sales(t 1) ,
while intrinsic price of the IPO is:
Intrinsic Price = Intrinsic ValueShares Outstanding .
I use the intrinsic (fair) price as a benchmark to compare the oﬀer price and the first-
day market price. I decompose the first-day return into its two drivers: oﬀer price
undervaluation (coming from a low oﬀer price) and market overpricing (coming from a
overoptimistic first-day closing market price):
O f f er PriceUndervaluation = Intrinsic Price O f f er PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100 ,
Market Overpricing = First DayClosing Price Intrinsic PriceO f f er Price ⇤ 100 .
Table 3.13 reports the average first-day return (row 1) and its two components (rows
2 and 3) for the full sample (column 1) and for the quartiles formed based on the short
sale volume on the oﬀer day that is subject to short sale restrictions (from column 2 to
column 5). All variables are winsorized at 1% in order to make sure that extreme values
of the distribution are not driving the results.7 Diﬀerences in the first-day return and its
two components between the heavily-shorted IPOs (quartile 4) and lightly-shorted IPOs
(quartile 1) are in column 6, while column 7 reports the t-statistics of these diﬀerences.
7Due to winsorizing the sum of oﬀer price undervaluation and market overpricing does not give





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The average first-day return increases with the short sale volume on the oﬀer
day. Heavily-shorted IPOs have the highest first-day return (averaging 30.84%), while
lightly-shorted IPOs are the ones with the lowest first-day return (only 1.19%).
The oﬀer prices of the IPOs in my sample are set on average 6.34% higher than their
industry peers, which is in line with the finding of Purnanandam and Swaminathan
(2004) that the median IPO was significantly overvalued relative to industry peers.
Heavily-shorted IPOs have oﬀer prices that are set more closely to their industry peers,
deviating by only 4.29%.
The close price on the first trading day deviates significantly from the industry
peers (on average by 21.87% for the entire sample), and is likely the driving force
behind the magnitude of the first-day return. This finding indicates that investors are
overoptimistic about new issues and exhibit a high demand for them. Heavily-shorted
IPOs have the highest overpricing relative to their industry peers (averaging 34.79%),
while lightly-shorted IPOs have the lowest deviation of the closing price on the first
trading day relative to their industry peers (average 12.15%). The diﬀerences between
the heavily-shorted IPOs and lightly-shorted IPOs are always statistically significant.
First Ritter and Welch (2002) and then Cornelli and Ljungqvist (2006) argue that
overoptimism among retail investors may explain the much-documented price jumps
once trading in newly listed stocks begins, as well as the subsequent low returns over
the longer run.
Since IPOs with the highest first-day returns are considered to be hot issues with
the highest demand, they are consequently overpriced by the market at the end of the
first trading day. As short sellers are more sophisticated than other retail investors,
they note the overpricing and go against the behavioral biases such as overoptimism
that surround hot issues in order to make profits on the longer run.
This finding is robust to the regression framework reported in Table 3.14. I regress
the short sale volume on the oﬀer day separately on the two components of the fist day
return: deviation of the oﬀer price relative to the industry peers (oﬀer price undervalu-
ation) and deviation of the closing first-day price relative to the industry peers (market
overpricing).
Short selling on the oﬀer day increases with the deviation of the closing first-day
trading price relative to the industry peers (market overpricing). The market overpric-
ing variable has a positive and statistically significant coeﬃcient, as reported in the
second column of Table 14. The deviation of the oﬀer price relative to the industry
peers (oﬀer price undervaluation) does not seem to influence short selling volume on
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Table 3.14: Cross-section of Short Sale Volume on Decomposed First-Day Return
The table shows results from a regression in which the dependent variables is short sale volume subject
to short sale restrictions on the oﬀer date scaled by 100,000 shares. In the first column the variable
of interest is the oﬀer price undervaluation defined as the percentage diﬀerence between the intrinsic
price and the oﬀer price, while in the second column the variable of interest is the market overpricing
defined as the percentage diﬀerence between the first-day closing market price and the intrinsic price.
Intrinsic price is computed as the value of the price-to-sales ratio of the most similar industry peer
(matched by market capitalization) on the IPO date multiplied by the sales of the respective IPO.
Controlling variables are diﬀerent IPO characteristics defined the same as in Table 12. Year of the
IPO and 48 Fama and French industry fixed eﬀects are included in all regressions.
Dependent Variable: Short Sale Volume




Gross Proceeds -0.0054 -0.0068
(1.01) (1.28)
Shares Oﬀered 0.0176*** 0.0190***
(3.05) (3.31)
Size (lnMV) -0.2554 -0.4059
(0.64) (1.02)
Issue Priced Range 4.1578*** 3.5007***
(4.63) (3.82)
Over-allotment Sold Shares -0.0393* -0.0365*
(1.92) (1.81)
Overallotment Amount 0.0924*** 0.0999***
(2.79) (3.05)
Negative Price Revision 3.7294*** 3.2726***
(2.83) (2.49)
Nasdaq Dummy 1.6410** 1.3757*
(2.07) (1.75)




Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Industry (FF48) Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes
Observations 610 610
Adj. R-squared 67.56% 68.12%
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;*** significant at 1%
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the oﬀer day. Its regression coeﬃcient is statistically insignificant, as reported in the
first column of Table 14.
To conclude, the results show that short sellers go against the sentiment of indi-
vidual investors, whose overoptimism about hot issues on the first trading day leads to
overpriced securities. This is an indication that short sellers are more sophisticated than
individual investors, picking overpriced IPOs on the oﬀer day and presumbly bringing
prices back to their fundamental values in the longer run.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper I examine short sale volume on the oﬀer day of initial public oﬀerings
(IPOs) and the IPOs’ subsequent performance. IPOs are major corporate events sur-
rounded by much noise and pricing ineﬃciencies. It is therefore of interest to know
whether short sellers possess superior information about the fundamentals of IPOs rel-
ative to other investors. To my best knowledge this paper is a first attempt to measure
the long-run performance of IPOs conditioned on short selling activity on the first trad-
ing day. Edwards and Hanley (2010) explore the short selling activity on the oﬀer day,
but their main focus is on the first-day return.
I find that short sellers of IPOs have a longer length of time between opening
and unwinding their positions relative to short sellers of other securities reported in
the previous literature. The approximate duration of the position in this sample of
IPOs is 100 trading days. IPO prices need more time to stabilize and return to the
fundamentals after the initial boost. The first-day return might not be a good measure
of IPO performances, so I focus more on the long-run performance of IPOs.
I find that short sale trades on the oﬀer day that are subject to short sale restrictions
under the Alternative Uptick Rule 201 are the most informative about subsequent
performance. Transactions that are exempted from the restrictions of this rule (such
as arbitrage of positions on option exchanges or foreign markets, hedging of derivatives
due within a few days and the syndicate short covering of IPOs) are not informative
about future long-run performance, because they are more short-term oriented and do
not necessarily anticipate future underperformance.
The main finding is that short sellers are well-informed about the fundamental
value of IPOs. Heavily-shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day underperform both relative to
lightly-shorted IPOs and relative to the overall market over a one-year window. On
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a risk-adjusted basis, when using the calendar time-series portfolio approach, heavily-
shorted IPOs on the oﬀer day underperform lightly-shorted IPOs by an average of nine
basis points daily (22.68% annualized return) and 1.72% monthly (20.64% annualized
return). These returns are also robust to alternative specifications of abnormal returns
(CARs and BHARs).
When using accounting measures such as net income, earnings per share and ROA
I find that accounting performance declines significantly in the quarter after the IPO
for companies that were the most shorted on the first trading day.
To support the main finding of this paper, I show that short sellers are sophisticated
investors that possess information about the fundamentals of IPOs and are at least
informed as analysts. Heavily-shorted IPOs receive the least favorable initiation of
analysts’ recommendations, which occur on average 28 trading days after the oﬀer day
in my sample. I further show that heavily-shorted IPOs have the highest predicted
probability of being downgraded by analysts within the first year after the IPO.
I explore which types of IPOs are subject to more short selling on the oﬀer day. I
provide evidence that short sellers are picking hot issues with high demand and high
first-day returns. Heavily-shorted IPOs are overpriced at the end of the first trading
day on average by 35% relative to their industry peers. Short sellers go against the
sentiment of individual investors for hot issues. This result indicates that short sellers
are more sophisticated than other investors and go against behavioral biases such as
overoptimism that surrounds hot issues in order to make profits in the longer run.
Overall, the results indicate that, on average, short sellers are sophisticated investors
who are well-informed regarding the fundamental value of IPOs and important contrib-
utors to eﬃcient stock prices. At the same time I also detect the existence of sizable
and persistent limits to arbitrage because price corrections of initial public oﬀerings
generally require six months to one year. A natural follow-up to this paper would be to
study the cost at which short sellers are applying their trading strategies on the oﬀer
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